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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to find out whether or not blues music is an event. I explore what
constitutes a musical or artistic event in modern times and to see how this has changed in relation
to earlier periods. I also identify its essential formal elements. I divide blues music into two
categories, namely, its technical playing qualities (the micro) and its historical changes (the
macro). This division frames the entire project and illustrates that in order to discuss an artistic
event, we must account for both its technical and historical aspects. I examine several theories of
the event including those of Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, and Martin Heidegger. While
Deleuzian events are common and happen at the most elemental stages in life, Badiou’s notion of
the event focuses on rare historical occurrences. Heidegger, by contrast, offers an ontological
look at the happening of artistic works. He claims that great works of art are happenings that tell
the viewer something about the culture from which they originated. However, Heidegger’s
theory falls short because of his exclusive consideration of static forms of art as well as his
distrust of technology. In response to Heidegger, I turn to the works of Walter Benjamin and
Theodor Adorno. Benjamin provides a theory about the importance of mechanical reproduction
and its effects on the work of art. While Adorno’s theory proposes that modern forms of music
are essentially non-events. Adorno’s critique of jazz (and popular music in general, including the
blues) comes from a misunderstanding of the importance of the medium on the general
population. I conclude that blues music is an event and that it cannot be considered outside of its
history as a musical form of reproduction. Ultimately, I will illustrate that the event of blues
music changes the way we consider artistic events as a whole.
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The Event of Blues Music - Introduction
Is blues music an event? This is the question I pursue in my dissertation. Although seemingly
broad, it seeks to answer much more than the question of blues music and its place within event
theory. By looking for an answer, I aim to explore what constitutes a musical or artistic event
and to see how it has been impacted by technological changes. I will look at the question about
the nature of events from several different viewpoints. The first will look at the history of blues
music to show how it has evolved and to name the essential elements that make up its playing
qualities. By doing so, I will divide blues music into two categories, namely, its technical playing
qualities (the micro) and its historical changes (the macro). Through this division I will illustrate
that if we are to explain its eventful qualities, blues music needs to be considered from both the
micro and the macro perspectives. I will start from the origins of blues music and discuss why
the blues was such an important break from traditional forms of music. From a technical
standpoint, blues music was known for its improvisational style that did not depend on written
notation. From a historical standpoint blues music was originally performed by African
Americans in the early twentieth century, but that changed in the middle of the century when it
began to appeal more to white audiences, which shifted its style dramatically. What I hope the
reader will learn from this chapter is that blues music has a complicated history in which its style
was influenced greatly by the individuals that played it.
The next step will be to look at several theories of the event in order to understand how
blues music can be considered an event and whether or not certain aspects of the blues are
events. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I will examine Gilles Deleuze’s and Alain Badiou’s thought
because their theories complement one another even though in some aspects they drastically
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differ. While Deleuzian events are common and happen at the most elemental stages in life,
Badiou’s notion of the event focuses on rare historical occurrences. These two theories are each
one part of the micro and macro division that I set out to explain throughout the entire project. I
conclude that it is not possible to consider the blues event in merely the micro or macro forms.
Both are needed if we are to understand artistic events at all, especially when it comes to blues
music and its intricate history. Deleuze’s theory gives us a method of discussing the micro events
of blues music, such as the “blue note” on a scale, or the minor variations we find in individual
playing styles. Badiou’s notion of the new, however, helps us understand why blues music was
an important deviation away from classical music.
Although Deleuze and Badiou each account for one aspect of the event, Martin
Heidegger’s approach offers an ontological look at the happening of artistic works. Chapter 3
will explore Heidegger’s theories on the happening of the work and how the event of art can only
be explained in its cultural context as a form of revealing of being. Heidegger believes that great
works of art are happenings that tell the viewer something about the culture from which they
originated. Thus, great works of art are events that bring-forth the being of a particular time and
place. Where Heidegger’s theory falls short is in his exclusive consideration of static forms of art
and lack of discussion on music, as well as his distrust of technology. Without a proper concern
of how being is exemplified through other forms of art such as music or film, we are left with
only a limited possibility for how truth can manifest itself in artistic form. Heidegger’s thesis that
technology limits the revealing of being loses an essential aspect of blues music history, namely
its recorded history and its place within the industry of music.
In response to Heidegger I turn to the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno in
Chapter 4. What Heidegger fails to discuss with mechanical reproduction, Benjamin addresses
2

by providing a theory about the importance of reproduction technology for various art forms.
However, once again I find this approach ultimately dissatisfying. This dissatisfaction is
expressed by a number of critics who claim that Benjamin failed to consider how the aura may
actually survive through reproduction. These authors open up conversations on the nature of
reproduction in music and what impact it has had on the industry and its participants. We will be
able to return to the issue of the micro and macro distinction by showing that blues history has
been influenced by the subtle differences in individual artists, made possible in large part due to
the advent of mechanical reproduction.
The final section of Chapter 4 provides an important critique of the culture industry and
its potential to use works of art as a means to control the population. It explores Adorno’s theory
that modern forms of music are essentially non-events. I argue that Adorno’s critique of jazz
(and popular music in general, including the blues) stems from a misunderstanding of the
potential effects that the medium can have on the listener. I draw the conclusion that blues music
as an event cannot be considered outside of its history as a musical form of reproduction. Ever
since blues music has been standardized, it has been recorded and its recording is what we know
to be truthful. Technology, through mechanical reproduction does not need to be a negative
aspect of blues history, and has in fact caused more exposure than ever previously possible.
Technological reproduction has split the event by taking away the limits of time and space and
blues music has developed parallel to this changing landscape. Ultimately, I will illustrate that
blues music is an event that should change the way in which we consider artistic events as a
whole. We can no longer consider artistic or musical events without considering the technologies
from which and in which they develop.
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Chapter 1 - Blues Music History
The history of blues music cannot be separated from the social, economic and cultural living
conditions of those who performed and created it. As William Barlow states, “The blues tradition
is therefore interwoven with the social conditions, concerns, conflicts, and shifts in
consciousness among working-class African Americans.”1 Although we will see that blues music
has had many contributors, its origins are primarily African. The task of this chapter will be to
look at this history as well as the technical aspects of the music itself to better understand the
music from both a technical and cultural standpoint. Just as an event is not merely a series of
technical occurrences or happenings, neither are the complex qualities of art or music. This
chapter is meant to be an introduction into the varying aspects of the blues, including the people
who have been part of its history. The methodology of this chapter will be to look at some blues
historians that have discussed various themes throughout the history of blues music. Although it
would be impossible to go into depth for each one of these themes, I will discuss a wide breadth
of topics in order to illustrate the complexity of this cultural phenomenon. My hopes are that this
will lay the foundation for the chapters to come so that the reader has a general understanding of
blues music theory and its history.

Origins
The primary location for the beginning of this study is the southern part of the United States.
Places such as Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, Tennessee and Louisiana, all play an important part
in the early development of blues music. It was this region that for a couple of centuries was
referred to as the “Cotton Belt.” Although life for most African Americans around the country
1

William Barlow, Looking Up at Down: The Emergence of Blues Culture. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1989), XII
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was very difficult, life in this area is of particular importance for this study. Because cotton was
such an important commodity to those areas, plantation owners required a vast amount of labour,
often using slaves. Slave owners de-humanized African Americans in a number of ways, which
justified their use of slaves in the labour force. The value of slaves was based solely on how
much they could work, or in the case of many females, how many children they could bear in
order to continue generational slavery.
One of slavery’s most devastating effects was robbing Africans of their identity and
grouping them into a homogenous mass, so that they would no longer identify with their cultural
origins. However, the complete annihilation of cultural identity was impossible. We find the
earliest folk songs were done in groups and acted out in solidarity. It was a matter of achieving
personal freedom over salvation, thus many early folk songs were a secular form of music. It
became common for groups of slaves to sing in the fields, participating in either field hollers, or
work songs.2 The latter was a group performance in the form of a call and response, in which one
singer would sing a verse and then it would be repeated either identically or with some small
variations by the rest of the group. Field hollers also sometimes followed this formula, but were
mostly done as solo performances.3 These songs were meant to be a form of sorrowful
expression and were one of the few means by which African Americans could communicate with
one another. Other kinds of work songs used to voice displeasure, or to communicate during
work, included arhoolies (a style without instruments that consisted of whoops, hollers, cries and
arhoolies as they were called) and ballads as well. All these styles would later contribute to the
formation of rural folk blues. These songs were done in communal settings, even if performed by

2
3

Barlow, 17-18.
Giles Oakley, The Devil’s Music: A History of the Blues. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), 37.
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a single person.4 There was often a purpose to each kind of song which gave them meaning
beyond entertainment value. The blues began to grow in popularity as more communal
gatherings began to form. Blues was at its base a social, rather than solitary form of music that
gave people a voice when they needed one. As we will see, this social aspect is what many critics
will say is lacking in white musicians that overtook the blues scene in the 1960s. Whereas
African American musicians sang because they felt a need to communicate with one another
about their hardships, white musicians were criticized for appropriating the blues for their
personal experiences, but could never convey any sense of communal or racial oppression in the
same manner. The blues and early folk music gave African Americans an opportunity to practice
their own culture away from the influence of slave, or land owners. Blues music is a perfect
example, as it is a purely aural/oral tradition, an important aspect of many African cultures.
Unlike some of the songs that are produced for entertainment value, many of these songs were
made for the purpose of human interaction. During the long working hours either on cotton or
sugar plantations, this was one of the few times when the voices of the oppressed could be heard.
This cultivated sentiments of solidarity that would not have otherwise been possible in complete
silence.
I do not want to overstate the role of these songs in the formation of symbiotic
relationships among workers, there were other times when African Americans could interact
with one another. However, I want to emphasize the formation of a cultural happening that
would later contribute to the creation of blues music. As Oakley writes, “The blues has always
functioned as a form of cultural expression which not only provided real pleasure and uplifting
entertainment, but also helped enable significant numbers of black people to negotiate their own

4
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sense of identity.”5 The blues was an expression of cultural values that was personal in nature
and inaccessible to whites. It was one of the few things that African Americans could claim to be
their own and stemmed from a common struggle. Despite having languages that were distinct
from their captors, music became another form of personal expression that was created and
played by African Americans, which allowed traditions from the past to live on and created new
ones to pass down for generations.
During this time, other forms of music that included African Americans began to
develop, sometimes positive, while other times they perpetuated negative stereotypes. The
positive forms of music came during camp meetings near the end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. As David Hatch and Stephen Millward explain, the
meetings were interracial religious gatherings in which different styles of music would be shared.
Because of the influence of African styles, religious music took on a tone previously unheard.
There were various types of shouts, chants and rhythms practiced during the singing of these
religious songs.6 These gatherings were the early origins of not only blues, but also gospel music.
The two styles developed parallel to each other and oftentimes it was not clear which style was
being played, because of the lack of standardization in both genres. Early gospel was very
similar to blues, as it depended on simple patterns, often improvised and not written down. This
oral practice was indicative of many styles during the time and resulted in a lack of
standardization and replication. Each performance could be thought of as a unique occurrence
that could never be identically replicated, even if two performances were similar. Part of the

5
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reason why blues music was unique was that each performance was new and fresh, never relying
on a standard set of notations given to the performer.
On the other end of the spectrum, not all forms of early folk music were positive.
Minstrel shows were a form of live entertainment in which performers (mostly white) would
dress up in black face and imitate what they believed to be various characteristics of African
Americans. As one can imagine, these performances were based on negative stereotypes that
were created and perpetuated by the white population. In the 1840s, characters were created that
were meant to portray the average African American male. Some of these characters included the
black simpleton, Zip Coon, Jim Crow and the Negro dandy, the latter was a portrayal of an
African American who tried to behave and dress like a white person.7 African Americans would
sometimes participate in these shows as a means to earn money. Later in the century, African
Americans developed their own version of “Coon Songs” (a derivative of minstrel shows), which
was a way of recapturing their identity. If audiences wanted to see black stereotypes, then some
African Americans thought they could earn money themselves rather than allow whites to
continue exploiting their image.8 Although it perpetuated black stereotypes, some saw it as a way
of empowering black voices by allowing them to control their own narrative. Despite the
controversy, Coon songs were one of the first organized forms of black entertainment and later
used ragtime inspired music, which was also a primarily black form of music.9
Despite the abolition of slavery in 1865, most African Americans continued to live in
poverty. Over the course of the next century, progress would be made towards the civil rights

7

Giles Oakley, The Devil’s Music: A History of the Blues. (New York: De Capo Press, 1997), 22.
& Dick Weissman, Blues: The Basics. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 14.
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movement, but this progress was slow. Although technically free by law, most African
Americans would live in a system that was designed to keep them in the poorest classes. Few had
enough money to buy their own land or property, forcing many to take out loans that would
essentially keep them in perpetual servitude to the land owners. Sharecropping10 and farm
tenancy replaced slave plantations, but with very little effect on the African American economic
situation. Everything, including the land, the materials, and the equipment was on loan at high
interest. Even when profits could be made by working the land, all the money went back to
repaying the loans. Along with the economic aspects, various social complexities began after
slave liberation. African Americans were no longer forced into arbitrary groups and were able to
experience more social mobility. As we shall see, the music of the blues reflects that mobility.
For the first time, African Americans were able to travel around the country and experience the
world outside of their small communities. That does not imply that their lives became easier, but
things certainly began to change. What once could only be imagined (the idea of autonomous
movement throughout the country), was now becoming a real possibility. It also allowed for the
possibility to create real communities and not ones that were forced upon them by plantation
owners.
Shortly after, new forms of music began to emerge primarily from African American
communities, including what are known today as jazz, ragtime and the blues. Ragtime emerged
in the 1890s and would later influence boogie woogie.11 Giles Oakley describes the music as
melancholic with an addition of a left hand bass on piano.12 Along with the more melodic forms

10

Sharecropping occurs when the land owner allows a tenant to use their land in exchange for a share of the
harvested crops.
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Oakley, 32.
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of music, some of the first songs published were spirituals that were about escaping bondage.13
But this turn in mobility and activity sparked the genre that is the matter at hand; blues music.
For African Americans, life was not easy at the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, Dick
Weissman calls the period from 1890-1920 one of “maximum oppression,” in which we saw
sharecropping, lynching and raping of African Americans.14 It is not surprising that the blues
developed out of this period. Despite already having developed other forms of music, there was
no music like the blues that presented the African American situation better. Julia Simon
characterizes the blues by its spontaneity, immediacy, feeling and its ability to stay in the
moment, an idea agreed upon by David Evans who says blues music expresses “a remarkable
sense of immediacy.”15 Simon explains that the carpe diem sentiment often expressed in blues
music stems from the socioeconomic conditions experienced by its performers, who often felt as
though they had no future prospects.16 This sense of immediacy is not only expressed through
lyrics, but in blues music’s improvisational character, in which the musician has the freedom to
choose their own path. But to explain blues music in more detail requires a more technical
understanding of how it set itself apart from other forms of music.

The Beginning of Blues Standardization
After discussing the time period from which it developed, we have yet to explore the technical
aspects of blues music. An interesting feature of the blues is that it does not have a clear origin
and there is no definition of the blues as such. Several authors including Michael Neumann and
Tom Lamont have noted the varying influences on early African and blues music. Neumann
13

Weissman, 13.
Weissman, 2.
15
JuliaSimon, Time in the Blues. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), XI. &
David Evans, “The Development of the Blues.” In The Cambridge Companion to Blues and Gospel Music.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20.
16
Simon, 29.
14
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suggests that Arab music made its way into Africa which influenced early blues.17 Lamont
documented the blues and compared it to Egyptian “Sira Hilaliyya,” saying they have similarities
in how they deal with life (particularly when dealing with the ruling order) and their origins are
from poor African communities.18 Authors Hatch and Millward admit that the blues is a vague
term that is not easily defined.19 For example, country blues, minstrel songs, and jazz all have
songs with twelve bar structures. In their search for a definition of the blues, Wade Fox and
Richard Greene cite Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, in which a few members have
similar qualities that are evident, but not necessarily on a conscious level.20 To be considered a
“blues song,” a piece should contain a number of standard musical features, without necessarily
having all of them at once. In defining the blues, we also need to account for emotional tone,
which cannot necessarily be defined technically and certainly cannot be conveyed accurately in
written form. Interestingly, as we will see in the next section, hillbilly and folk music tend to
have more sorrowful themes than the blues. This may seem counterintuitive, but blues music is
not strictly meant to be sad and depressing and even has a history of comedic elements. Although
thematically the blues keeps pain at the forefront, it is ultimately about feeling better.21 The blues
can be emancipating, through its themes of defiance, change and hope. Therefore, if we are
going to find a definition for the blues, we must investigate as many of its qualities as possible.
Thus far, I have discussed some of the historical circumstances that gave birth to blues
music, but now need to explain some of the technical aspects of the music itself. The blues is a
musical style based around African folk music with an emphasis on strong downbeats. These
17

Michael Neumann, “Distributive History: Did Whites Rip-Off the Blues.” In Blues Philosophy For Everyone:
Thinking Deep About Feeling Low. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 178.
18
Robert Switzer, “Signifying the Blues.” ALIF: Journal of Comparative Poetics (2001): 27-28.
19
Hatch & Millward, 35.
20
Wade Fox & Richard Greene. “Twelve-Bar Zombies: Wittgensteinian Reflections on the Blues”. In Blues
Philosophy For Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling Low. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 32.
21
Switzer, 25-26.
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beats are countered with rhythmic inflections. There is also a building and falling of emotion
through scales. With the addition of “blue notes” to scales, a rising tension builds throughout the
song, and then is countered by a falling pitch. As William Barlow explains, “The use of blue
notes was at the heart of the blues sound, they gave it its subversive character, a dissonance
instantly recognizable in both vocals and instrumental renderings.”22 Blue notes on the 3rd and 7th
notes of a scale are considered to take on an in-between sound that is not quite major or minor in
tone. On their own, blue notes have very little impact, but when they are placed in a blues scale
they have a unique sound. Thus, it is an event that must be heard to be appreciated. Standard
blues songs also have a tension in the chord progression, which adds to the rising and falling
quality of its sound. There is no one definitive form of blues, but these qualities are often part of
what we know from twentieth century blues music. However, many different styles of songs
have been called blues over the years, even in the beginning of its recorded history.
The first composer to copyright the word blues was a white violinist named Hart Wand in
1912, with his song “Dallas Blues.” However, Francis Davis claims the first song to be a blues
song is “Oh, You Beautiful Doll” which was published in 1911, with a twelve bar opening.23
This is important because many blues songs are based on the twelve bar format, in which all the
chords are played in a twelve bar progression and then repeated. Although during this time jazz
and what we will later call “folk blues” developed parallel to each other, jazz musicians often
departed from the standard twelve-bar format and altered its harmonic progression in various
ways. When jazz musicians did play twelve bar blues, it was often played in b flat rather than
natural E and A which were preferred by blues musicians.24 Blues tended more towards major

22

Barlow, 325.
Francis Davis, The History of the Blues. (New York: Hyperion, 1995), 58-59.
24
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chords, using the I, IV, and V chords within the major scale. This numbering system is based
around a one octave scale in which the musician begins with the tonic note (I), then moves to the
sub-dominant (IV), back to the tonic, to the dominant (V), back to the sub-dominant and finally
moves back to the tonic in the end. The effect of this progression is that it creates a rising tension
and then a release in a relatively short amount of time. It is worth noting that having a blues
chord progression does not necessarily mean that it is a blues song. For example, many of Chuck
Berry’s songs have this familiar progression, but are not blues songs as such. This point
exemplifies the difficulty of trying to define the blues as such. In blues music these chord
progressions coincided with a three-verse pattern that can be answered each time with a short
response by the guitar. By the time blues became synonymous with folk styles in the late 1920s,
the blues lyrical structure changed from iambic heptameter, to pentameter in order to allow for
guitar response.25 Although this format became popular, it took over a generation to develop
after some of the first songs were recorded.
Returning briefly to its story of origin, there is no musician we can definitively say was
the first to create blues music. There is a story that is known to many about the “first time” a
person ever heard the blues. I have pieced together this story from several blues historians who
have re-told their versions.26 The story is of W.C. Handy (an African American musical
composer), who happened to hear a style of music he had never heard before at a train station. It
was a man playing a guitar and using a knife blade as a slide to produce a unique sound.27 The
man repeated one verse three times with a basic three chord progression. There is no way we can
confirm that this was the first blues song ever played, but it was certainly an important event in

25
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blues history as it would inspire Handy’s “The Memphis Blues” in 1912, another one of those
songs that is considered to be the one of the first official blues numbers.28
Many other early songs have the word “blues” in them, but this was only titular.
According to Francis Davis, the song “Crazy Blues” by Mamie Smith in 1920 is more of a pop
song than a blues song, and the same can be said about W.C. Handy’s “The Memphis Blues.”29
Despite the fact that these songs are synonymous with blues culture, listeners would be hardpressed to call them blues songs. However, Handy’s song stands apart from all others for several
reasons. The first was that Handy was one of the first people to see commercial possibility in
blues music. In publishing his songs, Handy set the standard for blues music in compositional
form. Whereas most musicians within the same genre were players or performers, Handy was
also a composer of music, which allowed him to set a standard for others to follow. With this
ability, Handy used fragments of folk songs to create polished material.30 “The Memphis Blues”
had a twelve bar structure and relied on a three chord progression. Both of these features are
staples in most standard blues songs. For better or for worse, this was the first time that blues
music became standardized in a formal way.
This standardized form would be highly influential on the rural blues musicians of the
1930s. However, the blues in the 1910s, 20s, and after WWII were very different. In the early
1920s, the blues were actually identified with African American women more than any other
group. As noted above, “Crazy Blues” was another important variation of blues recorded in
1920. Although Davis hesitates to call it blues, the song has historical import on a number of
levels. It sold 75,000 copies, making it the most successful “blues” record up to that date and
28
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equally important, it was performed by an African American woman.31 Despite missing the
typical structure and harmonic progression of a standard blues song, “Crazy Blues” ushered in a
new era of female blues singers in the 1920s. Ma Rainey and Memphis Minnie were two other
female singers that were well known blues singers during this time. However, there is
controversy whether or not they were truly blues singers or if they used the blues as part of their
larger act. They would all sing blues songs, but they had large orchestras and almost never wrote
the songs themselves. As Oakley argues, female blues singers had a reputation of playing
contrived music that was too close to vaudeville.32 Hence, there is a reason why female blues
singers of the 1920s have been overlooked by many blues historians. Oakley believes that female
blues singers had as much of an influence on blues music as any of their male counterparts.
Despite the success of these female singers, the vaudeville style would not last for long.
By the end of the 1920s, the stock market crashed and vaudeville lost its popularity. A lack of
economic support for vaudeville developed and female blues singers were the first to suffer the
effects. During the depression, the cost of recording music began to be a factor and one of the
cheapest forms of music became southern blues music. With no need for backup singers,
orchestras, or songwriters, the solo bluesman became much more popular, which hurt female
singers, the majority of whom lost popularity in the 1930s. Despite a downturn in record sales
because of the depression, by the end of the 1930s, blues could be heard across the United States,
helped greatly by the advent of jukeboxes and African American-oriented radio programs. By
1932, a number of record companies had consolidated, which led to what David Evans calls an
“assembly line approach to blues recording.”33 Companies began to look for artists that could
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sing, play and write their own music. The history of black blues music has always been tied to
the economic situation of its performers, and this was a primary example. Moreover, the
beginning of standardized forms of blues music coincided with the pressures of industry and the
technologies that came with it.

Delta and Piedmont Blues
As one era of blues ended, another began. By the late 1920s, several regions began developing
and recording their own style of blues. Two main regions, the Delta and Piedmont areas were the
main centres of blues music during this time. Texas and Memphis were two other important
areas that will be discussed in this section. As we recall, W.C. Handy’s “Memphis Blues” was
crucial to the standardization of blues music. Although the female singers of the 1920s adopted
some of these aspects of the blues, the Delta and Piedmont players did it to a much greater
degree. Many of the songs had twelve bars structures, three stanzas in an AAB pattern, and relied
on the I, IV, and V chords from the major scale. Although there were many exceptions, this was
by far the most common form of blues during this time, particularly in the Delta region.
As Delta blues began, it was actually a break with the older styles in the South. The
guitar and harmonica replaced the fiddle and the banjo.34 The slide guitar was also able to
recreate the arhoolies sound. With a renewed emphasis on the singular performer, bluesmen
developed personae in their performances such as “the trickster.” These personae were ways in
which various bluesmen could use their imaginations in song and in performance. The characters
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created often embraced their vices and were meant to be relatable to the average person.35 The
flaws of each performer were celebrated, which gave the music a sense of realism that connected
with the audience. No one was expected to be perfect, which was indicative of everyday life. The
artists were revealing something about everyday life and the way people lived. Blues took on a
tone that resonated with the average person, something which was evidenced by its humble
structure and lyrical qualities.
A number of singers became more politically and socially relevant when their songs
discussed more than just personal themes. It is often the case that those who suffer the most
during difficult economic times are the ones that have the least, and this was very much the case
during the 1929 market crash. African Americans often lost their jobs from their places of
employment before anyone else and were hired last.36 The same happened with economic relief,
which went to whites first. The themes of poverty and systematic racism could be heard in
various blues songs, as they related to everyday life. This was in stark contrast to the blues from
the 1920s sung by female artists, who rarely mentioned political troubles, instead focusing on
more personal problems. Although male blues singers also sang about their own personal issues,
Delta blues players generally discussed more pressing political and social issues of the time.
Charley Patton from Mississippi was known for his social commentary, including being one of
many artists to sing about the 1927 flood of the Mississippi basin in “High Water Everywhere,”
as well as the 1929 Delta drought in “Dry Well Blues.” That said, Bessie Smith also sang about
the 1927 Mississippi floods in “Back Water Blues,” so there were some socially relevant themes
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during the vaudeville era. Songs about the boll weevil (an insect that came to Texas in the 1890s)
were also popular. The insect reached Mississippi by 1915 and wreaked havoc among farmers.37
Several other themes also cropped up during this time. One of the most well known
myths from the time was based on meeting the Devil at the crossroads. The legend asserts that at
midnight at a deserted crossroad, the Devil appears in the form of a man. The Devil will then
tune your guitar and give you the ability to play in exchange for your soul. Among the first to
exploit this myth was blues musician Tommy Johnson from Mississippi. This same story was
later echoed by another Delta bluesman named Robert Johnson (no relation), but his story
became even more legendary because of his seemingly sudden emergence as a talented guitarist.
One of his most famous songs was “Crossroad Blues,” where he explains this encounter:
I went to the crossroad
fell down on my knees
I went to the crossroad
fell down on my knees
Asked the Lord above "Have mercy, now
save poor Bob, if you please
Mmmmm, standin' at the crossroad
I tried to flag a ride
Standin' at the crossroad
I tried to flag a ride
Didn't nobody seem to know me
everybody pass me by
Mmm, the sun goin' down, boy
dark gon' catch me here
oooo ooee eeee
boy, dark gon' catch me here
I haven't got no lovin' sweet woman that
love and feel my care
You can run, you can run
tell my friend-boy Willie Brown
37
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You can run, you can run
tell my friend-boy Willie Brown
Lord, that I'm standin' at the crossroad, babe
I believe I'm sinkin' down38
As Barlow notes, the crossroads come from an African tale from the Yoruba people. He states
that in “Yoruban folklore, a crossroads symbolizes the junction between the physical and the
spiritual worlds, the human and the divine, where mortals sought out the god Legba in order to
learn their fate.”39 For Barlow, this is an important form of defiance by African Americans
against white hegemony. The combination of African and Christian folklore provided a modern
interpretation of life for many African Americans during the time. Although Johnson used the
Devil in his songs, this Devil is clearly the Christianized reincarnation of Legba in these tales,
which preserves the African folk tale but in a modern form. In many ways, African American
communities were at a crossroads themselves as they tried to navigate the “free” world, but with
very little to their names.
These songs illustrate another important theme related to the crossroads, which is life
beyond the everyday. In order to escape the everyday realities that most people faced, the blues
took on themes of a better life away from the South. Similar thematically to gospel songs that
discussed salvation and liberation, the blues discussed a life outside the world in which the artists
grew up, but rather than Jordan, the new Promised Land was the North. As one of the earliest
Delta bluesmen, Charley Patton’s work expressed what William Barlow calls a desire for a
reality beyond the every day.40 This was typical of many Delta blues legends who wanted to
escape their immediate surroundings. Barlow points to “Pony Blues” and “Going to Move to

38

Crossroad Blues Lyrics.
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MUSIC/blues/crb.html (accessed March 20th, 2017)
39
Barlow, 49.
40
Barlow, 37.

19

Alabama” as examples of the desire for social mobility. Robert Johnson also spoke about social
mobility in even more of his songs, including the blues staples, “Sweet Home Chicago,”
“Rambling on My Mind,” and “Walking Blues.”These songs contributed to the growing desire to
leave the South for various reasons.41
By 1922, the row tractor decreased the demand for workers in the South. Although
sharecropping was still common in the South in the 1930s, with 44% of African American
farmers participating,42 by the 1930s, African Americans began to migrate north in significant
numbers. While the cotton industry began to dwindle, the mechanical production of arms and
other work developed in the North. These conditions are tied to the social mobility of which
many bluesmen spoke during this same period. For them it was not simply a matter of arbitrarily
leaving their homes, but as a means to finding a better life. This had profound effects on black
culture and music, and changed the demographics of the United States. Chicago became a
popular destination for many African Americans, because of its accessibility by rail from the
South. It also had a history of accepting freed and runaway slaves prior to liberation. Lastly,
Chicago was home to a well known black culture newspaper called the “Defender,” which drew
national attention and was one of the few papers where African Americans were the target
audience.43 As we will see in the next section, this became one of the new centres for an updated
blues sound.
But before we move on to discuss Chicago and more urban blues, there are a few more
things we need to take away from this era of blues music. Returning briefly to the discussion of
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lyrical themes, Giles Oakley explains that the principal theme of the blues is sexual relationships.
He states,
Almost all other themes, leaving town, train rides, work trouble, general
dissatisfaction sooner or later reverts to the central concern. Most frequently the
core of the relationship is seen as inherently unstable, transient, but with infinite
scope for pleasure and exultation in success, or pain and torment in failure. This
gives blues its tension and ambiguity, dealing simultaneously with togetherness
and loneliness, communion and isolation, physical joy and emotional anguish.44
This is perhaps the best description of the blues. It always has this tension that resides at the
surface and is exemplified both lyrically and tonally. Often times these problems are dealt with
in a humorous or ironic manner, rather than melancholy.
I think one of the biggest misconceptions of the blues is that many people feel as though
the blues must be sad and depressing. This cannot be further from the truth. If you study the
lyrics and even listen to many blues songs, you will find a lot of irony and humour in the lyrics
and the tone of the music often matches this feeling found in the lyrics. Irony was often used as a
mechanism to overcome the grim realities that many people faced. The blues was often much
more humorous and ironic than most people think. Take for example the lyrics of Robert
Johnson from “Malted Milk”:
Malted milk, malted milk, keep rushin’ to my head
Malted milk, malted milk, keep rushin’ to my head
And I have a funny, funny feelin’ and I'm talkin’ all out my head45
In this example, Johnson is clearly not talking about malted milk, but rather alcohol and how it is
beginning to affect his senses. This song illustrates the type of humour present in many blues
songs from the time. In hearing the song, the listener knows the artist is singing in jest and the
44

Oakley, 55.
Malted Milk Lyrics
https://genius.com/Robert-johnson-malted-milk-lyrics (Accessed March 22nd, 2017)
45

21

tone of the guitar matches his voice. Again, the fact that the song is not played in a minor key,
contributes to the tone of the entire song.
After looking at the various qualities of folk blues, we have yet to discuss one of its most
significant aspects, which was its improvisatory nature. The blues was no longer meant to be
played in a large group that was rehearsed and planned out with technical detail. The
improvisatory nature of the blues (and in jazz) represented more than an attempt to redefine how
music can be played; through improvisation the artists tried to convey their release from social
constraints and their freedom to express themselves as individuals. However, because there was
improvisation, there was also a lot of borrowing of verses and chord progressions from one artist
to another. There was often no record of who wrote certain songs, as they simply came to be
known as part of the canon. This was one of the many drawbacks of not having recorded history.
Texas bluesman Henry Thomas borrowed from various minstrel songs, to create a mix of blues
and traditional sounds, leading Oakley to say, “This is a characteristic of many blues, the lashing
together of lines or verses often almost totally unrelated to form an impressionist sweep and
linked only by the overall mood of the song.”46 This process of borrowing creates a tension
between individual performers and the tradition. Julia Simon explains that with improvisation
comes a whole set of traditions that is not merely a matter of individual expressions, but rather a
set of culturally determined values.47 This tension plays out as a kind of dialectic in which the
individual is free to pursue his or her own style, while adhering to the tradition.48
Because of the constant borrowing of songs in blues music, it became difficult to identify
a single composer for some songs. Authors Hatch and Millward note that singers such as Blind
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Lemon Jefferson used what are called “stock phrases” in many of his songs, meaning that he
borrowed parts of songs from other artists he knew and used them in his own recordings.49
Simon uses similar language when she refers to the blues tradition as a “virtual stock house”
from which artists borrow lyrics, chords and progressions.50 Jefferson and many of his
contemporaries used this method in their recordings because of the simple and repetitive
structure of the blues. Other songs such as “Minglewood Blues,” or “Roll and Tumble Blues,”
were recorded thirty times over a span of forty years in different styles and varieties.51 Similarly,
Robert Johnson’s famous “Sweet Home Chicago” was influenced by Kokomo Arnold’s “Old
Original Kokomo Blues,” which was a nod to Scrapper Blackwell’s “Kokomo Blues.” Even a
versatile and original songwriter like Robert Johnson borrowed different material to suit his own.
What makes borrowing even more important is the influence that Johnson’s song has had on the
history of popular blues. Known by many enthusiasts as a blues standard, “Sweet Home
Chicago’s” influence can be traced back rather easily, yet most people associate it with Robert
Johnson.
Simon makes an important point on composition and performance, in which she
references David Evans who states that they are often one and the same, as each time a song is
performed, it is new. Although Evans claims this applies only to folk blues, Simon makes the
case that vaudeville blues also has this quality.52 In either case, the improvisatory and loose style
that blues music has makes it one of its most important and distinguishing factors. Rather than
depending on a set of notes, performers were free to produce their own versions of songs without
necessarily replaying every note exactly. In a discussion on the oral and textual tradition in
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music, Robert Switzer states, “What matters is not ‘texts’ and not ‘artifacts,’ but lived (and
originally, ‘live’) performative events.”53 The oral blues tradition undercuts the textual tradition
that is exemplified in Western classical music. Blues music therefore, ushered in a new and
exciting form of musical expression and to a great degree changed the way we must consider a
musical event. Works became independent of their composition and the work was expressed
more in the moment than ever. The temporal setting became crucial to how we experience a
musical event, because of how it may deviate from one artist to another. As I will demonstrate
below, these events became increasingly difficult to pinpoint when we add technological
mediation to the equation. For now, I would like the reader to note the important shift from
standard composition to improvisation.
Before concluding this section, I would like to briefly examine some of the other styles
present in the South during this time. In our previous discussion of camp meetings, I noted that
they were often interracial and led to the development of gospel and blues music. Both of these
styles impacted later hillbilly music in the 1920s as well. Blues and country blues in the 1920s
were very similar in tone and structure. Although not as popular as Delta blues, another form of
blues that is not discussed as much today is “Piedmont Blues;” a form that was influenced
greatly by ragtime. Piedmont styles were much less intense and emotional. Life in the south-east
was comparatively less difficult than in the Deep South, which was reflected in the music. The
Piedmont area also had white musicians playing more classic folk style blues. Other forms of
blues included Memphis Jug Bands which had more ensembles. This resulted in a more complete
sound that was not reliant upon a solo artist with a guitar.54 Lyrically, themes of poverty
continued, but were now related to more urban settings. Memphis also had more “traditional”
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forms of blues with singular artists, but had broader influences that came from areas across the
South. All these styles contributed greatly to the general narrative of blues music during this
time. Although they varied from one another in different ways, they were generally composed
and sung by African American musicians. There were some influential white singers such as
Jimmie Rodgers, a singer which will be discussed later, but by the time Robert Johnson was
playing, blues and country music began to diverge and it became clear which race was associated
with what music.55 Thus, the issue of borrowing from the tradition became much more
contentious when we present different races and cultures into the situation. While Delta
musicians were almost exclusively African American, this was not the case in other parts of the
South. In the next several sections, we will see how these issues changed the face of the blues
and how it developed.

Urban Blues and the Advent of Rock n’ Roll
The main centre for urban blues after WWII was Chicago. With the urban migration in full
swing, African Americans were now moving north in greater numbers. To put it into more
concrete numbers, six and a half million African Americans migrated north between 1910 and
1970. 56 By WWII, half of the African American population lived in urban centres; this is in
contrast to less than 20% in 1900.57 The shift in demographics meant there was a shift in culture,
particularly in music. Despite the growing popularity of what would be called “race records,”
popular music was still dominated by white musicians, but this would soon change. The blues
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was also impacted greatly by this shift, as cities such as Detroit, Indianapolis, St. Louis and
Chicago all began to develop their own blues sounds.
The most important musicians from the time were Muddy Waters, Elmore James, Willie
Dixon, Howlin’ Wolf, John Lee Hooker and B.B. King. What made urban blues unique was not
necessarily the instruments they used, but how they used them. Although not an entirely new
technique, these musicians amplified the blues which changed the blues dynamic forever. It was
no longer about the solo musician with an acoustic guitar, but an entire band usually consisting
of a guitar, electric bass, drums and possibly a harmonica. With its broader and louder sound,
Chicago blues was known for its amplification which was well suited for the roar of the city.58 In
loud clubs, musicians would struggle to be heard, so this was a perfect solution. Although
vaudeville blues musicians often had full backing bands, the new style of urban blues was
different. Prior to amplification, guitars were not really considered a soloing instrument. They
were often drowned out by horn sections in ensembles and provided a harmony. But with
amplification, the guitar could be the focal point even in a large band, which shifted the centre of
attention to the singer/guitarist and not just the singer.
Thematically, songs stayed very much the same, but with a more urban-centric focus.
However, no matter where the musicians lived, everyday problems continued to be at the
forefront of the blues. But, the Chicago sound was much different than the Delta or Piedmont
styles. It was louder and in many ways sounded much more rugged because of amplification. 59
The singers themselves also changed their technique. Although no one would call singers like
Robert Johnson reserved, other singers such as Charley Patton, or Blind Lemon Jefferson were
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certainly much quieter in their delivery; this would no longer be the case in Chicago blues. Many
songs were now belted out with the full raspiness of tone on display. Again, this was a way of
matching the loudness of the full band and changed how the blues sounded. Of course, there
would be backlash against this type of sound.
Taste in music began to change quickly by the 1950s, as there was a mood for change
after the war. An example of this was when Muddy Waters decided to play the electric guitar in
1958 during a concert in England and was criticized for playing an “inauthentic” form of blues.
Authenticity in this case meant playing rural style blues with only a single acoustic guitar. The
next year, he decided to return and play on a Spanish guitar and once again faced criticism, this
time for playing music that was deemed to be out of date.60 Ross Cole explains that this shift was
part of a greater debate about blues authenticity and the changing demographics of blues
listeners.61 This shift is a key point in popular tastes and perception of how “real” blues was
meant to be played. The theme of authenticity would soon become a major issue in blues and
other forms of music and is an important one for this work. However, before I explore it further,
I want to continue outlining the changing landscape in music during this period.
Once the blues sound became amplified, it began to appeal to a younger and more active
audience. Popular music was becoming more engaging and record companies soon began to
realize its commercial potential. Musicians who grew up listening to the blues also began to
explore new options that were blues hybrids such as rhythm and blues, rock n’ roll and other
forms of pop. Styles such as rockabilly performed by Chuck Berry and Eddie Cochrane among
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others, was a blues oriented country style of music. Berry and Cochrane borrowed from white
musicians, adapting southern country music to create rockabilly. Songs like “Milkcow Blues” by
Cochrane and “Maybellene” by Berry, are perfect examples. The former is an important example
because Cochrane added a riff to the song, which gives the song a distinct new sound. Rhythm
and blues in general did not use the twelve bar structure and began using choruses, something
which was not seen in blues. This was part of the shift towards a broader appeal. By the late
1940s and early 1950s, rhythm and blues replaced “race” records and encompassed many
differing styles.
Eventually, the standard blues sound began to wane in popularity among both African
American and white audiences. Rhythm and blues, as well as doo-wop, became the most popular
form of “race music” with artists including Chuck Berry, Fats Domino, Sam Cooke and Jackie
Wilson. Davis also notes that record labels such as Chess, Crown, and Duke records were not
doing too much to promote the blues, as it began to be associated with a southern rural sound,
whereas many African Americans were now further North and in urban areas.62 By the time
Chuck Berry released anthems such as “School Days” and “Rock N’ Roll Music,” mass cultural
products like popular radio and American Bandstand were beginning to change how people
experienced music. Radio and television programs appealed to young audiences and thus
dictated what was popular among the youth.
Blues musician Muddy Waters believed that rock music hurt blues music rather than
helping it.63 Waters, among others, could not compete with artists such as Ray Charles, James
Brown or Little Richard in popularity. Rock music had a broader appeal and was a much
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friendlier kind of music to which one could dance and have fun. Rock was also much more
conducive to larger gatherings where people went to have fun and not worry about the
oppression seen in the world. Whereas blues was once a source for gathering people together,
rock took over, but certainly with a different tone. However, the success of some of these artists
would be short-lived and by the late 1950s, rock music was in trouble. Elvis Presley was in the
army, Buddy Holly had passed away in a plane crash and both Chuck Berry and Jerry Lee Lewis
were involved in scandals. British rock had not yet developed because Britain was still
recovering from the effects of WWII. By the 1960s, many of those same young teens that
listened to Berry, grew up and were ready for more mature music themselves. This was part of
the reason why a blues revival began to form.

Authenticity: The Narrative of the Blues Revival
During the 1930s and 40s, the Proletarian Folk Revival was a group of white leftists promoting
black music in New York City. Their goal was to record various artists for the sake of historical
preservation. Two men that were well known through this movement were John and Alan
Lomax.64 Part of the narrative of folk blues relied on its “purity” which people like the Lomax’s
sought. For the Lomax’s, African American blues musicians possessed an authentic sound,
meaning that they had a purity of sound that only African Americans could produce. Therefore,
the authentic became associated with stereotypical images of African American blues musicians.
Because of the relative isolation found in the South, a lot of the music was free from commercial
influence. Although, the musicians were still playing music in order to make a living, they had
limited local audiences. Thus, what the Lomax’s tried to capture was a purity, or authenticity that
never existed, but was imagined by outsiders who heard the music. They pictured stereotypical
64
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images of bluesmen that played for the sheer love of music and that their skill to play the blues
was an innate talent that needed to be shared. But in their insistence on the purity of folk blues,
the Lomax’s were partly responsible for commercializing a “pure” sound from the South. Cole
believes the blues revival period was marked by a new age of minstrelsy in which African
American blues artists were forced to play “to fulfil white demand.”65 John Lomax in particular
“was instrumental in promulgating the relationship between black masculinity, primitivism and
institutional expressivity vital to white investment in the blues – initiating a turn towards the
representation of individual musicians as ‘folk artists.’”66 This folkloric ideal placed African
Americans at the centre of a primitivist image created by the Lomax’s. They wanted to capture
an idealized version of African American culture associated with a purity that existed outside of
the historical and cultural context from which they developed. This was the beginning of the
search for authenticity in blues music, something which had never been important prior to this
time.
Although many African American performers became quite successful, they were very
susceptible to being exploited. Some would receive little to no royalties; others would not even
get composer credits for the songs that they performed. Another way in which they could be
exploited was through flat fee payments that came from recordings.67 Rather than wait for
royalties, many performers chose to take an upfront payment that was very low in comparison to
the royalties they would have received in a fair standard contract. However, in times of need,
musicians took these deals in order to maintain basic living standards. There was a pattern of
exploitation by record companies that were owned primarily by white people. Although there
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were cases in which African American record executives exploited African American musicians,
in general, during this time companies were run by white executives. In consideration of artistic
exploitation, we must not forget that there were many “cover” songs recorded in the 1950s that
were done in order to secure commercial property for record companies.68 Companies wanted to
make money and one of the best ways was to maintain commercial property. Thus, many artists
were influenced by companies into recording songs that were not necessarily of their choosing,
but in order to continue making their own music, they would need to fulfill the demands of their
contracts.
By the early 1960s, popular music was in the midst of major changes. As noted above,
the rock n’ roll craze declined and a new generation of fans were ready for a new trend to form.
Simultaneously, the more mature rock n’ roll fans were ready to settle into their own music as
well. This created two different, but equally important movements that were relevant to blues
music history. The first was the British invasion which was influenced by both blues and rock n’
roll and secondly was the folk blues revival. Both of these movements were crucial to
understanding the development of blues music during this time.
With the new blues revival, came the desire to hear some of the “original” southern blues
artists. Once again, Alan Lomax and his new partner Dick Waterman went to the South looking
for some of the legends of the blues.69 They found musicians such as John Hurt, Skip James and
Son House and decided that these musicians should be heard once again by the public. They also
decided to brand many of these artists as “folk blues” for the purpose of marketing them to
young white audiences, who were becoming increasingly interested in folk music, especially the
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blues. The mythology created by promoters is what attracted white audiences. Phil Spiro (the
man who re-discovered Son House) admitted that his ego was part of the reason why he
convinced House to come back and play. Spiro treated him like a rare record – a commodity –
rather than a human being.70 Unfortunately, House could never live up to the image of his former
self, as he had little interest in pursuing a musical career. Interestingly, after a lengthy period
away from music, Son House had to be re-taught how to play his own songs by Al Wilson from
the band Canned Heat. Wilson knew House’s songs so well that he would play them for House
so that he could remember how to play them himself.71
One of the main showcases for these “re-discovered” artists was the Newport Folk
Festival. Several blues historians have noted the importance of this festival. Although the story
of Bob Dylan at the 1965 festival is well known, Stephen Milward argues that another artist’s
appearance was even more important to the history of blues music, that of the Paul Butterfield
Blues Band, featuring Mike Bloomfield on guitar, a sentiment shared by Francis Davis.72 This
was an important point for the beginning of urban blues. During the concert, the musicians
decided to plug in their guitars, rather than play a more traditional acoustic set. This drew
criticism from crowds who were more interested in the “authentic” acoustic folk sounds, which
consisted of solo artists playing an all acoustic set. Once again, the insistence of acoustic folk
sounds perpetuated the notion of what real authentic blues was meant to be.
Although many have noted its various contributions to the cultural musical ethos, one of
the most extensive studies of the festival was done by Ulrich Adelt who noted its negative
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aspects. Adelt explains the festival was more responsible for creating reifications of negative
imagery rather than positive ones.73 What organizers tried to attract were “authentic” musicians.
Folk was meant to be a counter-cultural ideology, which promoted truth and authenticity. Bob
Dylan and Paul Butterfield received some negative criticism when they decided to play a
partially electric set which was seen as a move away from authentic folk music and a literal and
figurative distortion of folk ideals. This ideology was determined by a primarily white audience
and organizing body. The Newport Folk Festival decided to keep themes “traditional,” despite
continual changes in African American musical tastes that were bound to changes in the political
realm. Unfortunately, the blues became synonymous with what many African Americans wanted
to escape, an old order which consisted of anger, anguish and alienation. Soul music became the
new music associated with black empowerment and promoted themes of togetherness over
solitude. Although other authors have mentioned it, Adelt explains in more detail how blues and
soul began to diverge.74 While there were soul anthems such as “Say It Loud (I’m Black and I’m
Proud)” by James Brown and “Respect” by Otis Redding and later Aretha Franklin, in the
meantime B.B. King was singing about sweet angels, becoming disconnected with African
American audiences, especially the younger ones. This would be seen as the most definitive split
between blues and soul music. Despite their inclusion of African American musicians, Newport
organizers opted for more conservative styles they believed to be “pure.” Therefore, it is not
surprising that musician John Hurt was so well received by audiences. He had a quiet personality
and a gentle picking and singing style. Conversely, the case of Josh White exemplified the
stereotyping seen during the blues revival period. White’s style was seen as too clean and
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“cosmopolitan.”75 It did not resonate well with the raw and rugged sounds that many whites
considered to be an authentic blues sound of the time. The organizers of the festival tried to
capture an “authentic” sound and subsequently misrepresented the attempted shifts by African
American blues artists during this same period. Their attempts to dictate the blues sound through
“authentic” performances artificially altered the musical ethos. The electric blues and soul music
of the time were much more aligned with the changing tastes of performers and audiences alike.
Rather than try to understand the changing cultural landscape, Newport organizers were only
interested in essentialist notions of authenticity and ignored the historical changes in African
American culture.
Adelt explains that during the festival many audience members were discouraged from
dancing.76 Despite the encouragement from various African American artists to get up and
dance, crowds remained mainly sedentary.77 This diverged from blues history in which
movement and bodily “groove” were at the heart of the music. But the sedentariness of audiences
allowed them to observe the racial Other as objects of study. This response exemplifies the
attitude of observation employed by many of the crowds at the festival. They seemed to be more
interested in preserving a false sense of authentic culture rather than understanding the culture
itself. However, Adelt admits this view was not held by all blues musicians. In an interview, Son
House believed blues did not involve movement, unlike Skip James and B.B. King who thought
movement was an essential part to the blues experience.78 Regardless, many of the white crowds
were never interested in participating in blues culture, as much as observing what they thought
were authentic blues musicians.
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Importantly, prior to this event, the early 1960s folk blues revival was not nearly as
commercially successful. One of the more surprising aspects of this turn was that as whites
began to be the primary consumers of blues music, African American artists began to emulate
white musicians, by performing longer guitar solos, which were uncommon up until that point.79
Thus, for the first time in its history, white audiences and musicians began to dictate some of the
styles that drove blues music. As mentioned previously, there were white blues musicians, even
dating back to some of its earliest forms, but because of the new narrative of authenticity, white
musicians were no longer deemed to be on par with African American ones. The racial divide
that had previously never existed, was being promoted primarily by white music promoters and
audiences. Consequently, blues music was also beginning to change in terms of its sound. The
folk festival revealed the desire for authentic folk blues music, while the more mainstream
popular sound was also in the midst of significant changes. Around 1962-63, the British invasion
was beginning to shape the pop industry. Bands such as The Rolling Stones, The Beatles, The
Who and later The Yardbirds were coming to the United States and playing rhythm and blues
inspired rock music. Muddy Waters, who was struggling to breakthrough in the 1950s, became
more accepted after The Beatles and The Rolling Stones became popular. Both of those bands
adapted rhythm and blues and consequently grew the sound with white audiences.
A noteworthy point is that race was not as much of a factor in Great Britain as it was in
the United States. This made musical choices a lot simpler for many. Blues was based largely on
youthful rebellion and the freedom to escape conservatism, and thus did not carry the same
baggage that was found in the United States.80 One of Adelt’s main arguments is that whites
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created a de-politicized blues culture.81 Even though it was meant as a rebellion from old
conservative views, it minimized the African American aspect of the blues experience. Adelt’s
analysis of authenticity touches upon several musicians from this period, focusing his attention
on Janis Joplin, Eric Clapton and B.B. King.
Eric Clapton was one of the most influential blues musicians from England during the
1960s. Clapton began his career with The Yardbirds, an all-white British blues band. He decided
to leave the group after he felt they began to play too much pop music, while he was more
interested in playing more traditional blues music. He would continue his career by joining John
Mayall and the Bluesbreakers.82 Although he only played on one album with the group, it was
arguably one of the most influential electric blues albums of all-time, mainly because of the
equipment Clapton used. At this time, Clapton switched from a Fender Stratocaster to a Gibson
Les Paul and paired it with a Marshall amplifier. This became one of the quintessential sounds of
blues rock for the next decade and is still used widely today. In describing this event, Milward
states “‘All Your Love’ was the opening track of the Mayall album, and the first sound one hears
was the crude, thunderous squawk of Clapton’s Les Paul. Roots music, and the blues, would
never again be quite the same.”83 By emphasizing feedback and distortion, artists like Clapton
changed the sound of music permanently, influencing others such as Jimmy Page and Jimi
Hendrix.
In his investigation of famous white blues musicians, Adelt saw Clapton as a perfect
example of a white musician appropriating black music for his personal needs. Despite its history
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as a communally based form of music, Adelt says Clapton used blues music as an individualistic
remedy to his problems. Adelt cites several examples of what he believes to be Clapton’s
essentialism. Clapton always tried to achieve a more “authentic” blues sound that he claimed was
only accessible by African American men.84 By playing the blues, Clapton merely used it as a
platform to deal with his personal identity crisis, but never as a political form of music that is
meant to exemplify the struggles of daily life of a people. One such song exemplifies this
personal struggle during his time with another band called “Blind Faith.” In a song called
“Presence of the Lord,” Steve Winwood (the lead vocalist) sings about having found a place to
live, in the presence of the lord. Although initially it seems to be a song about spirituality and a
search for inner peace, it was actually a line written by Clapton describing his new mansion.85 I
believe this is part of what Adelt critiques in Clapton’s music. For Clapton, the music was a
personal remedy, rather than a political and communal experience.
A particularly poignant example of this kind of personal struggle is found in another song
entitled “Have You Ever Loved a Woman” by Derek and the Dominos Live at the Fillmore.86 It
is a cover of a song written by Billy Myles for Freddie King. The reason why I picked this
particular version and performance is the story behind it. At the time, Eric Clapton was in a state
of depression and addicted to drugs and alcohol, an addiction that nearly destroyed his life. But
the most important reason is that he was in love with someone, in this case his best friend’s wife,
who happened to be Pattie Boyd, the wife of former Beatles star George Harrison. For Clapton,
this song (and the album Layla and Other Assorted Love Songs) had a personal meaning, because
he wrote and performed the songs as a declaration of his love for her. Much like many others, he
84
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faced a dilemma that could not be easily solved. Either accept the fact that he could not be with
this woman or proclaim his love for her publicly and potentially lose his best friend. In the end,
he actually did the latter and did not lose his friend. Nevertheless, during this time, she refused
his advances and this was partly the cause of his depression.
The song starts with a guitar solo in a typical manner found in many slow blues numbers.
The lyrics are in the common AAB pattern. Clapton sings the lyrics:
Have you ever loved a woman
So much you tremble in pain
Have you ever loved a woman
So much you tremble in pain
And all the time you know
She bears another man’s name
The lyrics themselves are typical of a slow blues song, but what gives them life is the way
Clapton sings them. The words mean something to him, which is why he chose to cover this
song on the album. There is evident pain in his voice and the audience can feel that these are not
simply empty words to him, but ones that come from personal experience. There is one more
similar verse that follows, at which point Clapton (who sings and plays lead guitar), says to the
audience “let me tell you all about her” referring to Pattie Boyd. He goes into a riveting guitar
solo which is full of passion and unbelievable emotion that the rest of the song builds towards.
This is his way of revealing his love without explicitly saying anything through spoken language,
but rather playing the guitar and letting his instrument do the speaking for him. The song features
one more verse that goes as follows:
Have you ever loved a woman
And you know you can’t leave her alone (x2)
Something deep inside you
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Won’t let you wreck your best friend’s home87
Blues has always been a personal struggle to some degree. Even though his life has very
little in common with African American blues musicians from the 1920s and 30s, it is almost
certain that what he conveys in the playing of this song can be experienced by people of different
races, genders, and time periods. The sorrowful experience of loving someone without the other
reciprocating can be very painful and this song expresses that experience in a way that only
Clapton can convey at that time. Surely he can play this song now and perhaps even copy his
technique very closely, but he can never capture that moment in time when he was in a state of
depression and the only way he could convey those emotions was through song. Despite Adelt’s
criticism, I do not think you can completely separate personal experience from blues music. As
written above, Oakley’s note that sexual relationships have always driven blues music
thematically needs to be reiterated. This theme clearly goes beyond any class, race, or gender.
Even though any blues singer can sing about travelling the rails, this theme hardly strikes a chord
with anyone past a certain time. However, relationships have been, and continue to be, a concern
for people of different backgrounds, thus connecting musicians and audiences across many
different eras and communities. I would say that at least in this particular case, blues music had a
genuine connection to Clapton’s experience which he shared with those of the past. Simon notes
that we share in experience through compassion and empathy, even if we do not live under the
same material conditions.88
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In a similar critique, Adelt looks at Janis Joplin who he says reduced blues music to
suffering.89 This misses the humour often involved in many blues songs. As an example, Joplin
changed “Ball & Chain” from a major to a minor key and from a shuffle to slow blues. However,
we should ask whether it is necessary to dictate how one interprets or sings the blues. Adelt
criticizes Joplin’s suffering, saying it was more of a choice than a fact of life, as she grew up in a
middle class home and decided to live in poverty. In several instances, Joplin thought that she
was incapable of suffering in the same way as an African American. She believed that her
inability to suffer hindered her ability to properly sing the blues.90 Adelt critiques Joplin’s use of
blues without catharsis. For Joplin, there was no overcoming of suffering, something which was
often done with humour by African American musicians in order to escape the suffering of daily
life. Although I believe Joplin’s suffering to be genuine, I can see why Adelt critiques both
Clapton and Joplin. Realistically, neither Clapton nor Joplin experienced the same systematic
hardships as the African American musicians whose music they played. Yet, I do not believe this
to be the same problematic scenario as the Newport Music Festival. While Clapton and Joplin
may have used blues music to express personal experiences, they certainly were not on par with
the level of exploitation we saw from the organizers of the Newport festivals. Joplin and
Clapton’s feelings and emotions were genuinely theirs, even if they did not always write the
songs they used to express themselves. I would argue that in playing this music, they were
paying tribute to the people who wrote and played them, as opposed appropriating them as their
own. At the same time, they were intentionally altering the songs to suit the style of music which
they knew. By playing the songs in this new fashion, they brought the songs into a new musical
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dimension rather than pretending to rehash old material in old styles. If they did the latter, then I
would tend to agree more with Adelt, because that would simply be copying the songs without
adding anything new. This sentiment is expressed by Julia Simon when it comes to the reworking of songs by white artists, as she compares Nick Moss and the Flip Tops to Muddy
Waters.91 Both of these artists re-worked songs with different tempos and timing to suit their
particular contexts. Simon believes that the heart of the blues genre lies in a “process of
repetition with a difference.”92 While I alluded to it earlier, the notion of borrowing and reworking comes back into play but within a new context, one with a racial dimension. Therefore,
moving forward we need to be careful about what constitutes a reproduction, or a copy and how
do these categories change the way we should think about blues music as an event. For now, I
would like to finish Adelt’s exposition before continuing on these themes.
For B.B. King, song styles were a matter of class and not necessarily race. King’s views
on the matter changed during the 1960s when white management exposed him to more white
audiences. Adelt quotes King as saying he was always somewhat uncomfortable with the
attention and was saddened by the loss of African American audiences.93 Adelt also notes the
problematic way that King’s biographers have described his move to playing for white
audiences. They often described this transition as “progressive,” whereas before he was stuck
playing for African American audiences that never drew the commercial success he would see
with whites.94 This interpretation is highly problematic for several reasons. First, economic
success is not always the best barometer for musical success. Some of the wealthiest musicians
are not necessarily the best, as sometimes their sound must be compromised in order to appeal to
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a wider audience. Secondly, the idea that African American audiences somehow held King back
does not factor in the changing desires for musical tastes in African American communities. It is
not necessarily the case that there were no audiences, but perhaps they did not support that kind
of music. As many authors have noted, African American audiences were no longer as interested
in traditional styles like the blues, and were more interested in progressive black voices.95 White
audiences had more recently discovered traditional black folk blues and thus were more
welcoming of those styles. As we saw other authors note, B.B. King’s style during this time
began to mimic some of the white blues musicians’ styles with longer, more drawn out solos,
which happened to appeal more to white audiences.
During the 1970s, there was an attempt to reinscribe a more “authentic” black sound into
King’s albums. For example, he played in front of African American inmates; however, this was
done for a white consumer audience. What Adelt argues is that music producers and companies
were interested in creating an authentic “black” sound in order to appeal to their white audiences.
This was based around the essentialist notion that there was an authentic sound that only African
Americans could achieve and that only the most sophisticated of listeners could hear and
understand. What developed was a conservative blues culture based on a “safe” black tone,
which was controlled and consumed by whites. Unlike soul music with its messages of black
empowerment, blues became a form of music that was more accessible to whites, because of its
more traditional ease of play. It was simply less threatening to the white agenda. Adelt believes
this culminated when B.B. King played during G.H.W. Bush’s inauguration. Adelt states, “It is
quite ironic that the blues, with its long history as an agent of liberation for oppressed minorities
and women, had become the music at a party celebrating the highest member of the white male
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power structure.”96 The promulgation and promotion of an essentialist blues style infiltrated all
forms of blues music, from the folk revival, to the urban blues of B.B. King, to white blues
artists such as Clatpton and Joplin. These three musicians are examples of an essentialism that
grew out of the 1930s and continues until the present day. But it was only possible because of the
people who promoted such an agenda.
Adelt writes that publications such as The Chicago Defender said that the blues began to
shift towards white audiences as early as the 1950s.97 By the late 1960s, blues became part of
white popular culture. Living Blues magazine (whose staff was primarily white) concentrated on
black musicians and perpetuated further notions of segregation and an authentic blues sound.
Similarly, magazines like Rolling Stone and Sing Out! provided similar accounts of blues as a
racially pure genre.98 In his description of the founding editors of Living Blues magazine, Adelt
illustrates that many of them were introduced to blues through white musicians and that they
equated black music with authenticity, realness and honesty.99 Living Blues was hypocritical in
their portrayal of the blues, as many editors were introduced to the style through white musicians
and yet they were only interested in discussing African American musicians. Despite their claims
that they discussed the living tradition of the blues, the magazine focused on the 1930s-50s time
period rather than their own.100
These examples raise the question of whether or not we need to take an essentialist
viewpoint of blues music, or is there more subtlety to this question? Part of answering this
question relies on knowing what makes blues music what it is. Meaning, what gives someone the
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privilege or capability to play the blues. In David Carr’s “Can White Men Play the Blues? Music,
Learning Theory, and Performance Knowledge,” he explains that there is more to playing the
blues than technical skill. He believes we need an understanding of behaviour to master it.101
Philip Jenkins shares similar sentiments, saying you must have certain experiences to play the
blues. For example, Barry Manilow has not had those experiences.102 This is the difference in
blues between form and expression. While one may have the technical skill in its formal aspects,
that does not necessarily mean they are playing the blues. Along this point, we should ask if a
child can play the blues? What does it take for anyone to play the blues? I am not sure there is a
definitive answer to this question, but what is certain is that maintaining a stance that only
African Americans have access to some notion of the blues that is inaccessible to everyone else
can be highly problematic, particularly when it becomes objectified in the manner that we saw
during the blues revival period. Musicians were treated like objects of study, rather than human
beings and analyzed rather than understood. But that was not a universal experience in blues
music. Many white blues musicians succeeded in developing a new style of blues, rather than
stealing black blues for the sake of their own personal gain. To lump all white blues musicians
together and say they were thieves is just as irresponsible as saying that whites played no role in
the history of blues music.
One of the most common stereotypes perpetrated by those who say whites stole black
music is the idea of sexual energy. This is misleading because white musicians such as Elvis
Presley and many others have sexualized music themselves. To claim black music influenced
white sexualisation puts forth the stereotype of the black sexual deviant. The idea that black
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bodies are sexualized is a harmful stereotype that has been used to marginalize the African
American population. Conversely, we should not rely on the trope that white people needed to
“save” black music. Although blues music began to be consumed and played by white people as
much as African Americans, this was more of a reflection of changing tastes than anything else.
Ignoring the changing tastes of communities falls back into the belief that certain kinds of music
or art should be associated with communities. In other words, blues music should be listened to
and performed solely by African Americans because it has African American origins. But it
became clear that many African Americans wanted to listen to other forms of music that was not
associated with past struggles. Instead, they leaned towards soul music for black empowerment.
Adelt states that in some cases white people have classified blues more narrowly than
African Americans.103 Although his evidence seems more anecdotal than anything, if true, this
often leads to an essentialist view about what blues can and cannot be. It is interesting to note
that Adelt claims for example that Cream’s second album was less blues than psychedelic rock,
even though it is very much based on blues chords.104 This parallels a well known and influential
magazine “Blues Unlimited” which claimed that Cream’s music was not blues, but purely
rock.105 Why is it fair to claim that Cream’s music is not the blues, or at least blues rock? This
seems inconsistent with Adelt’s previous claims that blues can vary in form and tone.
Nevertheless, I believe Adelt’s main point is that blues does not necessarily belong to any one
race, or class of people. The problem lies in identifying blues in terms of authenticity associated
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with a race. It is not as though white people cannot play or listen to blues music, but when it is
fetishized, the people who play it become objects of study.
Some other authors who have written on the topic of race in music have tended to take a
softer stance than Adelt, citing a more complex history of white and African American artists
borrowing and learning from one another. In a chapter dealing with appropriation, we find Dave
Headlam being sympathetic to white musicians because of the varying backgrounds of rock n’
roll music. Country western, blues, pop, and rhythm and blues all influenced rock in some way.
He cites the styles of Elvis and Chuck Berry who had been influenced by white and African
American musicians alike.106 However, he calls the new blues context a “museum-like recreation.”107 He continues in his criticism of pop music saying, “These pop alterations have the
effect of making the sound less personal and more objectified and predictable.”108 For Headlam,
rock is a simplification of more complex blues modes. However, he notes that we should not
ignore the borrowing and re-working of songs that has been a part of the history of blues when
looking at appropriation. By claiming that someone has the right to a genre of music brings us
back to ideas of purity and authenticity which we are trying to avoid. Ironically, it has often been
whites who have perpetuated such notions of authenticity in the pursuit of re-creating an
objectivity in music that never existed.
Whether or not some people would like to admit, white musicians, promoters and
audiences changed blues music. Although many white bands and musicians would play covers of
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old blues songs such as “Stop Breaking Down” by The Rolling Stones and the White Stripes,
“Travelling Riverside Blues” by Led Zeppelin, “Spoonfull” by Cream and countless others,
many of these arrangements were changed to suit the more modern sound. That is why I disagree
with authors like Fox and Greene who claim that modern blues are empty “zombie blues” that
lack “the authenticity of the earlier generations of blues players.”109 These were not cases of
simply stealing music for the sake of profiting; they were genuine attempts to re-interpret the
music in a modern form and for a new audience. Like any form of entertainment, some attempts
were successful, while others failed, but to say blankly that white musicians stole the blues from
African American players ignores a complex history.
White blues music was for the most part a genuine attempt to honour the music from the
past, while creating a new style. Milward and Hatch divide songs into song families, song
extensions and originals.110 For example, a song family involves doing covers or renditions of
old songs with new musical developments. Someone doing a cover with a similar arrangement
would be in the same family, while a song extension is something that Muddy Waters would do.
By bringing amplification for Delta blues, Waters made older songs feel and sound different.
New songs usually develop after years of learning to play standards and finding one’s own
personal sound or voice. I believe many white and African American musicians could be
classified in each of these categories when developing their own particular style. Although The
Beatles started as a rhythm and blues band, towards the end they experimented with many
different styles. They eventually created their own kind of music that had many influences.
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The blues has been an influence on many artists and it is not always clear where the blues
begins or ends in particular songs. Blues has always had a history of borrowing of lyrics, chord
progressions and tones, which has led to a great deal of controversy, including the right to call a
song one’s own. This is not an exclusively white or black matter, but rather a by-product of the
nature of blues music as such. Artists such as Jimmie Rodgers influenced Howlin’ Wolf and B.B.
King and these artists went on to influence thousands of other artists of all races.111 Both Sonny
Boy Williamson and John Lee Hooker were backed by British bands in England, consisting of
many white musicians. The only conclusions that can be drawn from this, is that there are no
clear boundaries of the blues other than creating a sense of solidarity felt between the crowd and
the performers.
Can we gather from this exposition that there was a blues community? As Oakley
explains, some artists like Henry Townsend felt like the blues was more than simply
entertainment. Townsend believed blues spoke to people on a deeper level because of its themes
and its origins; this made the blues relevant for communities and made the singers important to
those communities. Blues has always been a matter of truth for Townsend, and the blues
expresses that truth. In speaking about the blues, Townsend says that “these songs are dedicated
to the truth.”112 They are stories about the everyday happenings of a people. This harkens back to
the point on self-expression, the blues speaks to the audience and is not just a matter of inner
feelings being displayed by the artist. In an analogy between the blues and medicine, blues
musician Roosevelt Sykes said that blues players do not have the blues themselves, but they play
it for those that do. Much like a doctor who treats his ailing patients, in a similar sense the
musician plays for those that have the blues. This implies that blues is not just a form of self111
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expression, but rather a reflection of the audience’s feelings and desires.113 There is a shared
experience between the performer and the listeners that crosses spatial boundaries.
In essence, it is difficult to claim that blues belongs to any particular race or even class of
people. Barlow makes the important point that we often find leisure time divided by social class
or race.114 This often remains a point of division, but the blues has been a bridging point in which
both white and African American people can participate. The fact that people of so many
backgrounds seem to find blues music relatable is a testament to its openness and universality. It
invites us to participate and offers a way of dealing with certain issues we find in the world, no
matter what our background may be. Even music often considered “black music” such as
Motown, was created for a national interracial audience. Thus, to call any kind of music white or
black music ignores its varying roots and influences. One event that can be pointed to is the
death of Jimmie Rodgers, who was a well known white blues musician. Having been an
influence on various artists, his death was an important point in which music became
increasingly segregated. Perhaps music depends on certain figures to bridge the racial gap.
Hatch and Milward note the importance of white musicians to history of blues. They
question whether it is fair to call it all “black music,” knowing the complex history. They also
criticize the scholarship, saying many white musicians were only mentioned in passing.115
Authors continue by noting the power base of southern blues music was predominantly white,
meaning that many whites had an influence on the sound of blues music, even if it was not as
significant as the contributions from African Americans. In this case, culture cannot be neatly
divided by race, as doing so generates stereotypes and what Michael Neumann calls “cardboard
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blacks and whites” and draws boundaries in blues music where there are none.116 Although we
can safely claim that African Americans were responsible for the origins and development of
blues music, white musicians certainly played a role, including influencing African American
artists.

Technological Mediation and the Blues
Thus far I have discussed some of the historical background of blues music, but one important
factor of the blues is our experience of it through technological advancements. It is a given that
we listen to music, but how we listen to it and how that has affected our experience of music
must be discussed. In its original form, blues was not recorded, but along with its
standardization, came its introduction into the music industry. At that point the two facets of
blues music (its playing and its reproduction) became forever intertwined, creating a
complication in how we deal with its evental character.
With the growing popularity of different kinds of folk music across the United States,
record producers and executives saw a potentially profitable situation which could be exploited.
As Barlow states “the record industry began to absorb black folk music into its sphere of
capitalist production. The blues performance was transformed into a mass-produced
commodity.”117 He believes that the blues gave way to imitations and “inauthentic” forms of
music. Record producers essentially took African American forms of music and sold it back to
them in lower quality, while earning significant profits. In his discussion of the development of
mass production, Davis states that the blues was impacted greatly by technological advancement.
Mamie Smith’s “Crazy Blues” from 1920, opened the door for mass production and consumption
116
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of “black” music. From that point forward, African Americans were seen as a major consumerist
market and had the potential to shape the world of music. Davis states “The history of the blues,
in one sense, is the history of folk art in the age of mechanical reproduction.”118
There is an important distinction between recorded and the unrecorded music that occurs
when the boundary between performer and audience becomes mediated. The oral tradition that
once existed as a vital aspect of African American culture was ruptured by the mechanically
reproduced process. With the advent of recording technology, it was no longer necessary to
gather in groups and listen to performers discuss their sorrows with a live audience. Recordings
took over sheet music as the most popular form of musical medium by the 1950s.119 The switch
in music from a written to an aural/oral tradition began, due in part to the price of records
decreasing significantly by the end of the 1920s. Radio broadcasts also played a role, as the
quality of radio was as good as any record, which rendered records less popular for a brief time.
Records eventually rebounded and became collector’s items and once again people began to
afford and use them on a regular basis. All of these technological changes played a role in
determining how people experienced blues and music in general.120 It also played a role in how
we view the blues historically.
Unlike visual mediums, the blues has aural/oral tradition, which means that musical
notation was not the primary means by which the music was documented. Therefore, we must
rely on historical recordings to know how it sounds. However, recordings were not possible
when the genre originated. This is an important characteristic of the blues event, as the blues has
always had an aural/oral tradition. This downside of this tradition is that we cannot be certain
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how the blues sounded prior to being recorded. Weissman admits that our knowledge of the
blues is limited by technology. Even when recording became possible, songs had to be limited to
two and a half minutes long on a ten inch seventy-eight r.p.m disc. We are also limited by the
fact that only some musicians were recorded, while countless others were not. Unlike today
where we can hear almost any musician in the western world that has access to a computer, this
was not possible early in the twentieth century. This problem is exemplified specifically in
foundational forms of blues music such as field hollers. Although many people consider field
hollers to be part of the foundation of the blues, it is difficult to know with certainty how much
impact they had. As Davis points out, there were no recordings of field hollers until the 1930s,
thus we cannot know with certainty how they may have sounded a hundred years prior.121
Although we know that the blues retained some technical aspects such as the call and response
patterns that field hollers began, by the time field hollers were recorded, they may have already
been influenced by the blues sound itself. The technological reproduction of field hollers has
thus shaped the way we think of that type of music, as much as, or if not more than, any of the
original participants back when the music began.
Davis raises an important point, did records codify blues music in the 1920s or did the
musicians do this themselves organically? When you consider the fact that there were never any
standard ways of playing the blues prior to the early work by W.C. Handy and Hart Wand, we
have to wonder why southern blues music began to have so many variations of the twelve bar,
three stanza and four chord progression. Perhaps blues simply evolved in such a way, but just as
likely is the fact that recordings of blues influenced musicians to mimic what they knew. With
reproduction changing and shaping music, we are forced to acknowledge the changing themes of
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originality and authenticity. The notion of authenticity has changed with primacy now being
given to recordings. As Ken Ueno notes, we often compare live music to how it sounds on the
recording, not vice versa.122 We no longer prioritize the live aspects of music, but rather rely on
the recording as authentic sounds. Thus, the history of blues is largely based on the technological
advances that developed in the twentieth century. Prior to recording, we have no records of blues
music, other than folk tales of people playing something similar to the blues. There were many
musicians that played the blues across the United States who were never recorded, despite
achieving local popularity. There are various stories of unrecorded artists, but discussing them
only adds speculative thoughts about what the blues may have been. Because the blues has had
such an aural/oral tradition, there has not been much written about the blues during this time
period, either in terms of musical composition or historical documentation. Therefore, the notion
that there is an authentic form of blues (often associated with folk blues) is problematic not only
because of the history of authenticity in terms of race, but also how much mechanical
reproduction drove people to believe this was what blues was meant to be, when in fact, this was
simply the beginnings of an era of mechanical reproduction and not the blues as such.
Blues is a form of music that is very much tied to mechanical reproduction, which
destroys the mythical qualities that many people have tried to inscribe into it. However, I do not
want to imply that its cultural impact has somehow been lessened through reproduction. Rather, I
think that in admitting that the blues is more of a modern form of popular music, we can begin to
classify the differences between it and its origins more clearly and thus we are able to discuss the
event of blues music as such much more accurately. The event of blues as a cultural phenomenon
is tied directly to its recorded history and as a consequence the artistic event of blues music
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illustrates the impact of mechanical reproduction on all artistic mediums. Blues music has an
important place in musical and artistic history because of its ties to technological reproduction.
Unlike some static forms of art such as painting or architecture, blues music in particular is in a
state of constant change, something which was not repeatable prior to technological
reproduction. With the advent of recording technology, the fluctuating quality of blues music
was at once captured, as well as eliminated when the song could be repeated continuously. These
technological advancements changed how we must consider the artistic event, specifically the
musical event distinct from other forms of art.

Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, I would like to add one final note to this chapter. In consideration of any event,
whether artistic or not, we must look at it from many perspectives, otherwise we are liable to
miss some of its most important facets. The blues presents us with a unique opportunity to
consider the event both from a small and a large scale, or what I will call the micro and the
macro scale. On the micro side, we have the songs and their unique properties, such as tone
variation, chord and rhythm changes, and so on. These small or even minute changes can in fact
be considered events in their own right and have shaped the complex landscape of this artistic
medium. On the macro scale, we have the important changes in the history of blues music from
its inception until today, whether this is the advent of mechanical reproduction or the way in
which the audience went from a primarily African American to white consumer base. Both the
micro and the macro elements play an important role in how we consider blues music as an event
and what I hope to explore in the coming chapters. Only by looking at all its facets can we arrive
at an answer of what constitutes an artistic event and what makes the blues unique in this regard.
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Chapter 2 –Deleuze and Badiou – The Micro and the Macro Event
After reading the previous chapter on the history of blues music, the reader should have an idea
of its complexity, as well as a basic understanding of how the music is played and sounds. It
would be impossible in such a short exposition to know all the details surrounding blues music,
but the reader should appreciate a few important points before we proceed further into the next
chapter. First, blues music has a primarily aural/oral history prior to its recording, thus leaving us
with no clear notion of what it sounded like prior to mechanical reproduction. Secondly, when it
was recorded, it took on a standardized compositional form that included 12 bars, using the I, IV,
and V chords and an AAB verse pattern that has been re-created by many artists throughout its
history. This standardized form has led to what we today consider to be “blues music,” and has
shaped our notion of it more than any other method. However, it also led to a great deal of
copying and borrowing from artists, which can sometimes blur the lines of originality, copying
and simulacra. This is further complicated by the fact that blues music is often improvised.
Finally, the notion of the blues “event” must be considered on the micro and the macro levels in
order to arrive at any definite conclusions. This chapter will begin to explore this last claim
through the work of two important twentieth century thinkers, namely, Gilles Deleuze and Alain
Badiou.
In this chapter I aim to present two very different views on what constitutes an event. I
am particularly interested in Deleuze and Badiou because they present important cases for the
philosophy of event(s). Their treatments of the event (particularly in Badiou’s case) are at the
forefront of their respective philosophies and are essential to understanding the philosophy of the
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event.123 I will use this chapter as a starting point for our discussion of the event and will contrast
the theories of Deleuze and Badiou with those of Martin Heidegger. Although Deleuze never
discussed Heidegger in much detail, there are some parallels that will be alluded to in this
chapter, with particular attention given to the influence Heidegger had on Badiou. My
comparison of all three of these figures will be limited to the context of the artistic event and
blues music. Badiou admits he had a contentious relationship with Deleuze in which they shared
ideas, but also clashed on various topics. I will illustrate that these two thinkers perfectly
exemplify the micro and macro distinction that resides within the complexity of an artistic event.

Deleuze and the Micro Event
Peter Hertz-Ohmes explains that in translating words such as event we come across various
issues.124 He explains that événement in French translates to event, while in German the word is
Ereignis. For Deleuze, neither of these words properly capture the meaning of événement, which
for him is a metamorphosis or transformation.125 The word “event” is not synonymous with
happening, or occurrence, but with change, or more precisely with becoming. Crockett believes
that Deleuze uses the term event to mean becoming rather than a happening, or something that
happens.126 The event is what is occurring in the process of what is already happening. Thus, we
will see that understanding the event for Deleuze is not about knowing a set of factual
occurrences derived from a series of past facts, but knowing the process by which they happen
123

Although Badiou is known more for his philosophy of the event, Clayton Crocket calls Deleuze a philosopher of
the event as well.
Clayton Crocket, Deleuze Beyond Badiou: Ontology, Multiplicity, and Event. (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2013), 8.
124
Peter Hertz-Ohmes, “Sense, Being and the Revelatory Event: Deleuze and Metamorphosis,” Deleuze Studies 10.
2 (2010): 84.
Hertz-Ohmes, 84.
125
Hertz-Ohmes, 84.
126
Crockett, 77.

56

such as the variation of sense, intensity and emotion. However, one of the most complicated
aspects of Deleuze and Badiou is that understanding a term like the event within their respective
systems means that we need to look at a whole set of terms associated with it. That said, I will
limit the discussion to a few concepts in order to stay focused on the concept of event. Another
complication in both of their theories is the fact that the use of the term event goes through some
changes. In this dissertation I will be focusing primarily on Deleuze’s notion of event in
Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. These texts contain his most thorough
examinations of the concept of the event, and the former book is an important foundational work
that contains several important concepts. However, at times I will address some of the works of
Deleuze and Guattari as well.
Deleuze’s definition of an ideal event is a singularity or a set of singularities. This can be
exemplified in a number of ways, such as the points on a mathematical curve, in a state of
affairs, or a psychological or moral person.127 Deleuze draws an important distinction here when
discussing the notion of the singular. Philosophy has traditionally opposed the singular with the
universal, but in mathematics the singular draws its opposition from the ordinary.128 An ordinary
point is where nothing new happens and is a continuation of a sequence, whereas in the singular
something new happens which interrupts the sequence. For example, a square has four points at
90 degree angles which can all be considered singularities, or points of inflection. These
singularities are sudden breaks with the ordinary points found along the lines that make up the
square. The turning points can easily be applied to more concrete settings such as emotional
variations, chemical changes, or even passageways in buildings that lead from one room to
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another.129 In each of these examples, we find a change in process, or a variation from one point
to another, mediated by a singular point. The singular presents a break from the ordinary,
producing a point where there is significant change. However, we noted that an ideal event is a
singularity, which leads us to ask: what does the ideal mean for Deleuze and how does Deleuze
move from the ideal to the real?
Deleuze distinguishes between what he calls the virtual and the actual. He is careful here
in noting that despite conventional thinking, reality is not composed of the actual and the
possible, but the actual and the virtual.130 There is a dynamism between the virtual and the actual
as they are equally important for the formation of reality. The virtual can be considered the
unactualized, or ideal aspect of reality, but that does not make it less real than the actual.131
Deleuze states that the “reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations
along with the singular points which correspond to them,”132 as opposed to the actual, which has
a concrete existence. To better understand how Deleuze draws these conclusions, it is important
to understand some of the foundations of Deleuze’s theory. Deleuze sees a problem in how
metaphysics has proposed the theory of difference. Specifically, Deleuze sees Plato’s concept of
the Idea as problematic, as its basis is founded upon the notion of a fixed, eternal identity,
placing difference and becoming in a subordinate position “to the powers of the One.”133 Miguel
De Beistegui says that the concept of the Idea is “at once a political weapon, a moral tool, and an
aesthetic ideal.”134 The Idea is meant to provide philosophy with a transcendent power over
virtually every dimension of being, and divides being into things that are and things that
129
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resemble the things that are, with difference in a position between these two realms. This system
places identity at the forefront of being by making Ideas unchanging and transcendent, while
worldly beings are defined by their difference from those ideals. Notions of identity, analogy and
opposition have prevented us from thinking of difference in itself.
De Beistegui emphasizes the distinction that Plato makes between a copy and
simulacrum. Whereas the copy is meant to refer to the original, a simulacrum operates outside of
this duality. De Beistegui explains that “the copy is defined in relation to the original, which it
resembles more or less, or which it imitates to a greater or lesser extent, the simulacrum is
defined by the fact that it seems to conform to the original, or the model, but in reality unfolds
outside the relation between original and copy.”135 According to Deleuze, a copy is a “wellfounded pretender” that tries to resemble the original,136 whereas simulacra are “false
pretenders” that are complete perversions.137 The division between model, copy, and simulacrum
allowed Plato to place copies into the category of icons and simulacra into phantasms. Plato tried
to eliminate this kind of simulation as he saw it as a form of deception and imitation of being.
Ideas are true, whereas semblances are not. The Idea can help us distinguish between images that
resemble the original, versus those that are mere semblances. Thus, the Idea becomes the model
from which all images can draw. This constructs part of Plato’s hierarchy as those who
understand Ideas (philosophers) can tell the difference between it and a copy or simulacrum,
while those that intentionally deceive are banned from the polis. Deleuze sees this line of
thinking as problematic and states that, “overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy
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of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.”138
Deleuze sees the importance of the simulacrum, as it possesses creative power outside of the
model/copy distinction. It is the event of difference that the simulacrum creates, rather than the
identity it tries to replicate. By emphasizing a fixed identity, Plato constructed a system that
relegated worldly objects to copies of the Ideal, something which Deleuze believes can be
overturned by looking outside of the model/copy duality.
Instead of looking at difference between two identities (as in the case of the model and
copy), Deleuze seeks to find difference itself. He does this by overturning Plato’s view of the
Idea through the notion of differential relations. Ideas are not static, eternal beings that shape the
objects of reality; rather, they are “virtual multiplicities, made up of relations between
differential elements.”139 This places difference in the foundational role, rather than a
subordinate one. But for Deleuze, difference is not limited to the virtual; difference has a way of
actualizing. For instance, an object can become something depending on the context in which it
is placed. As it encounters other objects, it goes through the process of becoming something
other because of how those other objects may interact with it. This process is the change from the
virtual to the actual, or from an unmeasured ideal state to a measureable real state. The change
that occurs between states is only possible through what Deleuze calls differenciation. Deleuze
explains that “whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem,
differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by
local integrations).”140 Thus, difference can actualize through the process of differenciation.
Differenciation actualizes in the world of extension through changes in what Deleuze calls
intensity. Differences of intensity include differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, and
138

Deleuze, DR, 66.
Deleuze, DR, 244.
140
Deleuze, DR, 209.
139

60

potential.141 Deleuze even states that saying difference in intensity is a tautology, as intensity is
the form of difference itself.142 What differentiates the intensive from the extensive then is how
they can be measured or divided. For example, if we take an extended object such as water and
place it in a container and then divide the contents into two separate containers, only the volume
of the water is divided, while the temperature is not. Therefore, things such as temperature are
pure differences that alter the extended world and resist the same divisions we find in extended
objects.
James Williams says Deleuze sees reality as a “manifold of communicating processes”
and any significant change to these processes is called an event.143 Williams explains that there
are many different kinds of events that further illustrate Deleuze’s point. For example, the water
temperature presented in the paragraph above, animals that alter their course because of climate
change, or citizens who become politically active in times of crisis.144 These events can be subtle
or obvious, but occur because something is shifting within a series that alters the course of
extended objects and bodies through changes in intensity. Thus, an event has actual relations
between bodies, as well as virtual changes in intensity of Ideas in relation to those bodies. The
move away from identity can only be done by distancing oneself from the notion that an Idea is
tied to essences.145 Otherwise, we are forced to ask the question of “What is X?” as a way of
finding the identity of a being. Deleuze seeks to overturn this line of thinking by focusing his

141

Deleuze, DR, 222.
Deleuze, DR, 222.
143
James Williams, “If Not Here, Then Where? On the Location and Individuation of Events in Badiou and
Deleuze,” Deleuze Studies 3.1 (2009): 106.
Williams, IHT, 106.
144
James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense: A Critical Introduction and Guide. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2008), 2.
145
Deleuze, DR, 188.
142

61

attention on difference which he believes can be tied to the idea of an event. In The Logic of
Sense, Deleuze looks to stoic philosophy in order to expand on the notion of the event.
Deleuze’s theory was heavily influenced by the Stoics, whom he believes transformed the
idea of the event. Sean Bowden and Michael James Bennett explain a great deal of Stoic
philosophy including their logic, physics, epistemology and ethics. Rather than delve into the
entirety of this system, I want to provide a summary of some of these points in order to show
how Deleuze was influenced by their system. The Stoics posited a division between bodies (that
exist) and four incorporeals (sayable, void, place, and time), which they claim do not exist in the
same manner as bodies, but rather subsist or inhere, meaning they have a minimal being.146
Bennett explains that things such as the void are still things, but since the void is by definition in
opposition to a body, it cannot exist like a body.147 Most importantly, Deleuze illustrates that
incorporeals overturn any notions of substance found in Aristotle, as for the Stoics accidents
such as quality or quantity have no less being than substance itself. This means that for the
Stoics, the highest term for an entity is not being, but something, which consists of both being
and non-being.
In terms of bodies, Stoic physics dictates that the cosmos is composed of things that act
upon one another and cause changes in each other. This means that no thing is independent of
another; however, these causes are distinct from event-effects.148 Bowden further explains that
each body has within itself the capability to impose a force upon another body which is the
event, or the effect. Corporeal bodies do not act upon incorporeal events, but rather cause them
146
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by acting upon other bodies: “This event” Bowden states, “is not another body, but a predicate, a
sayable, which comes to be true of the body whose effect it is.”149 Bowden’s example concerns a
piece of wood that is burnt. Only because the wood has the natural properties of being burnable
can it be burnt. In other words, the wood “will be the complete cause of the predicate ‘being
burnt’ which is true of the wood.”150 These causes are only possible through the notion that there
must be active and passive forces that allow for events to occur, for example, when a person
imposes their will on something in order to move it. Bodies can be active or passive in this
process, but are part of the same ideal event, e.g. the event of being burnt. Thus, the process of a
stick burning someone is the result of several different bodies (the stick, the fire and a person)
interacting and causing the event of being burnt. This is a qualitative change which occurs as a
result of bodies interacting with one another and causing intensive changes such as temperature
variations that cause the stick to become lit. This move causes a reversal of Platonism by
reducing the incorporeal realm to a secondary level only produced through the interactions of
bodies. Deleuze states that “if bodies with their states, qualities, and quantities, assume all
characteristics of substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are relegated to
the other side, that is to the impassive extra-Being which is sterile, inefficacious, and on the
surface of things.”151 Unlike the realm of bodies, the effects subsist in the regime of sense. This
presents a complete break from Platonism, rather than a re-formulation in any way.
To further our conversation on incorporeals, we turn to what Stoics call sayables. It is
evident that sayables are not themselves bodies, but things that can be said about bodies. The
goal of these sayables is essentially to connect bodies and their corresponding events and to see
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how they are either compatible or incompatible with one another.152 Incorporeals are not
substances or bodies; they are the effects of actions in the world. There is a gap here between
what is said and the states of affairs themselves, which Deleuze tries to resolve by claiming there
is sense that gives both the sayable and the state of affairs meaning. For Deleuze, the point here
is that the event is “an objective ontological ideality for the determination of states of affairs, but
only in so far as it is also understood to be an ongoing sense-event.”153 This produces a state of
affairs that is determined by various events and is ontologically dependent upon them. In this
move, Deleuze reveals an important connection between the virtual and the actual that is dictated
by the event of language.
Deleuze emphasizes the importance of language in relation to events, saying that events
are meant to be expressible and utterable.154 To expand upon the significance of language in
Deleuzian events, I turn to Leonard Lawlor’s point on events and their ties to verbs. Lawlor
states, “the event expressed in the proposition ‘the tree is green’ is not found in the predicate
“green,” but in the infinitive ‘to green.’”155 He goes on to say that for Deleuze this infinitive
gives the verb a power to divide into other tenses and this power makes the event unlimited.
Constantin Boundas agrees with the importance of the infinitive modes, saying that verbs in this
way “guarantee reversibility between past and future by virtue of the fact that they themselves
are untimely matrices. They stand for forces, intensities and acts, rather than substances or
qualities.”156 That is why it would not be accurate to characterize Deleuze’s notion of an event as
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a happening, as we will see in Heidegger. Events understood as happenings often take on the
gerundive tone, such as the spilling of coffee or the erecting of a monument, whereas the
infinitive verb “to green” has no such tone and subsists rather than exists. The happening of
spilling of coffee is not what concerns Deleuze, but rather how this happening affects the
material bodies as well as the effects that spilling has on those material bodies. For example, the
spilling of the coffee creates anger or humour, or at a different level it can alter someone’s shirt
by leaving a stain. This is why Deleuze does not wish to place events merely in an ideal world.
Events take on the language of the infinitive as they traverse between the real modes of the
actual and the virtual. Deleuze explains that events are virtual, but distributed in states of affairs.
The virtual always exceeds the actual in its possibilities, as exemplified by the spilling of coffee.
The variations are infinite, but the way the virtual actualizes is only one such possibility. This is
the process of actualization that events go through when they are actualized in day-to-day
activities.157
Let us now turn to one of Deleuze’s famous examples of an event in the opening
paragraphs of The Logic of Sense where he provides an analysis of Lewis Carroll’s Alice and
Through the Looking-Glass.158 He describes Alice’s growth as a pure event, in which Alice
simultaneously grows larger while becoming smaller, by which Deleuze means that as Alice
grows larger, she is larger than before, while also being smaller than she will be. Although at
first glance this appears to be contradictory, Deleuze reveals that this event is possible when we
consider time from a different perspective. The stages of becoming both larger and smaller are
not contradictory at all, because her state of becoming pulls at both the past and the future while
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eluding the present.159 Alice’s state of flux cannot be discussed as a state of presence, but needs
to be taken within the context of the dynamic sense of becoming that Deleuze wishes to
establish. In terms of the temporal dimension, there is no way of assigning precise measured
moments at each point of growth. As Bowden explains, the event is needed for temporal points
to even exist, rather than the other way around. Without the pure event, points t1, t2, etc. would
have no meaning.160 The process of an event has a temporal aspect that moves it away from the
past into a future that never comes, as it is always in the process of becoming something, which
incidentally leaves out the present. Events should not be considered as occurrences that happen
at a distinct place and time, and to which one can point to and say “there’s the event!” Events
have subtlety and play out as a process that cannot be identified at any given point in time.
Events are thus never fully in the present; they either have happened or are in a process of
becoming.
To explain this unique sense of temporality, Deleuze turns back again to the Stoics and
the distinction they make between the temporality of depths (Chronos) and surfaces (Aion). The
former is the limited present which accounts for actions of bodies and mixtures. The latter is the
unlimited past and future, which accounts for effects such as events at the surface. Deleuze
defines Chronos as “the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as causes
and the state of their mixture in depth” and Aion as “the essentially unlimited past and future,
which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects.”161 Events “subsist and insist” in the
infinitive form of Aion, meaning they do not exist like the bodies they affect.162 For Chronos,
only present time exists, while the past and future are relative to the present. For Aion, the past
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and future subsist in time and divide the present.163 These events have always already taken place
and are about to take place in the future. Thus, time stretches for Deleuze from its middle point
of the present towards the past and future. With the Stoic distinction between Aion and Chronos,
events can be explained as extra-temporal. Rather than thinking of time as merely a
chronological passage (Chronos), there is also Aion, an eternal sense of time, which houses
events and gives them their unique place. Aion is the “in-between” time in which events take
place and separates time from itself.164
The event is the point at which something occurs with the past and future on either side.
It is a passage from one dimension to another. In reference to Deleuze’s mathematical treatment
of points in time, De Beistegui states that time “is still a line” with points, but those points “are
the singular points of events, and not the ordinary points of states of affairs.”165 Thus, we have
come back around to see how Deleuze’s singular points work within his scheme of temporality
and the event. Even those singular points are not sudden interruptions, but the becoming of the
new angle in the square. They are the points at which the previous angle comes to meet the new
one and are the points at which the angle shifts. The singular is the stretching between the old
and the new, or the past and the future. In this matter, each instance of becoming is an instance of
a thing becoming something other. Where Deleuze differentiates himself from other notions of
becoming is in his view of becoming as an immanent process, rather than a transcendent one.
Events themselves are always conditioned by becoming and are only possible on the basis of
difference. It is not the difference between identities, but the different processes that occur at
level of the virtual and the actual.
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In consideration of this temporal factor in Deleuze’s theory of the event, we find that
Deleuze’s primary concern was indeed the overcoming of Platonism, through a theory of
immanence and becoming. Substances and Ideas limit our experience of the world by prioritizing
the static and the present, rather than the constant becoming that is the basis of events. To some
degree he shares this idea with Heidegger, who as we shall see is also an opponent of the
“objective presence” found in Plato, albeit Heidegger’s conclusions and methods are certainly
different from those of Deleuze, especially as he emphasises negativity. Events are not static
substances; rather, they are changing, intensifying effects of bodies and their interactions, as well
as the changes in intensity that occur between them. Therefore, Deleuze operates at the most
minute levels of events, where things are not necessarily seen or experienced evidently. The
Deleuzian event can be very subtle, but is nonetheless a vital change in which we pass from one
state into another. These changing states are conditioned only by the fact that they are in a
process of constant becoming. Here we have a beginning point of our discussion on the event
which will now be countered by Badiou.

Badiou and Badiou’s Deleuze
To say that Deleuze and Badiou do not share the same views on the event would be an
understatement. Jon Roffe states that their views of the event are so opposed that we can
“conclude that Deleuze’s view excludes every important feature of the event in terms of
Badiou’s own account.”166 There is even some contention as to whether or not Deleuze and
Badiou understood one another’s projects. For example, Bela Egyed cites several sources that
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say Deleuze’s treatment of Badiou was a fundamental misunderstanding of his work.167 Further
Egyed himself says that Badiou’s analysis of Deleuze is only “somewhat more generous.”168 I
plan to detail some of these disagreements as they pertain to the notion of the event and beyond.
As the reader will see, these disagreements were never fully resolved, in most part because they
simply had vastly different approaches.
To understand the differences between Deleuze and Badiou requires an analysis of
Badiou’s thought as a whole. Badiou’s philosophy seeks a return to ontology over epistemology
and a philosophy of language. Epistemology focuses on knowledge over truth, while ontology
looks at what Badiou calls “truth procedures.” Truth is always something new, whereas
knowledge is what repeats. The new for Badiou is what he calls the void, the nothing, or the
coming-to-be of truth.169 These concepts draw a distinction between truth and knowledge. For
Badiou, truth occurs in four domains: art (particularly in poetry), politics, science (particularly in
mathematics) and love. These generators or conditions do not communicate directly, but through
their relation to truth. For example, art produces its own truths, which conditions philosophy in a
certain manner, while science may have its own set of truths that condition philosophy
differently. The task for philosophy is to account for all of these truth procedures by looking at
situations in a more general manner, outside of the particular ways of an artist or a scientist. In
other words, philosophy must conceptually seize these truth generators and by doing so turns
them into conditions of philosophy.170 Badiou believes that problems can occur when philosophy
tries to become one of its conditions, such as the case of Heidegger’s philosophy and his
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involvement with the Nazi party. In cases like this, philosophy tries to produce truth in domains
that are external to it, rather than allow truth to happen and condition philosophy. Justin Clemens
explains that philosophy can be sutured by the conditions which suppress it by making
philosophy follow one general procedure. All of thought gets put through one problem, as
exemplified by Marxism which sutures philosophy into political condition, or Romanticism to
the artistic condition.171 That is why it is crucial to maintain this difference and for philosophy to
remain conditioned by these four domains. There are no philosophical events as such, only
events created by conditions of philosophy.
Badiou resists prioritizing any single condition as the main producer of truth, but believes
mathematics plays an essential role. Contrary to Heidegger, Badiou believes mathematics, rather
than poetry, is what allowed Greek thought to emerge, although as noted by its conditions, both
mathematics and poetry have an important place in Badiou’s theory. Christopher Norris states
that poetry “has pride of place within Badiou’s conception of art as one of those enabling
‘conditions’ that allow us to grasp the history of truth as progressively revealed through a
sequence of world-transformative events which set new terms for artistic, political, scientific or
ethical fidelity.”172 It is not that Badiou wants to devalue poetry, but that he believes it is not the
sole site of truth.173 The four conditions all play important roles in philosophy, particularly for
the ancient Greeks. Although Badiou believes ancient philosophy was conditioned greatly by
mathematics, it was done so in the language of poetry: “poetry is mother of philosophy,” while
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“mathematics is father of philosophy.”174 Thus, both of these conditions have their rightful place
in the production of truth, but with mathematics at the forefront.
Badiou’s insistence on the importance of mathematics stems from his belief that
mathematics allowed the Greeks to break from doxa, or common-sense belief, and develop a
more complete sense of the world.175 For Badiou, this development in knowledge was an event.
Although Greeks undoubtedly advanced poetry, Badiou thought their advancements in
mathematics, particularly in the field of axiomatic-deductive reasoning, was far more crucial.176
That said, Badiou relies on modern mathematics rather than looking back to Greek arithmetic.
The idea of genus and species posits that there must be a limit point or specific difference
(differentia specifica), otherwise a series would infinitely regress. This limit point has been
posited in different ways throughout the history of philosophy and includes such propositions as
the omnipotent, infinite God, the One, the unmoved mover, or nature. However, we should not
think of Badiou’s mathematical foundations as abstract expressions, as they have real
consequences in the world. Badiou posits that there are “situations” that can be considered “any
presented multiplicity,” meaning they have very broad possibilities.177 In his theory, the One is
not, or is a derivative of the many, which is why Badiou emphasizes the multiple.178 He says this
in an effort to move away from the notion that being can be unified. But what is presented and
experienced in everyday life is unified. The only way to think being is to present it in a situation
“which means that we have to subtract from this fundamental multiplicity an element that will
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‘count-as-one’ in order to present it.”179 This allows for multiplicity to be properly presented in a
situation. For example, people live in a situation with pre-established givens that dictate to some
extent their ethical, political, and aesthetic interactions. A situation can be many things including
a country, a demonstration, or even an atom.180 Coming to terms with a situation means
recognizing what does and does not belong to it.
Badiou’s theory rests upon the distinction between belonging versus inclusion.181
Belonging is a relation of elements to sets and inclusion is the relation of sets to subsets.
Something can belong and be included, which is the concept of normality. To belong but not be
included is the singular and to be included but not belong is what he calls the excrescent.182 In
political terms, the normal is a citizen of a state. Those that belong but are not included could be
slaves, or any repressed group of people. The final category are those that are included but do not
belong, such as spies in a state.183 These situations can only be interrupted and altered by
something extrinsic to being, which Badiou calls events. Events are contingent, new, outside of
ontology; they are in the realm of the unthinkable. Events are ruptures in established “modes of
conceptual grasp.”184 Events are a kind of negation as the truth that is caused by the event makes
a hole in knowledge. In an event, we must consider making the unthinkable happen, meaning
that we can begin to include all those that belong. So for instance, the French Revolution
overturned the dominant ideology of the monarchy and put in place democratic notions of
freedom and liberty. This forced people to adopt a position which was not previously considered.
It was a violent rupture that overturned a previously untouchable power and allowed for the
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possibility of new forms of thought and governance. The opening of new worlds allows for the
possibility of overturning the dominant discourse. This illustrates that Badiou’s theory of the
event hinges upon the idea that there must be a fundamental negation or void. The new arises
from this void and shifts the situation to something previously unthinkable.
The political consequences of Badiou’s philosophy are evident. Excluded parts are
covered over by dominant ideology, but do not usually stay quiet for long. In cases such as the
French Revolution, the excluded population or forms of thought were building under the surface
even though they were held quiet by the dominant ideology. However, the exclusion of those
beliefs from the dominant ideology prevented them from being managed and could thus come to
the surface at any time. But an event is needed for the excluded part to become visible, otherwise
it will stay beneath the surface. Once it comes to the surface, these excluded parts produce truths,
subjects and systems. While this is a very simplistic explanation of the complexity of those
particular situations and events, it is meant to show how a situation can be interrupted by
something which was not previously possible. Badiou explains that the evental site is an
abnormal multiple, meaning that “none of its elements are presented in the situation.”185 The
event interrupts the present situation to produce something new (a void) and a site is created that
produces faithful subjects. That is why subjectivity has a special meaning for Badiou, as it can
only arise from an event. Subjects are created by acting upon the event and countering the
dominant ideology. However, events are random and very rare for Badiou. Political
confrontations do not necessarily become events. They must change the situation to be
considered events.
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In the occurrence of the event, something new must happen that produces a truth. Truth
appears only because an event interrupts repetition. In the case above, monarchic rule was a
repetition of the same, while an attempt to establish democratic values was the interruption of
those ideals. But the event is not a pure fact, as people must decide whether what has happened is
an event. As the event is rare for Badiou, it can only come to fruition with continued fidelity by
subjects, or what James Williams calls “militant fidelity.”186 This means that when something
occurs, in order for the occurrence to become an event, people need to recognize its importance
with continued support and devotion. With persistent fidelity, the event is named and eventually
recognized as an event as such; otherwise the occurrence will only remain part of the status quo.
Fidelity to the event is what keeps it alive. As soon as fidelity has dissipated so too does the
event. For example, there are still those that are faithful to the events of May ’68, but there is no
such fidelity to the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Perhaps there are some
abstract concepts that can be translated to present times, but politically and socially times are
much too different to consider the ideas of the English Revolution to be an event in today’s era.
There have been many events that overcome old ones and produce new paradigms. The fidelity
to one movement helps name the event and produces a site in which we can say the event
occurred.
A site is only evental retroactively and it is named as such.187 We cannot anticipate an
evental site prior to the event occurring. Only when an event occurs can its site be deemed as
such. People must be engaged with the happening in order to determine if an event has occurred.
The decision to say that an event has occurred brings forth truth. The event is the truth of a
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particular situation, the unfolding of a new regime of truth that covers over the hegemonic
narrative by including the previously excluded. The unfolding of the new has practical and
material consequences, as political, social or cultural changes can occur from an event. Badiou
states that a new logic comes through, as exemplified by new artistic movements in which new
forms come to fruition or scientific revolutions where new theories replace old ones.188 Truth
finds its process in finite subjects but continues through different people and eras, thus the
process of truth is itself infinite. Truth is inside the world of material objects and subjects, but is
universal as it goes beyond the world.189 Therefore, despite being located in the finite world, the
effects of the event are infinite and come back to affect the material world.
As the reader sees, events are rare occurrences for Badiou because they need continual
support from loyal subjects. An event therefore distinguishes itself from an occurrence, as
occurrences happen on a perpetual basis, whereas events are important breaks with the status
quo. Badiou is not interested in sensation and the minute changes we see in bodies, but the major
conditions that shape and alter bodily interactions within historical circumstances. Unlike
Deleuzian events, which occur constantly, Badiouan events are rare and thus have an important
place in the world. For Deleuze, changes in intensity come from repeated patterns. Consequently,
events happen through people and not to them; as the intensity changes in people, altering their
values and priorities. For Badiou, events require much more than changes in intensity and can
only occur with fidelity to the event. As Clayton Crockett explains, “Badiou argues that for
Deleuze there are too many events, and that therefore an event does not represent a break from
the status quo, which means that Deleuze’s thought possesses no inherently radical politics and
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succumbs to the tyranny of the dominant capitalist practices.”190 It is evident to see why Badiou
critiques Deleuze for being aristocratic and detached from history, whether one believes the
critiques are fair or not.191 I do not see Deleuze’s focus on the minute as a weak politics, as much
as an attention to the detail of the everyday changes that we see. Bodily motion or shifts can be
as eventful as traumatic experience, even if they are not as immediately evident. Consider a
disease that slowly builds: there is a point of shift that alters the body that may not be
immediately evident, but has as much of an effect on a person (or even a population if the
disease is transmittable) as the firing of a bullet. Badiou however does not share this focus on the
micro level, putting his attention towards the political and social changes we see in historical
events. Only when people gather and decide on events can they be named as such. The focus for
Badiou is on human political agents and their role in the world.
Badiou’s critique of Deleuze extends far beyond the rarity of events. In his exposition on
Deleuze in Being & Event II, Badiou looks at what he believes are the four axioms of the event
in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense.192 I would like to outline each one of these axioms before I
analyze their most important aspects. The first axiom states that unlimited becoming becomes the
event itself. The event is the ontological realization of the eternal truth of the One, namely, the
One of becoming. This particular axiom is probably the most controversial as it reduces Deleuze
to a thinker of the One through his philosophy of becoming (a point that will be expanded upon
below). The second axiom states that the event is what happened and what will happen, it is
never present. There is a synthesis of past and future, as Deleuze does not want the event to be a
barrier between one world and another. Badiou sees a problem with Deleuze’s notion of time as
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an eternal instance of being. Without any division of time, there is no room left for the void, a
concept which we have seen is essential to Badiou’s own theory of the event. The third axiom is
that the event is distinct from the actions of bodies, but it is caused by them. The event itself has
an effect on and is an effect of those bodies. The final axiom is that life is composed of a single
event. This last axiom comes out of Deleuze’s communicative events, where Deleuze capitalizes
the term ‘event’ in some cases to denote a unique event through which all other events
communicate.193 Though I have not mentioned this point explicitly, it should be of no surprise
that Deleuze makes such connections between events since events connect to one another
through constant change in processes in material bodies. The event can be considered a field of
difference in which singular events occur.
Of these four axioms the first one stands out as the most problematic. Badiou claims that
Deleuze is a philosopher of the One, citing The Logic of Sense, in which Deleuze discusses
events as being One, or under the idea of the One.194 At first, this claim seems implausible as
Deleuze sees ideas of essence or the One tied to the Platonic ideal; ideals which we have seen he
refutes in great detail.195 For Badiou, however, Deleuze’s theory expresses the One through
unlimited becomings, meaning the state of constant becoming leaves no room for a void that is
necessary in being. Thus, Deleuze’s idea of becoming replaces the One through unlimited
becoming, rather than static essences. Jon Roffe thinks Badiou’s claim that Deleuze is a thinker
of the One is problematic and the basis of this argument “leads Badiou astray from the very
beginning.”196 Part of Roffe’s argument against Badiou is based on how Deleuze sees the event
as essence, or essence as event, as well as Deleuze’s theory of becoming. These ideas enforce the
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idea of multiple changes over primary unity.197 Roffe explains that Badiou’s formulation of
Deleuze’s events leads Badiou to conclude that since events are effects, they cannot be the basis
of the new as they are not causes.198 Clayton Crockett also opposes Badiou’s claim that Deleuze
is a philosopher of the One, saying that Deleuze opposed the one by liberating simulacra from
models, copies and forms.199 In this case I tend to side with Roffe and Crockett in their critiques
of Badiou. I do not see Deleuze’s theory being reduced to the One, as events in their singularity
are still unique and reducing them under the umbrella of the One tends to downplay their unique
character. The truth of an event for Deleuze cannot be reduced to the One, as their truth lies in
their constant folding and unfolding.
Badiou’s entire critique reduces Deleuze to a kind a Platonist, which is further
exemplified by how Badiou sees Deleuze’s formulation of the virtual as a kind of Platonism.200
Badiou’s claim here is that the Idea is simply the virtual for Deleuze, as it grounds the actual.
Crockett refutes Badiou’s claim that Deleuze’s idea of the virtual is another name for being,201 in
which Badiou says Deleuze’s virtual is ultimately creating the ontological difference of being
versus beings.202 Crocket sees the virtual as a ground, but it certainly does not possess the
transcendent properties of a Platonistic ideal and is not an ontological split. I do not share
Badiou’s critique of Deleuze as a kind of Platonist, as that perpetuates the notion that the actual
needs the virtual in the same way as a copy needs its model. Deleuze wants to reformulate this
Platonistic model completely through radical becoming in which the virtual and the actual are in
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a constant state of flux, rather than the virtual as possessing any kind of ground to which the
actual is meant to conform. Further, I do not see Deleuze’s omission of the void as a sign that he
is a Platonist in any way. I can understand Badiou’s critique as he seeks radical change only
possible with the void, but keeping in mind Deleuze’s micro scale, we would not see the same
radical changes as we do in Badiou. No void is necessary in the changing states of emotion or
sensation. These are subtle variances that are in constant flux and do not require sudden dramatic
shifts. Thus, Badiou’s critique fails to account for the variation in scale between his and
Deleuze’s theories. Next, I would like to discuss the impact of these differences on their
respective theories on art.

Badiou and Deleuze on Artistic Events
In his Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou lays out three schemata of how philosophy and art have
been linked throughout different points in history.203 The first is the didactic schema, which
comes from Plato’s theory that stipulates that art is incapable of truth. Plato’s theory deems some
forms of art to be imitations or semblances of truth. This is exemplified in his dialogue Ion, in
which Plato is critical of orators and their use of rhetoric. By using rhetorical speech, orators
have the power to persuade the public with their use of language. Art must therefore be kept
under careful surveillance and control so that it does not influence the public in any adverse
ways. Furthermore, Ion himself, as he performs Homer, loses himself in imitation, thus art can
have adverse affects on the performers as well. The problem with this schema, as Badiou
explains, is that truth is considered extrinsic to art. In this schema, art is not immanent, meaning
that it is not coextensive with the truths that it generates.204 Without intrinsic value, art can be
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easily controlled and can influence the population by the will of its leaders, or in the case of Ion,
through rhetorical practices. We have already seen Deleuze’s rejection of Platonism and how
Plato deals with artists and art in the Republic, but Badiou’s writing on Plato is considerably
different. Badiou explains there is more to Plato’s critique of philosophy than we have perhaps
said.205 Plato does not dismiss art tout court, but has a problem with mimetic poetry, a point that
is very similar to the one Deleuze makes. Plato makes a distinction between Ideas, the material
objects, and the mimetic representations of those objects made by artists. For example, a bed has
some correspondence to the ideal of a bed and the image replicated by the artist. Counter to
Plato, for Badiou we can only find true life with poetry, as philosophy cannot be completely
abstract. Badiou notes that poetry is always in material and natural language and can be found in
any act of language.206 Even in texts that are not naturally poetic, poetry can be found, which is
why Badiou believes that Greek mathematics were still poetic. In this sense, poetry can open the
way toward truth, without falling into the mimetic trap. To some extent he shares this belief with
Heidegger, but explains why he ultimately splits with Heidegger through his next schema.
The second schema is the Romantic schema, which holds that art alone is capable of
truth, a position that he says is taken on by Heidegger.207 In his brief discussion of Heidegger,
Badiou explains that for Heidegger anything outside of being is a negative counter to art. In the
Romantic schema art’s relation to truth is immanent, as “art exposes the finite descent of the
Idea.”208 The work of art for Heidegger opens forth phusis (being), while the nothing stands apart
from being.209 Most importantly, in Badiou’s mind this schema exemplifies the ties between the
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poet and the thinker, rendering the message of poetry the same as any philosophical truth. As we
have seen, Badiou does not adopt such an extreme position, saying that art is not the only means
of getting to the truth of being. Badiou’s problem with this approach is that art is not the sole
producer of truths as Heidegger wants us to believe. Art is merely one of the conditions of
philosophy that produces truth; otherwise, philosophy risks suturing itself to one of its
conditions. I tend to agree in part with Badiou’s assessment that Heidegger limits his vision of
truth as a process of revealing. As I will outline in the following chapter, this causes some of
Heidegger’s limitations with respect to art and its modes of truthful productions, particularly
when it pertains to technological advances.
The third schema is the classical schema that posits that art is incapable of truth, but this
does not pose a serious problem for Badiou. This schema was proposed by Aristotle, contra
Plato, and places art outside of philosophy.210 For Aristotle, the aim of art was therapeutic
(catharsis) and not cognitive or revelatory. This absolves art of being untrue, because it deals
with the sense and not thought. It assigns art an innocence by absolving it of any responsibility
towards truth or even thought. Badiou states that art is “entirely exhausted by its act or by its
public operation,” thus rendering it a public service.211 The most problematic aspect of this
schema for Badiou is that unlike the second schema, the role of truth has no place at all. All three
of these schemas have played a role in modern philosophy, as Badiou claims the twentieth
century offered no new schemas.212 Instead, the twentieth century adopted these three schemas in
different ways. Marxism took on the didactic view, psychoanalysis took the classical view and
Heideggerian hermeneutics adopted the romantic view. Badiou emphasizes that art, or poetry in
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particular is only one of the conditions of truth and should not be considered as the only site, nor
should it be dismissed completely. Elie During explains that Badiou does not privilege art
because it has no power to influence philosophy as such.213 Only through the event can we come
to know the truth, which is the case for art as well.
As discussed in the previous section, we have seen that for Badiou, poetry or art has close
relations to universal truths. Poetry is not a matter of plain facts: when reading it, one gets a
sense of a happening or event. Truths are universal because they are based on events, as they
reveal much more than what a local situation can say. Events are not necessarily limited by the
place in which they occur. Truths go beyond ontological laws from which they arise.214 These
notions of truth eliminate the spatial or temporal limitations of the set of facts that are presented
by a situation. In dealing with finite dimensions such as objects or materials in the world, art
creates truth that is concerned with the infinite. Therefore, the event is a reformulation of being
and its situation, and alters being through the creation of something new. This is an essential
aspect of Badiou’s artistic event, as During defines an artistic event for Badiou as a change in the
formula of the world of art.215 In Badiou’s own words, “Artistic events are great mutations that
almost always bear on the question of what counts, or doesn’t count, as form.”216 An artistic
event is the coming to form of what was previously not within the situation of art; it is the
formalization of something previously unformed.
The formalization of events is dictated by a strength and weakness of events. For
example, there were abstract paintings during classical art periods, but they were ignored or were
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not considered to be great art. Once the avant-garde revolution took over, abstract art became the
norm and the event changed the strength of their existence from weak to strong. Something can
therefore exist without being considered an event, as the setting of time and place can influence
how we see particular works. We have discussed how this is often the case for Badiou as events
require fidelity from subjects, something which is often not the case with artists who explore
unknown genres during different artistic epochs. Thus, the situation dictates how a work may be
seen, but only an event can alter the situation. The abstract works of the past were non-events for
Badiou, which is why they did not change the artistic paradigm. He explains that individual
works are not the events themselves, which is why a single work does not entail an event. One of
the most important statements that Badiou makes is that a work of art is not itself an event, it is a
fact of art.217 A work is also not a truth; truth is the artistic procedure initiated by an event, a
procedure that is made up of various works, but not manifest in any of them.218 He goes on to say
that a work is the differential point of truth and a subject point of artistic truth. This is to be
differentiated from an event which is a group of works which he names a singular multiple of
works. Thus, a group of works produces an artistic configuration, which is not to be conflated
with a period or genre of art, but is an “identifiable sequence, initiated by an event.”219 This
sequence in turn produces a truth. Although he explicitly states it is not a genre or period, Badiou
points to Greek tragedy as an example of artistic configuration, which is a very broad term
denoting both period and time.220 Nevertheless, strength comes out of artistic events that are
made up of a multiplicity of works, rather than a singular work. The value Badiou that places
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here once again is on the larger, rather than the smaller scale. No single artist, composition, or
work can produce an artistic event, which lessens the importance of singular compositions.
Badiou is also interested in overturning the idea of the artist as creator of art and thinks
that we should try to locate subjects in works themselves and not at the source with its creator.221
He calls the creator of works a “vanishing cause,” implying that the origin of the creation is not
what sets forth the events.222 Creators do not possess secrets that the works transmit. Subjects are
constituted by works or groups of works. A system of works configures a new subjectivity
through engagement with those works. No single work can constitute a new subjectivity; only a
system made up of numerous works can create this new mode of thought. Thus, fidelity to a type
of art produces and names the artistic event. This establishes a communal aspect to all kinds of
events as they can never be an isolated incident that happens without the consent of a group of
participants. This is in direct contrast to Deleuze, whose theory of the event does not necessarily
involve humans, let alone their participation in something as large scale as what we see in
Badiou. To some extent, Badiou’s theory also reduces some of the unique qualities of each work
by grouping events into a whole. Although Badiou is never dismissive of individual works
outright, his theory here implies that the importance of works only lies in their relation to a
whole system that includes works and the subjects that are faithful to them.
Once again, this is in contrast to Deleuze who prioritizes the singularity of each work
over a genre. In his remarks on Deleuze, Antonio Calcagno notes that for Deleuze, art works
should not be grouped into styles or genres, as this obscures a work’s unique qualities. Each art
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work has its own essence that makes up a multiplicity of works.223 This puts more focus on the
detail of each composition rather than how it might fit in within a greater scheme. This focus on
composition is made evident in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, What is Philosophy?, in which they
say composition is the sole definition of art.224 In this work, the authors do not focus their
attention on how art may be impactful on a large scale, but rather on what kind of affects and
sensations art produces. This is an idea shared in part with Badiou who recognizes the affective
role of art in the formation of the previously formless. For example, the truth of art reveals itself
in the affective process of pleasure in the case “a new perceptual intensity.”225 This means that
subjects begin to become faithful to artistic events partly by their ability to be affected by
particular groups of works. Deleuze and Guattari focus more on the process of change in
individual works and subjects, rather than groups. They say that the materiality of a work passes
into sensation, which produces an affect that is metallic, stony, etc. Materials blend into the other
and we forget about it in our experience of sensation.226 These sensations become so powerful
that we become other in the experience of the work of art, meaning that we engage with the work
that the material aspects become replaced by the worldly objects they represent. How we
confront an event is up to us, but it is nevertheless imposed upon us, forcing us to act. The goal is
to ultimately “extract a bloc of sensations” in the work.227 What is then preserved in the work is
the bloc of sensations. These are the percepts and affects which are beings whose validity lies in
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themselves, rather than outside of them. Therefore, the work of art exists in itself and is
preserved in itself, not by something extrinsic to it.228
These two contrasting views of the event greatly impact their views on art and how they
approach artistic works. Badiou notes the importance of works within their historical place as
each work can only become an event if it has an effect on the world of art and its subjects,
ultimately creating a regime of the artistic event. No single work has enough power to transform
a paradigm without further communal fidelity. The communal aspects that make up Badiou’s
theory impact each philosophical condition, with each event relying on fidelity in order to exist.
A single work placed arbitrarily in history can have no impact, if there is no fidelity from
subjects to consider it an event. In contrast to these grander views, Deleuze’s exploration of
sensation and singularity place each work and potentially each brush stroke, each note, or each
chisel within their own particular location. There is ultimately no need to reconcile these two
viewpoints, as Deleuze and Badiou give us two distinct points of view on the event. What I aim
to do next is to show how each one influences blues music.

What Makes Blues Music an Event?
Now that we have established two of the more important views of the event, we can begin to
explore what makes blues music an event. As we have seen there are a number of factors that
make blues music history a complicated one. Deleuze and Badious’s theories centre the
discussion on one particular theme, namely, the event. But even in this context we have two very
distinct positions on what we call events and how art plays a role. As I alluded to earlier, we
must consider events on two different planes: the micro and the macro. This means we need to
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look at how blues music is played, as well as its place in history and its evolution as a musical
form. These two philosophers are useful to our project as they each provide one element of the
aforementioned dyad. On the micro side we have Deleuze, whose theory of events consists of
micro changes in bodies and the sensations that they produce. On the macro side we have
Badiou, whose events are large, paradigm shifting occurrences that alter being in significant
ways. When dealing with a topic as broad as blues music, we need to consider it from both of
these perspectives in order to understand it in greater detail.
Considering Deleuze’s evental connectivity, we can posit those ideas in relation to the
field of blues and artistic events. There are two levels of events here that can be incorporated into
a theory of artistic events. For example, blues music has its own set of codes, rhythms, and scales
that unify the genre to some degree. In playing the blues, musicians participate in singular events
that make up an Event that we can generally call blues music. It is only when those particular
things are done that leads us to say this person is playing blues music. Taken out of context, the
“blues” note in a scale has no meaning, it only garners its meaning when it is played within the
relation of the other notes on the scale; this is what can be meant by the micro scale. The
individual notes comprise a whole of a scale which constructs a whole of a song. This is
paralleled on a larger scale when one takes a blues song and puts it within the context of blues
music. Songs make up a genre, as they encompass some general rules of music, along with other
musical properties such as tone or intonation. But as we saw earlier, we need to be careful in
categorizing music in such a way with Deleuzian theory. There needs to be a focus on the
singularity and uniqueness of each song without resorting to a categorization of genres or styles,
otherwise we lose these unique singularities. That is why Nick Nesbitt looks at musical
composition from the Deleuzian view of internal difference. Traditionally we have come to know
87

chords within their scale position (e.g. C major is the tonic or I chord in the scale of C, but the IV
in scale of G). This creates a hierarchy of chords that differentiates each chord through its
relation to the others in a scale. Nesbitt cites a couple of examples in serious music that changed
this view including Wagner’s “Tristan chord,” which challenged the idea of where chords are
meant to belong.229 Similarly, Schoenberg employed what Nesbitt calls “a music of sheer
immanence,” where notes do not have reference to outside authority, giving each note its own
moment.230 Both of these examples call into question how we should look at musical
compositions as a whole.
I think challenging the idea of where chords may belong is essential to the progression
and evolution of music, but disagree with Nesbitt’s view of how individual chords or notes have
an immanent effect. Notes need to have some rule of hierarchy, otherwise they become arbitrary
and to a great extent un-musical. If I were to pluck 70 random notes in an arbitrary sequence,
with no rhythm, it would be difficult to necessarily classify what I did as music at all. The notes
or chords need to have some relation to each other in order to be called music, otherwise we lose
the idea of musicality completely. That does not mean we cannot explore musical limits and go
beyond them, which is Badiou’s precise point on events. The ideas that are imposed upon
situations that carry them onward and create something new are essential to building new sounds
and even new genres and styles. But there is a need for some form, otherwise we collapse into
complete chaos. I understand the desire to try and push Deleuze’s theory in this manner, with his
focus on immanence and the individual, but even Deleuze believes there is relationality, which is
at the forefront of his theory. This balance between the singular and the whole has to be
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maintained; otherwise the singularities have no purpose. It is essentially a matter of the small and
the large that is at question. Do we consider blues music from the point of view of the singular
occurrence, or from the broad spectrum of happenings that make up its history?
Blues music straddles this line between the idea of the small and large scale that we see
in both Badiou and Deleuze. There is no definitive answer, even when we consider only one of
the two perspectives, evidenced by Nesbitt’s reading of Deleuze. I turn back to Badiou here, and
how he considers events from a less magnified, larger picture. It should be of no surprise that
both Badiou and Deleuze discuss music to some degree. For Badiou, musical events have a large
scale structure, even if they are focused on one particular composer or artist. Specifically, Badiou
believes there are important distinctions that can be made in different eras, and how one era can
make way for another. For example, Schoenberg’s music reveals the truth of Wagner, or
Mahler.231 It is only when we come to know a novel form of music that we can then understand
the impact of a previous form. With the contemporary form of serious music, we can understand
classical forms of music better. This relates back to Badiou’s general theory of the event in
which events are designated as such only retrospectively. There is no immediate event in Badiou,
only ones that can be apprehended retrospectively through continued fidelity of subjects who
name an event as such. Badiou admits that art allows us to see these differences more evidently
than in other disciplines. In my view, this has to do with the fact that art plays on the senses so
much that it becomes immediately evident when something new or revolutionary arrives. It is
easy to see or hear an artistic event, but much more difficult for the average person to know a
scientific event. That is why artistic events are so vital, as they can be seen, heard and understood
almost immediately in many cases by anyone in the population. Political or scientific events are
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often not understood by the average citizen, at least in an immediate setting. This is most likely
why Badiou insists on the affectivity of events, as they play a crucial role in moving subjects in a
particular manner. This is evident when a new genre of music forms, enabling subjects to
designate its importance in relation to the situation.
Blues music is a kind of opposition to serious classical music, in several ways. Rather
than rely on classical forms of composition, blues music developed from a different musical
paradigm that did not rely on classical training. To me, this signals a complete break from
classical forms, even if blues is not the first form of music to do so. It is nevertheless an
important break from tradition coming from a culture that had no access to classical training, at
least in its beginning stages. This shift is the type of paradigm shift to which Badiou refers in
artistic events. We can now see blues music as such an event because of its break from
traditional forms of composition that move our focus away from the written score to the
individual player. It not only created important individual methods of playing, but in Badiou’s
terms established a complete set of playing possibilities that were never heard before. Similarly,
the manner in which the blues is played also constitutes the new in a Deleuzian sense, because it
constantly re-interprets each song. There is movement within each song when individual players
improvise new segments. Therefore, the blues is a presentation of the new on both the micro and
the macro scale.
However, Badiou disputes the importance of pop music, saying it has not done anything
new that cannot be achieved or found in serious music.232 He clarifies that he does not like the
term “pop” in reference to art or music, saying that there is “art of entertainment,” but does not
like putting art in such a hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, Badiou does categorize some forms
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of art as purely for entertainment without necessarily saying what belongs in this category. He
also admits there is one exception to the rule of pop or entertainment music that can compete or
challenge serious music and that is jazz. As I will discuss extensively in Chapter Four, this view
is contrary to Adorno’s discussions on the importance of jazz. Unlike Adorno, who is very
skeptical of jazz’s importance, Badiou believes classical or serious music did not anticipate
jazz.233 This lack of anticipation is essential to the extrinsic nature of events that is outside of the
situation. Blues music is a perfect example of a rupture to white hegemony, which never
considered this kind of music to be serious. But as soon as communities adopted the blues, it
became an event, specifically one of black culture.
When analyzed from both of these perspectives the argument can be made that blues
music is both the new rupture that caused a shift in musical thought and a kind of music that ebbs
and flows in its playing, always becoming something different, never staying the same.
Improvisation allows the blues to transform itself with every playing, thus not relying on a
model, but participating in the Deleuzian simulacra, wherein the music can simply be played
without the focus remaining on the score to act as a model which must be copied. Thus, blues
music is a kind of difference in itself that exemplifies Deleuze’s point perfectly. This new
manner of playing was also an important step away from the musical paradigm that dominated
the cultural ethos. In Badiouan terms, although other forms of musical composition existed for an
extended period of time, it was only after the abolition of slavery that it was allowed to flourish.
Once subjects had the freedom to communicate, they forced the event of a new kind of music to
the forefront. In this sense, the micro and the macro changes are both exemplified through blues
music’s counter of written and classically composed music.
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At this point I would like to discuss some aspects of race and its effects on the micro and
macro levels. As we know, at its roots blues music was influenced by field songs and various
other forms of music performed by African American slaves. On a macro level, Western music
was written, composed, and played primarily by white people, on the other hand the blues (and
other contemporary forms of music), was played for and by African Americans. It was a
complete break from white European notions of composition and gave African Americans a form
of music they could call their own. Badiou’s philosophy is particularly important in this case, as
field songs were an unanticipated break from traditional European music. Blues music is an
important event because it was not anticipated, not only from a purely musical standpoint, but
from a racial one as well. Western music certainly changed because of this event and blues music
has contributed to overturning the white classical musical paradigm.
Neither Badiou, nor Deleuze account for the totality of blues music as an event, but both
contribute significantly to the discussion. In the following chapter, I look at Heidegger’s views
on the artistic event and contrast them with the ones presented in this chapter. As I have alluded
to briefly in a few segments, Heidegger’s thesis has some similarities with Badiou’s in particular,
but we will see that there are significant differences. Heidegger sees a particular work as a
happening, something which differentiates him greatly from Badiou. Whereas Badiou sees
events as a configuration of subjects and works, only possible in retrospect, Heidegger sees the
work tied directly to its culture and consequently as a place where the truth happens. In fact,
Heidegger’s theory does not allow for retrospective events, as events happen in and during the
culture with which they are entwined. Works of art perish when they are ripped from those
cultures and cannot continue on in the same way as they did at their point of origin. Thus,
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Chapter 3 – Heidegger and the Cultural Happening
In Chapter One, I explored some of the history of blues music alongside some of the changes we
saw in music production and its listeners throughout the years. In the translator’s introduction to
the Introduction to Metaphysics, Gregory Fried and Richard Polt explain that according to
Heidegger, things become accessible or intelligible through an event or happening.234 Being as
such manifests itself through historical events, because for later Heidegger being is historically
situated. In this chapter, I aim to expand upon these points in greater detail. The foundation of
this chapter will be Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art, an important piece in the later
Heidegger’s theory on being and the event. The text will serve as a basis for discussions on art,
truth, technology and most importantly, the artistic event. Although the Origin mostly examines
art, it is complemented by Heidegger’s other works from both his early and his later periods.
However, I will focus predominantly on his later period to show that these works illustrate
Heidegger’s belief that being and history are tied together and that how being reveals itself
depends on the culture in which we live. Art plays a role in determining that culture and thus
alters the ways that we can experience being. For Heidegger, art’s eventful nature reveals its
importance within a particular epochal horizon, which is pertinent to my discussion on how blues
music is one such form of revealing. Exploring Heidegger’s theory on art will bring us closer to
understanding how and why artistic events such as blues music develop.
In addition to examining the later Heidegger, I will continue the discussion from the
previous chapter on Deleuze and Badiou with the hopes of showing that where their theories end,
Heidegger’s begins. The micro and the macro scale which was posited in the last chapter will be
further expanded upon to show how being manifests itself through culture and that blues music is
234
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a Heideggerian happening. Toward the end of the chapter, we will see that in the case of blues
music there is an essential component that fundamentally alters this event, namely, technological
reproduction. Without accounting for the impact of technology on the artistic medium,
Heidegger’s theory ultimately fails to properly develop a complete analysis of the artistic event.

“Truth” in the Philosophical Tradition
Before I highlight some of the main points of this chapter, I want to remind the reader that
despite its title, Heidegger’s focus in Origin is not art as such. He has never been interested in
providing a philosophy of art or a theory of aesthetics. Heidegger critiques the aesthetic approach
to art and its focus on beauty, consisting of what we find relaxing or pleasing. He explains that if
art is merely considered in those terms, then art “belongs in the domain of the pastry chef.”235
Heidegger believes that aesthetics reduces art along a subject/object divide by focusing on the
reception of art and its relation to feeling - a divide he wants to eliminate.236 Works of art are not
a matter of passive reception or sensory experience; rather, the focus of the work is and always
has been, being and more specifically in this context, the unconcealment of being. That is why
when we look to a passage in the Origin, we find an understanding of beauty as the shining-forth
of truth. Heidegger explains, “This shining, joined in the work is the beautiful. Beauty is one way
in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment."237 Thus, beauty participates in the
unconcealment of truth and is not a matter of passive aesthetic reception.
Every one of Heidegger’s texts focuses on being and how we experience the truth of its
shining. However, that is not to say Heidegger wants to brush art aside as a meaningless pastime,
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far from it. Art plays a significant role in our experience of being, and for Heidegger, it lies
central to the question of epochal being. Art is not necessarily what we see on walls and observe
for mere pleasure, it is part of the Zeitgeist238 and is a window onto how different epochs
experience being. But the manner in which being reveals itself changes for Heidegger; while
being reveals itself in numerous ways for the later Heidegger, the early Heidegger offered a
different approach.
In Being & Time, Heidegger believes that the question of the meaning of being has been
ignored, a point highlighted in his opening statement from the book.239 He thinks that the best
way to get back to it is through the analysis of an entity he calls Dasein. Dasein is the being for
whom being is a question.240 Thus, there is no better way of accessing being than looking at how
Dasein exists in its average everydayness. But Heidegger knows Dasein is only another entity241
and not being itself. Dasein lives amongst other beings and has unique access to the meaning of
being because it is the only being that ek-sists.242 Despite this unique position, Dasein is not
being as such. This is why Heidegger believes that examining Dasein will only give us a
preliminary sketch and not the complete picture of being itself. Nevertheless, he holds this is the
best approach to resolving the question of the meaning of being in Being and Time. We cannot
access being through art or culture in the same manner that we can through Dasein, because they
are only activities with which Dasein occupies itself in its average everydayness and not
Dasein’s main concern.243 Art and culture are relegated to the world of Das-Man, which is a
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mode of inauthentic existence for Heidegger. This is not the authentic being-towards-death that
ultimately concerns Dasein, and so art has a lesser value for the early Heidegger.
Further, in Heidegger’s On the Essence of Truth we find more of his early thoughts on
truth and being. Although he begins to look at the epochal aspects of being and truth, he
maintains that being is seen through particular beings in each epoch, and as a consequence being
as such is forgotten. We pay attention to a limited range of being, which leads us astray from
being as such. What we will see in his later texts is that Heidegger changes his views on how
being and history work together. Whereas this text explains the limitation of being through
historical epochs, later Heidegger will explain that truth and being as such can only reveal itself
through particular historical epochs. In other words, being and history will be tied together much
more closely for the later Heidegger. James Magrini explains that the difference between the
early and later Heidegger should not be considered a complete break, but a turn toward a new
way of thinking being.244 Whereas the early Heidegger considered Dasein as the site of truth’s
disclosure, the later Heidegger developed concepts that included Dasein, but ultimately went
beyond it. After Heidegger’s “turn” (Kehre), he begins to see being as historically situated and
acknowledges the importance of culture, art, technology and history in how we experience being.
As Gianni Vattimo states in the End of Modernity, for the later Heidegger “the world instead
becomes a world, and this at least indicates that the unfolding of truth cannot be conceived of as
a stable structure, but rather always as (an) event.”245
With this quotation, we can immediately begin to see the major differences between the
later Heidegger and the Heidegger of Being and Time. First, being in this case does not need to
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be mediated through Dasein. The work of art allows being to reveal itself as it is. Secondly,
being is tied to a particular epoch. As I will demonstrate below, Heidegger illustrates that the
cathedral in medieval times or the Greek temple were much more than buildings designed for
worship or the appreciation of beauty.246 They are the places where God presences himself. This
was a fundamental belief of the people of that time which is why the cathedral is not merely an
object that has artistic value, but one that exemplifies the being of that time. Being is no longer
disassociated from history, but rather is engrained in the historical and cultural practices of a
people. This greatly impacts Heidegger’s idea of significance and relevance. If the projects of a
people determine the being of a people, then the world of being is not a-historical. Being is
fundamentally tied to the world of a particular time and place. Therefore, how someone
experiences being can be determined by where and when they are born.
What we find in the Origin is that the work of art has the ability to reveal the being of a
particular epoch. The work of art is not a work of representation that re-presents an object in
pictorial form. For Heidegger, the work of art has a much greater purpose; to reveal the truth of
being as unconcealment (aletheia).247 One of Heidegger’s main concerns with the tradition is its
use of the word ‘truth.’ Overcoming metaphysics is the key to looking at art within a different
horizon, one which does not look at truth through ideas of identity, causality, epistemological
veridicality, or transcendental and dialectical explanation of beings.248 The way we look at truth
alters the way we look at art and consequently how we look at being. This term (truth) has
particular importance in Heidegger’s work and is worthy of further expansion before we go any
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further. Unconcealment in Heidegger’s work is synonymous with truth; a term he believes has
been altered greatly since its usage in pre-Socratic times.
Among the many other texts of Heidegger’s that discusses truth in detail is one
mentioned previously: On the Essence of Truth. Heidegger’s critique of the history of truth lies
in the traditional misinterpretation of what truth means and how we use it in our language. Truth
has traditionally been conceived of as a correspondence of knowledge to matter, or as the
adequation of our intellect to the thing.249 To summarize briefly, there is a subject who thinks of
an object in their mind and there is a corresponding object out in the world. The two come
together in correspondence in a moment of conscious thought. This sets up the dichotomy
between mind and matter, or inside and outside. For Heidegger, this presents a limitation on truth
as merely a theory of correspondence and does not get to the heart of the situation. It creates a
duality between the subject and object. The idea of truth is reduced to the mind-body problem; a
problem he sees as unresolvable in its essence because it is methodologically flawed.250 We
should not consider truth in terms of subject and object, or a theory of correspondence. Rather,
we should try to recover the ancient definition of truth as unconcealment. Truth does not appear
in propositions, but in our comportment and how we relate to being and beings. In other words,
truth does not necessarily equate to something true, in cases such as facts. Although a fact may
indeed be true in the sense of correspondence, the fact itself is not necessarily revealing. For
example, if I list a number of provincial or state capitals, that may provide us with information,
but not necessarily any truth. That is why Heidegger claims truth is revealed as freedom, or in
letting beings be.251 By letting beings be, we leave space for being to flourish and to unconceal.

249

Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth.” In Basic Writings. (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 118.
Heidegger, OET, 127.
251
Heidegger, OET, 128.
250

99

Truth is an unconcealment of beings, only possible when it has the freedom to show itself. Truth
is, therefore, the revealing of beings and not a matter of correspondence to some outside world.
But to say that truth reveals itself only scratches the surface of its meaning.
Perhaps one way to consider concealment and unconcealment is by thinking of the life
and growth of an outdoor perennial plant.252 The seeds and roots of the plant are always present,
although we only see the plant’s growth during particular parts of the year. The plant withdraws
out of the earth and unconceals itself through its growth. During the other times of the year, the
plant sustains itself within the ground, but we do not see its growth or its constant micro changes.
However, just because the plant is not visible does not mean it is not present; it is concealed by
the earth.253 Once it is time for it to grow and come out of the earth, the plant shows itself and
blossoms to its full potential and comes out of concealment into unconcealment. That is what
truth means for Heidegger. The plant was no less a plant, or no less truthful when it was in the
ground, but it had not yet come out of concealment. Therefore, there is always a duality at play
in truth that has a constant concealment and unconcealment. The plant does not go out of
existence once it perishes for the year; rather, it goes back into concealment until the following
year. This is how truth works for Heidegger; it is a constant withdrawing and revealing. It is not
the mere fact that the plant exists that is at issue for Heidegger, but how it presents itself in the
world. The plant’s existence is not the primary concern in how truth functions because we know
it always exists in a technical sense. The plant’s blooming is the full shining-forth of which
Heidegger speaks.254
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From this example we can proclaim that for Heidegger truth is an expression of being.
We saw in Badiou that truth is an expression of the new, or the void. This is not the case for
Heidegger, as the truth is not a radical break in the same sense, but the unconcealment of what is
already there. This impacts the event, as Heidegger’s theory does not depend on such a radical
break with the situation. Instead, Heidegger believes that being reveals itself in different manners
depending on the situation, or the historical context. However, the questions of how and where
the truth reveals itself for Heidegger remain to be discussed.

Heidegger’s Further Critique of the Tradition
Heidegger critiques the many constructed dichotomies in the history of philosophy. I have
already discussed the dualities of subject/object and mind/body, but another equally important
one is of phusis and techne. The former two are dealt with more in his early works, whereas the
latter dichotomy becomes a central focus in his later work. Heidegger believes that the tradition
changed drastically when Plato changed the notion of being from phusis to Idea,255 a point which
he addresses in great detail in his work Introduction to Metaphysics. Being for ancient Greeks
meant appearing, but not in the derivative sense as in “something appears to be,” like when we
say that something appears to be true. Rather, appearing means a “shining-forth.”256 Being as
phusis is a letting-step-forth from out of concealment.257 As Heidegger states, “Being means: to
appear in emerging, to step forth out of concealment – and for this very reason, concealment and
the provenance from concealment essentially belong to Being.”258
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In his work On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics B,1, Heidegger
further explains the history of the term phusis. The Latin translation of phusis is natura or nature
in English. Although we have commonly heard that phusis means what is natural, and techne
refers to what is made or created by human beings, Heidegger believes this does a great
disservice to the original meaning of both these terms. He explains that this translation formed
dichotomies between nature and its counterparts such as art, history, and spirit.259 Heidegger
believes phusis is closely related to ousia, but ousia should not be translated as substance or
essence (as he says it has been in Latin); rather, it should be understood as beingness.260 It is a
mode of presencing that relates to movedness or coming out of itself. Phusis is about movement
and its relation to movedness. Objects have movement until completion, at which point they
come to a stop as they reach their completion. Beings are always in movement and have a
destination toward which they are always moving. For example, a piece of wood has potential to
become a table. The piece of wood fulfills its movement when it becomes the table. Heidegger
reverses the Aristotelian notion of actuality prior to potentiality. For Heidegger, a thing can only
be that which it has potential to become.261 As he explains, “Surely in order for something to be
‘actual’ and to be able to be ‘actual,’ it must first be possible. Thus, potentiality is prior to
actuality.”262 In other words, the wood that is meant to become a table must have the potential to
become a table prior to it becoming that table. For instance, a fish, or a salad would not make for
a very good table, because their potential is not destined toward being a table. They each have
their own distinct ends, but neither tends toward being a table in the same way as a piece of
wood.
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Heidegger goes on to say that phusis is an unfolding of itself or a “coming-intoappearance.”263 Phusis is being itself, where beings first become observable. Heidegger places
emphasis on the unfolding of phusis, or its unveiling. Phusis is the event of standing forth and
arising from concealment into unconcealment. Therefore, phusis and truth are closely related in
that they are concerned with unconcealment and the revealing of being. As the reader can see,
the process of revealing is an unravelling rather than an abrupt appearance, as Badiou had
mentioned. For Heidegger, revealing is truth, and to alter that meaning, is to alter the meaning of
truth itself. One way we should not consider phusis is by thinking it somehow stands in
opposition to techne as we have done throughout the tradition. Techne is another term that he
considers to be historically misrepresented.
In the Origin, Heidegger gives his most detailed account of techne, but his focus on
techne extends through many of his later writings including The Question Concerning
Technology. Although often translated as art or craft, Heidegger explains that techne is a mode of
knowing.264 Heidegger believes we have lost the meaning of techne. He explains that techne is
not a matter of technical discussion, but a bringing-forth. Techne is episteme, or knowing in the
widest sense.265 In yet another essay on techne, Heidegger says that knowing the end of what
makes a bedstead is what drives the creator to completion.266 Art as techne is thus knowledge of
what will be, it is the knowledge of a thing’s telos. It is the role of the artist to know this telos
and to deliver the work over to its proper end, which varies depending upon what the thing may
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be. Thus, art is not techne because it is about technical skill, but about knowledge of how to
bring things to the fore.
By recalling the ancient definition of techne, Heidegger seeks to recover the idea that the
role of the artist is a revealer, more than a maker. Heidegger is less interested in the technical
aspects of the work and more so what the work can produce as a form of revealing.267 That is
why he does not believe it is accurate to say techne was about craft; it was about revealing and
the ability to reveal through knowledge. The artist has the ability to reveal the world which they
create through various mediums. For example, it is not enough to say that the wood or the marble
can become something more than its bare materiality; one must know how to create the
sculpture, or the piece of furniture. This is also why Heidegger believes that we have strayed far
from this notion of techne when we use it in the form of technology.268 Our techne (technology)
reduces natural things to what he calls a “standing-reserve” which is to be used for our personal
gain.269 We exploit the resources in our world through technology in order to use them for
personal gain. This can include the cutting down of forests or how we use natural resources to
create energy. In any case, we have come to a point where techne (or modern technology) means
the ability to exploit, rather than the ability to reveal. His wariness of technology will be an
aspect that I will dispute in later sections, but for now I wanted to point out that Heidegger does
not see technology in a positive manner because of its perversion of techne. Technology is no
longer a form of revealing as it once was, but rather a way of being that dictates our current
cultural and economic landscape.
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Heidegger explains the term Idea means a ‘look’ or a coming to presence of a thing.270 It
is a thing’s whatness, but not its thatness, meaning the essence of what makes the thing what it
is, rather than the mere fact that it is.271 The change that Plato makes to the thing’s look through
his formation of the Idea means that being is relegated to resemblance and mimesis. Everything
now becomes an image of what it should or what it can be. We become susceptible to treating
everything in terms of their possibility as ideal things, rather than things in a concrete setting. As
mentioned in the chapter on Deleuze and Badiou, in Plato’s doctrine we find that there is a
hierarchy of being, with mimesis being one of the lowest forms of being. For Plato, certain kinds
of mimesis are not considered being as such, but a perversion of being. Things such as art can be
mimetic because they are a reflection of the world, but not the world itself, nor are they
substantial like the tables that are created by craftsmen. Unlike Deleuze and Badiou, who make
some effort to differentiate between different types of art in Plato, Heidegger makes no such
effort, claiming that art for Plato has no direct relation to “true being.”272 Art is a deception, not a
truth for Plato. In Heidegger’s exposition of Plato, art counters being, because being is supposed
to be synonymous with permanence. This mimetic quality of art lowers all forms of artistic
production to a different quality, defined by its distance away from being.
In discussing Plato, the Idea for Heidegger lets things be seen, or lets them come to
presence in outward appearance. For example, the table maker in making a table does not
produce the outward appearance (eidos). The Idea is already granted to him or her, prior to the
production of the table. Therefore, the craftsman does not produce the being of beings, but rather
produces particular beings. The eidos is the being of beings, because it is the thing’s telos, or
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final creative purpose. This process of production results in what Heidegger calls the plurality of
production.273 God has outward appearance, the craftsman makes the thing, while the painter
creates images of those things. Heidegger explains that painters can only show one angle of the
table that he or she may paint. The artist can therefore, never bring all of the being of a thing to
the fore, because of their place in the world.274 Despite this limitation, the role of the artist is to
bring forth this truth in any way that he or she can.
Furthermore, truth becomes a property of logos for Plato, which is problematic for
Heidegger.275 Truth is an unconcealment for Heidegger and is possible in many forms.
Heidegger’s understanding of truth can unveil itself through art-works, whereas Plato’s idea of
truth is of a higher form which cannot be relegated to the mimetic realm. The definition of truth
as logos is also problematic because truth as logos becomes antithetical to falsity and stands only
for correctness.276 For Heidegger, truth is not necessarily determined by its stance in opposition
to falsity, or its ability to be correct, but its role as unconcealment of being. To put it in his terms,
truth reveals itself in culture, history, art and in various other manners, but there is no false way
of revealing for Heidegger. To speak in those terms is nonsensical because revealing does not
depend upon a theory of correspondence.
In his work Nietzsche Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, Heidegger describes art as
anti-Platonic because of its willingness to say yes to anti-truth.277 Notice how he does not say
falsity, as we must remember truth is not falsity’s antonym. Rather, anti-truth and truth work in
unison and are always near to each other. Where one finds truth, inevitably anti-truth can also be
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found, both of which are integral to being. Therefore, despite Heidegger’s unwillingness to say
that truth comes from the void, he is willing to say truth and anti-truth share the same space. In
this instance, Heidegger and Deleuze share in their sentiment that art can be an important method
of revealing a different kind of truth. Both of these authors are clearly influenced by Nietzsche,
who was staunchly opposed to Platonic theories on truth. Despite this influence, Heidegger does
not maintain the same position on the importance of mimesis as a form of difference. Ultimately,
Heidegger’s theory still rests upon the identity of being and not on difference and repetition itself
as in Deleuze.
In his critique of Plato, Heidegger exposes some of the tradition’s biggest misconceptions
about phusis and techne. The role of art is not to mimic or represent the world, but to reveal the
world in a specific manner. The artist is the visionary and the vehicle by which the world can be
revealed. By minimizing art, according to Heidegger, Plato reduced art to something untruthful
or a lesser form of being. Heidegger’s intent is to reverse this claim and say that not only is art
relevant, but it also plays a significant role in revealing being in our world. He also puts the artist
in a precarious position by claiming that they have the capability to see things in their finality.
Artists are to some degree visionaries that can produce things that others cannot. But, we will
later see that this view of artists is not necessarily as important as it may seem at this moment.
For now, I want to make clear that Plato’s alteration of the ancient meaning of being, changed
art’s place in the world of being, which is why it was important for Heidegger to recover the
definitions of these terms and restore art’s rightful place as a revealer of being. Rather than an
afterthought in our society, art becomes a creator and revealer of worlds that places art at the
forefront of culture and history. Art does not simply mimic the world, but has a part in creating
the world.
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The Event of Art
This brings us to the work of art and how it participates in truth. Before proceeding to discuss the
artistic event, it is important to look at the translation of the word “event” in Heidegger’s work.
The term “event” varies greatly in Heidegger’s texts and it is important to discuss the various
translations in order to construct a cohesive term. Clayton Crockett explains that Heidegger
transitions from Ereignis as an event of Dasein to the event manifesting itself in different
cultures and historical periods. This also signalled a transition from Gelassenheit, meaning
letting the being of beings be, to aletheia, as letting truth come forth as revelation. Although
many translators often use the term “event” for Heidegger’s Ereignis, in Contributions to
Philosophy (From Enowning), the translators believe this has always been a poor translation,
saying that the term event “does not even remotely approximate Ereignis.”278 For these
translators, the proper translation of Ereignis is “enowning” and not event.279 They believe the
term ‘event’ does not properly capture the movement of Ereignis. But we must also consider
how we think of the term event in this particular context. We are looking for an occurrence of
something that comes from a particular time and place and consequently alters that time and
place drastically. Among the various notes in his book The Event, Heidegger explains that being
is “qua event-related beginning.”280 For Heidegger, the term he uses in the Origin for this kind of
occurrence is “happening.” Happening in Heidegger’s German is “geschehen”281 and the event
has often been translated as Ereignis. Here, when I use the term event I employ Heidegger’s
sense of the “happening of truth,” which for him is the event of being that I have explained
above and which is summarized by Heidegger in the quotation below:
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Our asking of the fundamental metaphysical question is historical because it
opens up the happening of human Dasein in its essential relations, that is, its
relations to beings as such and as a whole – opens it up to possibilities not yet
asked about, futures to come <Zu-künften>, and in this way also binds it back to
its inception that has been, and thus sharpens it and gives weight to its burden in
its present. In this questioning, our Dasein is summoned to its history in the full
sense of the word, and is called to make a decision in it – and this is not a
derivative, useful application of this questioning in terms of morality and
worldviews. Instead, the fundamental position and attitude of the questioning is in
itself historical, stands and holds itself in the happening, and questions on the
ground of this happening and for this happening.282
This happening of being is an occurrence that changes or alters the paradigm of a given epoch.
Unlike Badiou, who splits being from event, the event in-sists in being, letting the event come
from outside of being to rupture through it, Heidegger’s event is located firmly within being as
its coming-forth. Being is irreducible for Badiou, manifesting in beings as the count-as-one of a
situation. The event is also irreducible, but not predictable like being. We can find being by
looking at the situation, but cannot do the same with the event. For Heidegger, the event or
happening of being is historical and located in history, not outside of being or history as it is for
Badiou. This historical happening opens up the relation of Dasein to being and its relation to
other beings. It is where people gather; it is a clearing in which being shows itself in its fullest.
Heidegger provides several important examples of this kind of happening and I would like to
expand upon them here.
It is well known that the “peasant shoes” in “A Pair of Shoes” were not those of a
peasant, but Van Gogh’s own, but this does not minimize Heidegger’s analysis. The value does
not lie in the fact of whose shoes they were, but what the shoes mean and more importantly what
they reveal.283 In other words, if the shoes belonged to a peasant which we are led to believe is
the case, they show us something about that world. The shoes are a window onto the world of the
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peasant and the life they lead. To put it more precisely, the work produces truth about a situation;
in this instance it is the situation of a peasant. What the work produces is a happening of truth.
Heidegger explains that the shoes reveal something about the equipmental being of equipment.
Not only is the being of the world of the peasant opened up by the work, but the equipmentality
of equipment is also shown.284
A piece of equipment has only one purpose, and that is to be useful. Heidegger states,
“The equipmental being of equipment consists indeed in its usefulness.”285 Thus, the
equipmentality of the equipment sinks into the background when it is used. According to
Heidegger,
The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they
are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about
the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them.
She stands and walks in them. That is how shoes actually serve. It is in the
process of the use of equipment that we must actually encounter the character of
equipment.286
As a result, the shoes are never made evident in their “shoe-ness” during their use. They are
naturally there in their use, but almost as if they were not there, because they sink into the
background in their usage. Otherwise if they were always immediately present, they would
impede the peasant from doing her necessary work. This is true for any tool or piece of
equipment. If it fails, then the tool no longer has the quality of equipmentality and it becomes
present-to-hand and is reduced to just another object in the world. A tool that is present-to-hand
does not capture a thing’s essence. By showing us the shoes in their rightful place, the work of
art tells us something about where the shoes have been and what purpose they serve – it shows
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the audience their equipmentality. As mentioned above, the shoes are not merely a representation
of some pair of shoes, but show “the toilsome tread of the worker.”287 For Heidegger, art is not
about representation, even in the case of the shoes. Although they do represent real shoes, the
purpose of the work is not to reproduce their likeness, but to tell the truth about the situation of
the person to whom they belong. Notice that the situation in Heidegger’s case is what being
entails, rather than the event imposing itself on the situation of being as in the case for Badiou.
The work creates the possibility for the truth to happen by opening up the necessary space. If the
work was merely about representation then how can we explain representation in other forms of
art? For example, in architecture, the building does not represent something out in the world, it is
itself a creation that stands on its own. A building does not stand in place of something in the
world, but is itself a work that is in the world.
To further illustrate his point, Heidegger chooses the example of a Greek temple, which
he says “portrays nothing.”288 The temple does not stand in place of something out in the world
because it is the opening of a world, in this case the world of religion, spirit, and culture for the
Greek people. Heidegger says the temple emerges out of itself.289 This is what the Greeks named
phusis, an emerging truth as being. The earth becomes illuminated as the world sets itself back. It
was built as the site where people could gather and worship. It is the place where people could
interact with the holy. It is also a place that is determined by the duality of Heidegger’s theory of
world and earth. There is a strife that arises between the world and the earth, each raising the
other.
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Although the world is what Heidegger considers to be the horizon that determines our
various modes of being within a given culture, the earth is far more basic and grounds the
world.290 Whereas the world is the emerging unconealing of phusis, the earth is its pair that acts
as a “sheltering agent.”291 Heidegger further explains that the work in setting up a world, sets
itself back against the materiality of its medium, whether it is the stone of the temple, or the
colour of the paint; this is the ground of the earth.292 So, in setting up a world, the work
simultaneously sets-forth the earth, meaning that it brings forth the materiality of the material in
its full shining. Heidegger states that the work causes the material aspects of the work to “come
forth for the very first time and to come into the open region of the work’s world. The rock
comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to
glow, tones to sing, the word to say.”293 The world and earth work in conjunction with one
another causing strife.294 The earth shelters because it is impenetrable. When we try to penetrate
a stone, or see the colour for what it is, we find nothing other than the stone or the colour.
Breaking it down into compounds, atoms or any rationalistic terms does not provide us with the
same sense of the material as when it stands in its proper place as a work. In trying to reduce
something to its bare materiality, we lose a sense of what it is for us. The materiality of the work
raises the question of a work’s thing-ness.
An important discussion that arises from the Origin and in many of Heidegger’s later
works is the question of ‘what is a thing?’ In his work entitled, What is a Thing? Heidegger
details the history of things and “thingliness.” He explains that we have named many objects in
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the world “things.” Everything from trees, to paintings, and to screws we call things, but we
usually do not call numbers things.295 However, upon further analysis even numbers and signs
can be called things.296 What is at question for Heidegger is not this or that particular thing, but
the thingliness behind all things, the truth of things. For example, the perception of the sun is a
question because we perceive the sun in a certain manner, while the “real” sun is another
thing.297 When we see the sun, we see what it was because of the time it takes for light to travel
to Earth. Our experience of it is mediated in this manner and our experience of the thingliness of
the sun must be analyzed.
Throughout the Origin text, Heidegger discusses the thingliness of things in more ways
than just equipment. In his discussion of the thing, Heidegger says we can point to many objects
and call them things. Just like any other object, a work of art can also be named a thing. But
reducing a work of art to a thing gives us only part of what makes a work what it is. The art
industry objectifies the object by making it into either an object of study or by creating a
monetary value.298 When we assign such values to works of art, we reduce them to objects,
rather than works of truth. This limits a work’s ability to reveal and thus reduces its evental
qualities to their thingliness. The art industry extends to the object-being of the work and not its
work-being.299 In the same vein, a painting can be moved from one exhibition to another and
becomes, as Heidegger says, shipped like coal.300 Dahlstrom and Grierson share sentiments on
the difference that Heidegger draws between world and artworld.301 While the artworld is the
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world of commercialization of the work, it is not the same as the world of art. The work of art
opens up the possibility of a historical world, whereas the artworld preserves the work through
various means. Museums and private collectors belong to the artworld, but the work of art is no
longer in the process of creating worlds. It has reached a point of preservation and has decayed
into a thing to be displayed. This is one of the traits of the aesthetic for Heidegger. The aesthetic
relies on the distance that the artworld preserves for people to gaze at the beauty of the work.
Any remnants of historical opening have long passed in the artworld. But that does not capture a
work’s essence by any means. If a work of art was like any other thing, then it would not be
significant. Rather, the work’s thingly element is not its singular quality. A work makes public
something other than itself; the work is allegorical and symbolic, while still possessing a thingly
quality.302
So what are we to make of a thing? Historical accounts from Aristotle and Plato tell us
that a thing is the bearer of properties.303 In later Latin translations we find a thing to be a
substance with accidents.304 A thing is not merely a collection of properties for Heidegger;
rather, it is that “around which the properties have assembled.”305 The thing is the substructure of
sorts, one that allows properties to assemble around it and come together as a cohesive whole. In
discussing the thingly character of work, Heidegger explains that there is stoneniness in a stone,
wood in carving or sound in music, among other things. This mention of sound having a thingly
element presents an important point in our discussion, but one which I would like to expand
upon in my next segment. In the examples given, there is a stoniness in the stone that shines forth
and
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when presented in a certain manner. The thingliness of the work of art creates a division in the
work. On the one hand, we have the bare materiality of what the work consists, whether it be the
stone, the wood, the paint etc. On the other hand, we have what lies beyond the material aspects,
namely its being within the historical epoch and the impact it makes on a community. This
parallels to a great extent our discussion of the micro and the macro scale. Neither of these two
aspects takes precedent in Heidegger’s work and both are integral to the whole. This is why the
event in Heidegger has to be composed of its elemental or material properties in the work, as
well as its impactful revealing in the world. In consideration of these two aspects of the work, we
now must ask how the work comes to fruition.
The standard view of the work states that the artist is the origin of the work. An artist has
the capability to construct the thingly element as they engage with the material properties of the
work. Artists and craftsmen have a foresight prior to the creation of the thing. Heidegger says
that it requires vision and clarity in order to create something.306 Presumably, this is the reason
why only some people can create works of art, since not everyone has an Idea prior to creation.
The artist is responsible for elevating the thingly element of the materials they use. By using
materials in a specific manner, the artist can reveal something about the element that is not
always immediately visible. In the same way the sculptor can bring out a work from a piece of
marble, the painter can use paint to illustrate something unique about the world. But Heidegger
does not place emphasis on the artist as such, but rather how the work works. Meaning, the artist
may be the one who helps out the process, but they are not what is important to the work as an
event.
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Tom Greaves explains that Heidegger’s emphasis in art lies in the revealing object and
not in its producer. Art is not the sum of its produced parts, but a mode of revealing only
accessible to a culture and through the artist from that culture.307 However, an artist’s technical
work does not necessarily produce an event, even if it is technically sound. Moreover, an artist
can produce a similar work as another artist, but may not reveal the world in the same way. A
mode of technical reproduction does not equal a reproduction in revealing. But before anything
can be revealed, the work itself must be created. What we know for certain is that handicraft
does not create works. In this case, Heidegger draws a distinction between making and creating,
with creation being a higher form of bringing forth.308 Truth happens when a work becomes a
work in its final form. This is the process of creation, it is the bringing forth of the work.
However, we wonder at what point does this bringing-forth occur? For example, a piece of
equipment is produced and done when the tool is ready for use. This is not the case when a work
is created. The createdness or the process of creation is part of the created work. This point is
tied to un-truth because in unconcealment there is the not-yet concealed element behind it.
To some extent then the artist has an important role to play because he or she is the
producer or maker of the work, but Heidegger says there is something more basic and originary
for the work of art: art itself is the source of the work and to a great extent the source of the
artist.309 But the answer of origin is not completely clear. How can a work become what it is
without art and how can art be called art without a work? Although seemingly a circular
question, Heidegger believes that unfolding this paradox is necessary in order to understand art
and the work. Logic tells us that we need to avoid circular reasoning, but Heidegger does not see
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this as a problem in the question of work and art. This is part of the philosophical task and not a
meaningless paradox. Part of the hermeneutical circle involves going back and forth until we
find our answer. The trouble resides in determining what art is through the work, or if we can
know the work only by first knowing art.
The other aspect of the work of art is its preservers. Although Heidegger does not think
we can preserve works eternally, he does recognize the role of preservers as equal to creators.310
Preservers are not to be confused with the connoisseurs of the artworld, but instead play a vital
role in the unfolding of truth of works. The work brings forth something which was previously
not there and consequently forces us to encounter a new way of being. We become preservers of
the work by participating in the openness opened up by the work. Jason Atwood states “If a work
has lost its world, its total significance is diminished because it cannot be fully preserved.”311
Thus, art needs preservers in order to endure. This does not come from the art industry, but from
the communities for which the works provide meaning. Therefore, the work of art is
fundamentally about an event that places people within a community that can preserve the work.
Once again we find another point of similarity between Badiou and Heidegger. However,
whereas Heidegger emphasizes the preservation of works after the fact, Badiou’s idea of event is
only possible with faithful subjects. Therefore, the event is not named or created retrospectively
for Heidegger and depends more on the object as a place of happening. Even if the work is
created by a person, Heidegger’s happening does not seem to rely on people in the same way as
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Badiou’s event. Yet, Heidegger’s happening of art necessarily needs human beings to create art
and preserve it for the happening to occur.
This indefinite role of the creator further complicates the role of the artist and what
impact they may have on the creation of particular works. Although we saw Heidegger discuss
the impact of artists as visionaries, their impact comes within a particular historical horizon. The
artist is limited by his or her place in the world and to some extent is at the mercy of what they
can create. The artist may have the knowledge of how to create these works, but their impact
cannot be known without the communities that make the works possible. This is why Heidegger
does not want to overemphasize the role of the artist as creator of art, because they cannot
control the impact of the art that they create after it is completed. They may be responsible in
part for the work’s revealing qualities, but are not the sole reason why a work may impact the
world as it does. The truth or its unfolding has a much richer process than simply applying paint
to a canvas or in playing particular notes. These creations must resonate within a community in
order to make a profound impact upon its people, which is an idea that both Heidegger and
Badiou share. Often times, it is not one, but many artists who create multiple works that make up
a style which defines an epoch, an idea that Badiou emphasizes. Therefore, the unfolding of truth
is not simply a matter of creating a work, but creating a work that impacts a whole community in
a profound manner. In the upcoming section, I would like to explore how blues music can be
considered one such form of revealing in Heidegger’s work.
When Heidegger points to various happenings in art, they tend to be cases which are
static and singular such as paintings or buildings. The process of creation has no real bearing on
the outcome, which is the point at which revealing occurs. What is missing is the dynamism that
art can have in cases of music. Even if we are to put aside the process of creation, in music we
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find a more difficult task of pointing to where we can find revealing. Is the point at which
revealing occurs in the recording of a song, in its playing, or in its written composition? The
answer to this question alters the evental nature of art and music tremendously. If we limit events
to the playing of a song, then all recorded material has a different kind of eventful nature and is
thus a different form of revealing, at least in Heidegger’s terms.

Heidegger and the Blues
One of the biggest challenges that I faced was the lack of material written on Heidegger and
music. Heidegger discussed music sparingly, even in his writings on art. Most of his points on
music were either mentioned in passing or in conjunction with other forms of art such as
painting, architecture, sculpture, etc.312 His only explicit mention of music is Beethoven’s
quartets, which he says “lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar.”313
Thus, authors (myself included) have had to speculate what he might say about certain types of
music, or use Heidegger’s theories in ways that may not be immediately evident in his writing.
Some of the authors that I will discuss in this section hold widely different interpretations of
Heidegger’s theories and have very little common ground in their themes.
For example, John Mood in “Leadbelly on Angst — Heidegger on the Blues” believes
Heidegger and the Delta blues musician Leadbelly share certain sentiments about death and
anxiety. We should recall that for Heidegger, anxiety is not the fear of something specific but a
fear of nothing in particular.314 To fear something, like a large predator for example, is not the
same as anxiety of the nothing. Anxiety goes beyond the everyday fearfulness we may have of
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particular things and it resides deep within us, afflicting our very existence. For Mood, the blues
is the same as angst or anxiety, because no particular thing causes the blues; the blues are the
primordial reality.315 We live with what Mood calls “being-in-dread” and are thrust into playing
the blues because of it.316 This is perhaps the most poignant example of Heidegger’s theories
used in conjunction with blues music, but is not the best for this discussion. Although it serves as
an interesting parallel, the article is concerned with details of Heidegger’s early work on mood
and anxiety, rather than how blues operates as a historical art form. Nevertheless, it exemplifies
some of the ways Heidegger’s theories crossover with music, including the blues.
In another case, David Lines believes that we tend to look at music in a functional
manner, particularly when it comes to educating people on music. Heidegger’s theory of art is
much less concerned with its functionality, which for Lines makes it more conducive to an
ethical view of music education. Rather than focusing solely on the functional aspects of music,
(such as its form, quality, etc.) Lines feels that we need to take a different approach if we are to
gain an understanding of music as a whole. Heidegger’s theory comes into play because of his
look at art within a greater context, particularly on his view of music within a cultural whole.317
According to Lines, this will help music students understand and think about music from a
broader cultural perspective and not just how it is played, composed, etc.318 Lines calls our
current educational view of musical creation an “object-being” in which creations appear as
objects of the mind’s power.319 He is more interested in ethically engaging the music as an event,
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meaning discussing the culture from which the music comes, with a focus on the communities
rather than merely the technical aspects that tend to be taught in schools.
These perspectives promote the idea that Heidegger’s theories on art do not focus solely
on the thingly quality of the work, but its place within a cultural context. It is interesting to note
that Heidegger only considers the written form of music and not the music as it is played, or its
recordings. Heidegger’s position in history tells us that during the period that he was writing the
Origin, the primary form of purchased music was still in written and not aural form.320 Pertinent
to our discussion, blues music was almost never written. This complicates the issue of the
thingliness of the thing and how music is heard and seen. The transition from written to aural
form alters the thingly character of the work. The thingly element of a song is much more
difficult to identify than cases of visual artworks. It would be safe to assume that the thingly
element of a blues song is not the physical vinyl record on which it was recorded. If it was, then
how would we account for digital recordings? Would their thingly character somehow be the
inside of a computer? It seems to me that the thingly element of music is the sound that is played,
something that Heidegger alludes to in Origin.321 Thus, the thingliness of music differs greatly
from the thingliness of a sculpture or a painting.
In his work “Heidegger and Jazz,” Trevor Thwaites says the being of jazz music is
revealed through tone, duration, melody etc. He writes that, “The musician unconceals or sets
free the nature of sound to become music.”322 This unconcealment is what distinguishes the work
from a mere thing, because music is more than just a series of arbitrary sounds. It produces
something that speaks to people through form, even if there are no lyrics. The poetic value thus
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lies in the harmony of notes, rather than in the formal language. In discussing the work of jazz
music, Thwaites says, “it ‘creates and gives form’ to our experiences of the world and reflects
the style of a culture and articulates its practices and values.”323 Therefore, to discuss music in its
relevance to different communities, we must go beyond the scope of the written work. Blues and
jazz share the quality of being improvised to a great extent, which makes Heidegger’s analysis of
music’s thingliness inadequate. Perhaps Beethoven’s sheet music lies in some storerooms, but
the music in audio form still exists and is played today. But what does that entail? Does it still
have relevance in terms of a happening in today’s world?
In terms of the artistic event, we have to carefully consider different types of mediums
and how they may impact events. The types of mediums Heidegger considers are more static and
eternal than what I discuss with blues music. Notably, a cathedral will not change in artistic
quality, other than possible renovations, which are not really considered as part of its original
creation, but rather are part of its maintenance. The same can be said of paintings, which have a
clear beginning and end. Music on the other hand does not have such a clear designation, which
is why Deleuze’s ideas on changing sensations are so important in this discussion. Music is a
constant flux of becoming, particularly when we consider the improvisatory nature of blues
music. There are elements of the blues that are strikingly different than classical compositions,
which shifts the discussion of a musical event. A song may be written and performed, but that
may be separate from the recorded product. We also must consider how songs are often played
and then re-played by new artists. The same song may have new interpretations that alter its form
significantly. A painting or a sculpture does not have this type of continual event quality; they
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are both created and maintained, but never re-contextualized in the same way as a song. There is
a vitality to music that can be altered throughout different generations.
Is there any reason why we should prioritize one aspect of the musical event over the
other? Should we consider the minute aspects of the micro event more fundamental than the
grander scaled macro happenings, or vice versa? I argue that these two aspects must go hand-inhand if we are to appreciate blues music as a whole. Take for example a song like “Stop
Breaking Down Blues,” written and performed originally by Robert Johnson. On a micro scale
we have a more up-tempo song than what we usually associate with Robert Johnson. In the first
chapter we saw some of its lyrics, but nothing about the song is out of the ordinary for what
Johnson did in those famous recording sessions. The song has since been recorded by several
other famous artists, most notably by The Rolling Stones and The White Stripes. We transition
here from the micro scale to the macro in looking at its history and then back in order to hear
how the song sounds in different eras. What do these newer recordings offer (if anything at all)
that the original one did not? Is there something about the way it is recorded? Is it the way the
song is played that differentiates them, or maybe the fact that the latter recordings are done by
white musicians that alters the meaning of the song? None of these questions can really be
answered by looking at only one level, either the micro or the macro.
Although artists may copy certain art works, there seems to be a difference in what that
entails as an event. For instance, if I were to re-create Van Gogh’s “Starry Night,” but with
different colours, or slight variations, yet continue in the same style of post-impressionist
painting, there would really be no continuation of the event here. Rather, I would be merely
making my own interpretation of a particular style of painting. The same can be said in
architecture, when there are “revival” periods of different styles or themes. There is a happening
123

in the temple or cathedral because it has meaning to the people from which it came. The Greek
temple makes sense for the people of that time and place, as they have a connection and deeper
understanding of what that work means. People during the Middle Ages had a more ubiquitous
relationship to God than we do today in most parts of the Western world. Although there are
many religious people today who follow many different religions, religious beliefs are far more
fragmented. Europe in the Middle Ages had one predominant religion, which is not the case
today. That is why the meaning of a particular church does not carry with it the same weight as it
once did, at least not in Heidegger’s terms. Instead, what we find today is that those same
churches that were once the central focus of a city are now places for tourist attractions. In these
cases, Heidegger says things withdraw from worlds, despite attempts at communal preservation.
This is part of the reason why Heidegger believes we have reached the end of great art.
Heidegger’s clearest explanation of why he believes art is in decline comes from his book
Nietzsche, Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, in which he proclaims that great art has lost its
relation to the absolute. He states, “What makes art great is not only and not in the first place the
high quality of what is created. Rather, art is great because it is an ‘absolute need.’ Because it is
that, and to the extent it is that, it also can and must be great in rank. For only on the basis of the
magnitude of its essential character does it also create a dimension of magnitude for the rank and
stature of what is brought forth.”324 It is not a matter of stylistic quality or poor technique, but
that art is no longer relevant in history and its relation to historical man. Philip Tonner echoes
Heidegger in this statement: “A great work of art is a bringing forth; it is an event that opens up a
historical world for a historical people. Historical worlds ebb and flow and when they end, like
the Greek and the medieval world, their great art works are no longer alive because they are no
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longer ‘opening up’ their worlds in the originary way that they once did.”325 In this regard,
Heidegger’s words hold true because of how our world has become increasingly fragmented
despite its insistence on globalization. In our current era, people have the ability to access infinite
sources of artistic creation and are not necessarily determined by one type of artistic expression.
While it was easier to define ancient Greek art, or different styles of the past, it has become
increasingly difficult to do so in our age. Now we look to smaller pockets where communities
devise their own styles.
We must ask whether it is actually the case that artistic creations experience world
withdrawal and if so, to what extent. Heidegger’s argument of world withdrawal is very
persuasive, particularly in the examples he provides. Literary works are great examples that
sometimes do not necessarily translate to present times, other than for historical purposes. People
certainly read the works of Shakespeare or even older works such as Antigone, but in a different
manner than they once did, because these pieces have a different relevance to today’s world.
Many read them for the sake of study or to better their personal individual knowledge and
understanding. Even though they are to be taken seriously as great works they no longer hold the
same influence as they perhaps did during the time they were written. Heidegger calls this worldwithdrawal or world-decay and believes this can never be undone.326 However, instead of
considering these pieces as relics of the past that have no bearing on the present, we simply need
to contextualize them differently. To what degree do the works of Shakespeare still influence
individuals today? This is part of the question of the event and the relevance that works of
literature or art have as time passes. The same can be said of great paintings or sculptures.
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Various styles go in and out of relevance as time passes, while new styles build on older ones or
in some cases are built completely anew by breaking away from the styles of the past.
Considering that part of this project is to discuss the notion of limits or ends in events, it is
interesting to note that Deleuze does not associate events with ends. As François Zourabichvili
states, there is no logical link between an event and an end for Deleuze.327 Unlike Heidegger’s
epochs which are clear happenings that are brought forth by different kind of poetic or artistic
events, an epoch for Deleuze does not denote a clear beginning or end. As Zourabichvili
explains, “an epoch comes to an end only because another has already begun.”328 But what is to
be said about blues music in the twentieth century? It presents a unique look at this question
because of the way music is practiced and played by various artists.
Blues music does not have a clear linear path over the course of the twentieth century. As
I alluded to in the first chapter, although blues music was originally part of African American
culture in its inception, as time went on, it continually grew and became associated as much with
white musicians as it did with African American artists. This dissolves any notion of a singular
continuous event, at least as we have seen in either Badiou or Heidegger. Certainly Deleuze
would not categorize it as such, since he is not interested in how styles or genres crossover
cultural bounds. Blues is very much fragmented by the variety of people who played the music,
as well as by its continual change in sound. We cannot necessarily point to one piece of blues
music and say that encompasses all of the blues. So then what we have is a series of events or
happenings that determine the whole of the blues. But to determine what constitutes a musical
event is still unclear.
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In music, the difficulty lies in knowing how to discuss a musical event. I have continually
expressed the difficulty of identifying the point at which we can say a musical event occurs, as
well as shown that there are many aspects when that we need to consider in doing so, namely the
micro and macro scales. In Heidegger’s discussion of the Idea, the medium with which the artist
works has a teleological purpose to it, which the artist brings-forth in the revealing of truth. But
this is much easier to discuss with things such as chairs, tables, sculptures or paintings, rather
than music. Let us look at a written symphony first. When the composer brings-forth the
symphony in written form, the work has come to a partial completion. If we are certain in this
case that no changes will be made after the publishing of the work, then the written form has
been completed. But what is the written form of music without sound? Empty. If there is no
sound attached to its written form, then we would not be so gripped by music. It is rare that
anyone can find beauty or relevance in culture when looking at sheet music, at least in
comparison to hearing the work being played. The vast majority of people (with the possible
exception of those formally trained in musical theory) are drawn to music because of how it
sounds, rather than what it looks like on paper. Music appeals to our ability to hear, just like
visual arts appeal to our ability to see. Thus, without someone to play it there is an
incompleteness to the purely written form of music. The musical event consists of a process that
involves much more than the composer, but includes all of its players, and its listeners as well.
The focus for Heidegger will always remain on the object of music, which we have yet to really
determine in our discussion.
The matter of the objectivity of music is further complicated by the fact that blues music
has rarely had a written form. There are some exceptions to this generality, including “The
Memphis Blues,” written by W.C. Handy, the song which many believe to be the first blues song
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ever written. But from the moment of its inception, the majority of famous blues musicians never
wrote down blues music in any form. Even into the days when blues music became consumed
and played by white people, the music often remained unwritten. Blues music was almost always
played by musicians who had little to no formal musical training and it relied heavily upon the
artists’ improvisational abilities. These two factors contribute to the difference in how blues
differs greatly from other forms of music. However, similar to blues music, jazz also relied on
improvisational abilities of artists. Thwaites discusses how jazz music is always in flux, because
of its constant interpretation and re-interpretation of the previous works. Thwaites explains that
the work is thus never complete or finished in a way.329 Each player brings with him or her their
own version of the song, thus giving it new life. To a great degree, we find the same process in
blues music with artists such as Robert Johnson using the works of the past to influence him in
his own songs.
Thus, the creative process is altered in blues music because it has never been about a
single composer sitting down and writing notation. Rather, blues has a fluctuating quality that
can change at any time, with slight variations being promoted by different artists. The flux in
blues music was never considered by Heidegger. Whether it is Beethoven’s symphonies, or Van
Gogh’s paintings, Heidegger’s theories on art were concerned with finished products, a point
which may be unproblematic when it comes to paintings or buildings, but is concerning when it
comes to music. The next sequence in this line of thinking leads us to wonder whether one song,
or its playing can be considered a happening in the same way as a painting, sculpture or any
visual form of art. If Heidegger considers only the static written aspects of music, then we do not
get the full analysis of what music is or what has become, which results in a lack of
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consideration for the musical event. This is why Deleuze’s theory is vital to completing the task
at hand, as Deleuze demonstrates the importance of becoming and internal difference,
emphasizing the particular qualities of each piece. This nuance is missing in both Badiou and
Heidegger, though more so in the former. Although both Badiou and Heidegger offer valuable
insight into the event, both of their theories are missing the necessary elements to discuss the
minutiae of a musical event. Neither can account for the manner in which blues music constantly
changes on a micro scale. Although Heidegger’s analyses of works are detailed, they ultimately
cannot account for these changes.
In his article “The Work of Art and Truth of Being as ‘Historical’” James Magrini uses
Robert Bernasconi’s work to point out that not all of Heidegger’s examples of art should be
considered great works, but more supplementary works. Similarly, Vattimo explains that for
example there are paintings that can be considered representational by nature. For instance, a
landscape only represents worlds, but is not responsible for founding new worlds.330 Magrini
claims that Heidegger’s example of Van Gogh’s shoes merely expresses a world, rather than
instituting one.331 Magrini goes further and explains that paintings preclude immediate power of
the masses because of how they are exhibited. It is not as though a painting is necessarily or
always unveiled to a mass audience reception. The temple is a better example of world
expressing work as it allowed masses of people to stand in the clearing of a god or god’s beings.
When originally created, it was not a matter of aesthetic gazing, but an event in which people
could participate and was impactful. Perhaps the same can be said of music, because of its ability
to reach the masses. Music can be participatory and engaging on communal as well as individual
levels. It is also exhibited on a different scale. Popular music is now able to be heard online or
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over the radio, giving it a very broad audience. In modern times, blues music is perhaps heard on
a lesser scale because of its specific audience, but even on a vinyl recording it can be purchased
and listened to by millions. Paintings can now be seen by millions at the touch of a button, but
since its reproducibility, music can reach many more people than the visual arts.
I propose that to think about the musical event properly, we must recontextualize
Heidegger’s as well as others’ theories of the event within a modern setting. Blues music is
important in this case because of its origins. Although classical forms of music are now recorded
and re-played, they relied heavily on the written form prior to recording devices. The origins of
blues music also began when there were no recording devices, but this was more problematic
because it was never written. What we know of blues music now is primarily based on
recordings from the 1920s and 30s which shaped the blues sound. Thus, the happening of blues
music and how it shaped communities fundamentally changed with the inception of recorded
music. The music was not necessarily diminished in quality, but became subjected to the world
of consumers, which greatly influenced its sound.
If we are to take the entire history of the blues movement into consideration, then we
must think of how technology has changed the musical event. From an artistic standpoint, it is
the case that a recorded piece of music like a blues song is not the same as a painting. However,
because of the continuous and replayable nature of recorded music, we find a change in cultural
happenings. We find Heidegger’s theories coming to their limits because he does not account for
how art in its reproducibility changes the artistic event. Blues music in particular, with its
unwritten history, is really dependent upon its replayability. Without continuous replaying, it
would have never survived as a musical form. Thus, to say that a song exists as a cultural
happening, means that we must consider all parts of it, including the way it may have evolved
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over the course of history. The event of music must lie partially in the form in which it is played
and not merely in its written form. If that is the case, then we cannot ignore the impact of
recorded material because it alters the temporal dimension of the event of any type of song.
Technology changes how events take up time. Because artistic events have been
considered to be singular occurrences that can lead to the further proliferation of their genre of
art, technology changes this process by potentially splitting the artistic medium. Therefore, it is
not that technology destroys a thing’s ability to reveal as Heidegger has led us to believe, rather,
technology profoundly changes it because of its impact on the temporal setting. Events are no
longer bound by space (location) and time of “original” occurrence. There are perhaps
exceptions like concerts in which a group is bound by a spatial and temporal location that unites
them, but the playing/hearing/listening to of music is primarily experienced on a more individual
and private level. With technological reproduction, events are replayed, reinvigorated and reimagined. Most of all, they take on new life and can sustain themselves for longer in different
cultures.
I once heard that when you create music, you must consider it from the point of view of
the casual listener as much as the observant listener. Music is now listened to by more people at
more times and very rarely do people sit down to listen to music. Instead, music is a background
soundtrack to our lives: when we walk, when we workout, when we drive or even when we do
chores around the house, music is often playing. Therefore, when the artist creates music, they
must take this into account. No longer are they creating it as if everyone will sit and listen
attentively. This does not mean that the music is of lesser quality, but it has changed, a problem
not necessarily regarded by musicians prior to the advent of recordings. Visual artists may not
have this problem, since it is not up to them how the work will be displayed. Museums or private
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collectors are the ones who have the task of displaying the work in such a way that will bring out
all the work’s properties for everyone to see. In music, the artist and production engineers have
this task so that it will sound properly no matter the device on which it is played. Thus, the
experience of music is varied greatly by how someone chooses to listen to it. Although
Heidegger’s focus is solely on the objective point of the work, his disregard of technological
mediation leaves a gap in his theory which must be reconciled with someone like Benjamin and
the secondary sources that ameliorate his theories.
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Chapter 4 – Benjamin and Adorno – Technology, Industry, and the Event
Following the preceding discussion of Heidegger’s views on art and being, it is important
evaluate some of the critiques of Heidegger’s position. Notable critiques came from the
Frankfurt School, as well as one of its major supporting figures, Walter Benjamin. In this chapter
I aim to present the works of Benjamin and his colleague, Theodor Adorno. I will focus on
Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Adorno’s and
Max Horkheimer’s essay, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” as well as
Adorno’s piece “On Jazz.” The latter work is not a response to Heidegger’s work, but I will
illustrate its importance for this dissertation in its critique of modern music and why it is an
unfair characterization of popular music in general. Despite the fact that neither Benjamin, nor
Adorno, nor Horkheimer have been associated with the idea of the event, I aim to show that in
our context, the event of blues music cannot be separated from the event of mechanical
reproduction and its effects, namely, the effects it has had on the culture industry.
Up until this point we have examined how blues music has shifted on both the micro and
macro levels. We have shown that in order to discuss blues music we must look at it from both of
these perspectives, leading us to conclude that the blues’ most important turn happened when
technological reproduction altered its path. Blues music has always been known as a primarily
aural/oral type of music that was meant to be played in order to pass its history down to others.
With the advent of mechanical reproduction in the form of records, blues music no longer needed
to be heard in person for people to experience it. This calls into question the event of blues music
and how we experience something like an artistic event in general, along with parallel notions of
originality, authenticity and as we will see in this chapter, aura. Although I have established that

133

technological reproduction needs to be considered as an important point of change, we will need
to further pursue it in order to more fully understand why this change impacted the event of blues
music. I aim to show that Benjamin’s thesis on mechanical reproduction is the appearance of an
important artistic event – the politicization of art. When art becomes politicized through
reproduction, it becomes more accessible to the masses by destroying the aura. However, I will
illustrate through various critiques that mechanical reproduction does not totally destroy the aura
as Benjamin would have us believe; in fact, in blues music the aura is preserved through the
individual performer. Therefore, the preservation of the aura is made possible through industry
and the greater distribution of music to the general population. In this manner, mechanical
reproduction can reveal micro differences on a macro level. The subtle variations of each artist
are rendered permanent through recordings and can be heard by the general population.
However, the advent of mechanical reproduction also allowed for the proliferation of the culture
industry.
Adorno’s critique of jazz is an important look at the impact of mechanical reproduction
on modern music. Adorno calls into question the evental quality of modern jazz, and as I intend
to argue, modern music in general. I will illustrate that Adorno’s critique of jazz is part of a
broader critique of the culture industry and one that dismisses similar forms of music such as the
blues. Adorno’s classification of jazz as a non-event fails to take into consideration many
important factors that separate jazz from previous forms of music, namely, its improvisatory
quality and other aspects that make jazz unique. Adorno calls into question aspects of jazz that
are similar in blues music, thus his critique against jazz as a non-event is an indirect attack on the
blues as well. I will demonstrate below that Adorno fails to see the importance of mechanical
reproduction and its effects on the artistic event.
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Benjamin’s “Aura”
I would like to begin by outlining Benjamin’s thoughts in, “The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction.” Benjamin’s essay has come to be known as somewhat of a response
to Heidegger’s the Origin essay. The two essays are considered to be contrasting views on art,
politics, and, to some degree, technology. In outlining the differences between Heidegger and
Benjamin, Beatrice Hanssen says that they were at odds with each other ethically, politically, and
in their thoughts on aesthetics.332 However, they shared in the belief that politics and art were
intertwined, even if their conclusions were quite different.333
In principle, throughout the history of art and craft, things have always been reproducible,
as artists and craftspeople could copy the works of others. In Benjamin’s mind, this capacity for
reproducibility differs from mechanical reproduction. Benjamin points to several instances of
reproduction in the history of art, including Greek founding and stamping, and later woodcut
graphic art.334 However, these forms of reproduction differed greatly from the modern forms we
would see during the beginning of the industrial revolution. Nineteenth century lithography
allowed artists to produce large quantities of art to sell on the open market. Photography soon
surpassed lithography as the dominant mode of reproduction, and the public perception of art
drastically changed. As Benjamin explains, “the process of pictorial reproduction was
accelerated so enormously that it could keep pace with speech.”335 For the first time in history,
film was able to capture motion and speech, something which was not possible through other
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forms of reproduction. Although Benjamin does not explicitly mention it, these technological
advances equally affected music production as well. With the advent of recording technology,
people could capture and reproduce music in large quantities. This changed how we experienced
music as people no longer needed to be at the physical origin of the music to hear it.
What develops is a division between the reproduced product and its “original.” Chris
Barker explains there is a difference in time and space between the original and the reproduction,
no matter how accurate the reproduction may be. Barker states, “A reproduction cannot
reproduce down to the atomic level the structure of the original.”336 In his comments on the
difference between the copy and the original, Benjamin introduces his most important term,
“aura,” which he vaguely defines in “Little History of Photography” as “a strange weave of
space and time.”337 In my reading of Benjamin, I understand the aura to be a quasi-mystical
quality that is attributed to a work extrinsically by the public, which ultimately comes to define
the object. The aura develops over time and comes to its fullest intensity once it is enmeshed
within a particular tradition. Only when a community attaches itself to that particular work can
the work then develop an aura. Thus, the aura can change with the values and tastes of a
particular society. It can be said that an aura is similar to a Badiouan event in the sense that it can
only develop with subjective fidelity to the artistic work. However, Benjamin’s theory differs
significantly from Badiou’s because even though a work may have an aura, it does not
necessarily mean the work itself was an event. An aura happens within the historical framework
of a culture that deepens its devotion to that particular work. Although a work may be
particularly well done, its stylistic excellence is not necessarily what characterizes a work’s place
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within that tradition. There may be works that are more technically precise and of better quality,
but do not necessarily have an aura. There is a significant element of chance as only some works
develop an aura, while others of equal or greater quality may be forgotten with time. Therefore, a
work’s technical qualities are not the sole determining factor in auratic development, which
means something outside the technical precision of a work can determine its aura.
For Benjamin, the aura of the work disappears when it is reproduced because the work
becomes detached from tradition. Reproductions undermine the aura and authenticity of the
original in two ways. First, they may open up technical aspects of the original not necessarily
seen by the naked eye. For example, with electronic versions of visual arts we can zoom in with
precision to see particular brushstrokes that may not be noticed by the average viewer. Even
prints can more precisely illustrate certain segments of works that were not previously noticeable
in the original. In music we are able to pause, rewind, and choose different segments of songs,
none of which are possible during live events. Secondly, reproductions reduce the distance
between the object and the viewer. Benjamin reminds us that the uniqueness of the work is
imbedded in tradition.338 A work’s unique quality and value often lies in ritual, as evidenced by
religious relics.339 For example, religious works are meant to convey a hierarchy in society which
the viewer is meant to feel when looking at it. The work has an authority over its viewer, creating
a distance between itself and the viewer. When we associate the aura with particular works, we
provide those works with an untouchable authority. Objects gain authority by being
unapproachable, which is especially true in cases of religious monuments or paintings. Only the
privileged few can see them and even fewer people can see them up close or physically handle
them in some way. As Nathan Ross explains,
338
339

Benjamin, WAMR, 223.
Benjamin, WAMR, 224.

137

For Benjamin, this is perhaps most apparent in the role of art within religious
rituals, where it is not even meant to be enjoyed or even seen, in some cases, but
meant to reinforce the feeling of distinction between sacred and profane. The
prevalence of the phenomenon of aura within aesthetic creation and experience
reveals the existential structure of a society that is organized around rituals that
reinforce the feeling of hierarchy.340
Again, the reproduction separates the work from ritual, which reduces the work’s authority over
its viewers. In cases of pictorial reproduction, we tend to think of a picture of a religious
monument as having less authority than the monument itself. Instead of ritual, for Benjamin
reproductions are based on practice-politics because they become accessible to the public.341 Art
loses its cultic value by being displayed in public venues rather than being kept in private
collections or reserved for the privileged few. With the advent of mechanical reproduction,
works become more accessible to the average citizen, which diminishes the authority of the
original. When we can access most works through prints, at the click of a button, or the tap of a
screen, we diminish the aura of the work because it becomes accessible to a significant amount
of people at any time. In this regard, Christopher Long states, “Whereas auratic perception
establishes an immediate hierarchy between subject and object by investing the object with a
high level of independence and authority, the perception at work in technical reproduction
undermines the authority of the object thereby liberating the subject from the object’s
mesmerizing power.”342 The reproduction diminishes the power and authority of the work by
virtue of its very existence. There is no longer simply one work that stands as the unique
authoritative figure, but a number of copies that share in the perception of the work. Although
Benjamin wants to dispel the notion that an original work has more meaning than a reproduction,
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it is curious to note that he admits an original work differs in time and space from even the most
perfect reproduction.343 However, he critiques the idea of authenticity and what it has come to
mean, maintaining that authenticity has become the basis of what an object can transmit to the
viewer.344 Authenticity stands outside of reproduction because it has come to be an authoritative
figure over the reproduction. By moving toward reproduction, we move closer to a more
communal form of art and away from notions of authority and authenticity.
Unlike Heidegger, who emphasizes the importance of the original work as the sole site of
being, Benjamin’s “event” is the ability to reproduce the original. It is not the aura that concerns
Benjamin as the place where being shines, but the reproduced work that allows for community
building. Therefore, the reproduction is the point at which Benjamin’s event occurs. What
distinguishes Benjamin from the previous thinkers in this dissertation is that unlike the others, it
is not the new that creates an event, but the reproduction of what already exists. However, saying
that a reproduction merely produces what already exists does a disservice to the concept in
general. Mechanical reproduction has value beyond its material means and produces something
much more profound: the political.
It is no wonder then that Benjamin focuses on reproductive arts such as films because of
their inherent reproducibility. Krzysztof Ziarek states:
It is symptomatic that Benjamin chose film as the focus and the engine of his
argument, a ‘crossover’ genre between mass culture and art, between
entertainment production and art creation. For it is film that instantiates the
difficulty of maintaining the difference between high and low art, between
popular culture and artistic endeavours, perhaps illustrating the progressive
dissolution of art into the ever-multiplying products of mass culture and
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entertainment industry, which constitutes a distinctive mark of twentieth-century
society.345
In essence a film is created for the sake of reproduction, so that it can be viewed by significant
audiences. This changes the audience’s role from observers to critics because of the distance that
is created by the camera in films. This is not the same kind of distance created by the authority of
the aura, but one which allows the audience to be part of participatory politics. Mass reception
becomes possible with film, while paintings could never be revealed on the same scale. Unlike
paintings or sculptures that can be kept in private collections and reserved for the few, films are
meant to be viewed on a larger scale, which place them in the realm of the political. When works
of art become detached from tradition, they have the potential to be used in new ways. Rather
than necessarily preserving the mythical value of works, we can re-contextualize works properly
to separate them from their cultic meaning.
The events in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017 show us how dangerous it can be when we
attach an aura to works. In this case a statue of Robert E. Lee stood in the centre of the city and
sparked protests by those who believed Lee was a symbol of oppression and violence. The statue
was ordered to be taken down, which caused counter-protests in the name of historical
preservation. When the alt-right tries to preserve works because of their “history” we attribute an
aura to figures such as Robert E. Lee who was and continues to be a symbol of hatred and
violence. The alt-right uses Lee’s status to promulgate the aura and cultic value of a man who
wanted to keep African Americans in servitude.346 By dispelling the aura of these works, we can
slowly undo the mythology that has been created by white conservative America, namely, that
certain figures and works need to be preserved for the sake of so-called “history” and tradition.
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Once we move past the myths, we can see works as the symbolic figures of violence that they
are. For Benjamin, this is the move away from the aestheticization of politics to the politicizing
of art. Art is now produced for the people, as it becomes politicized, rather than for genius or for
mystical ends. It has become divorced from its cultic value. Therefore, reproducibility becomes
the new when it tears down the ideas of originality and authenticity. The event of reproducibility
has the unique function of reproduction of the new, rather than merely copying what already
exists. For Benjamin, it is only when a work can be reproduced that it can lead us past idea of
originality and authenticity and into new forms of practice politics. For Benjamin, the artistic
event is the creation of political art.

Critiques of Benjamin
Despite the importance of Benjamin’s work, there are several critics who say that reproduction
does not in fact mean the death of the aura. Unlike Benjamin, Bruno Latour and Adam Lowe
propose just the opposite in “The Migration of the Aura or How to Explore the Original Through
its Fac Similies.” Latour and Lowe describe the story of a woman encountering Hans Holbein’s
work entitled The Ambassadors at the National Gallery in London, England. She was
disappointed that the painting was not as bright and vibrant as she remembered, not from a past
encounter with the original work, but rather from posters she had seen.347 This is an example of
how a reproduction has as much of an effect on someone’s perceptions of a painting as an
original. I will reiterate this point later when it comes to musical reproduction, but for now I
want to express the significance of this statement. Furthermore, Latour and Lowe claim that the
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aura can re-develop in the original work even if it is reproduced.348 The insistence on aura and
originality increases as copies and reproductions become greater in number and quality. We
become obsessed with trying to ensure we protect what is “original.” The reproductions help us
re-define originality and explore it further. One could pay homage to the original by copying it,
thus revitalizing the original in a new context. They also claim that the reproduction can be
costly and original on its own, depending upon the techniques, materials and time spent in
developing a reproduction.
For Latour and Lowe, the economic factors of reproductions should not be overlooked.
We assume when it comes to paintings, all copies will be easier to produce and cheaper than the
original. However, in theatre the costs of production often increase over time, which changes our
perception of the idea of originality. In painting we consider the original to be more “material”
than its reproductions, but often reproductions can be very costly even in these cases. The costs
depend on the techniques and medium used by the artist, for example paintings differ from
lithographs insofar as each copy of a lithograph has the same production value, whereas copies
of paintings vary wildly. Surely, there is a substantial difference between the original La
Gioconda as opposed to a picture taken on a smart phone for the billionth time by a tourist.
However, a quality print can be costly, depending on many factors such as composition value.
We need to consider how we treat reproductions in their own right. If we begin to treat
reproductions on their own merit, they can develop an aura as well. The labour and effort that go
into certain reproductions can be extensive and these factors should be considered when we look
at reproductions.
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Latour and Lowe underscore that technological changes have altered our views of
originality. For instance, original manuscripts often have the same process of production now as
their copies. Prior to the widespread use of typewriters or computers we may have had originally
written manuscripts and reproduced copies, but now they are often digitally written and offer no
substantial difference. Thus, it is reproductive techniques that alter the aura, and not necessarily
reproduction as such. If we lump all reproductions into one mass, then we do not consider the
complexities that come with certain reproductions. In music, the recorded song is equally
valuable no matter which copy one chooses, as is the case with film, unless we consider the
physical copy such as the vinyl recording or the film reel. Each non-physical reproduction is of
equal value so in these particular cases we cannot determine what is original versus what is
reproduced. Perhaps there are original vinyl pressings of songs, but these recordings question the
very nature of the work of art itself, as we are forced to confront what encompasses the work of
art in its totality. To do so we must question the materiality of works and how they differ from
one medium to another.
Latour and Lowe explain that originality and authenticity are often confined to the
medium of visual arts, in particular, painting. It is not always the case that someone is interested
in experiencing an “original” or “reproductive” theatre performance. We judge performances,
but do not consider any singular performance to be “original.” Each performance of a play brings
out qualities of its original writing, depending on how the play is performed. Thus in
performance art, the aura migrates or even disappears depending on the performance itself.
However, in his critique of Latour and Lowe, Chris Barker says that the authors make a false
analogy between performative and visual arts. Unlike paintings, plays need the stage in order to
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come to fruition, otherwise they do not reach their completion.349 Barker says that all
performances share in a “non-original equality” in relation to the script. Meanwhile, a painting,
even if there is a model which the artist uses, is never a reproduction of something in the world,
otherwise, Barker says we lapse into a Platonizing trap.350 The conclusion that Barker draws is
that while Latour and Lowe say there is an unequal treatment in arts, Barker believes this to be a
false analogy. We need to consider each form of art in its completed terms. This means a
painting is complete when the artist finishes his or her last brush stroke and deems it to be
complete. However, a theatre production is divided by its script and its performance. A script
may be complete, but the whole of a theatre production means that it must be performed to come
to fruition, otherwise the work is incomplete. Similarly, in order for a song or a symphony that is
written down to be complete, it needs to be played. It would be almost absurd to consider music
without the aural aspects, just as it is to consider a theatre production without the performance.351
It is worth noting that Badiou considers each theatrical performance a singular event.352
He calls these performances “events of thought” that produce “theatre-ideas” only produced in
theatre settings. Ideas in this context are produced on stage and cannot pre-exist the stage
performance. A theatre-idea in text or poem is incomplete.353 Only in the time of a performance
does this Idea come forth. Thus the Idea has a temporal factor, as it goes from being held in
eternal limbo while unperformed to finite in time of performance.354 All components of the
performance serve to complete the Idea. Therefore, much like Barker, Badiou considers the event
in theatre only to be complete when it is staged. Although a reproduction of a painting can be
349

Barker, 5.
Barker, 6.
351
This will be an important point later in the section on Adorno.
352
Badiou, HI, 72.
353
Badiou, HI, 73.
354
Badiou, HI, 73.
350

144

very easily made (exemplified by the earlier example of a picture taken in a museum), to
reproduce a stage performance is not usually as simple. The totality of the work goes beyond the
material components such as a script or sheet music. The work of art in music or theatre can only
be considered complete when they are performed. Therefore, paintings or other visual mediums
such as sculpture or architecture do not have the same kinds of reproductions as performance
based arts. Blues music in particular has a unique place in this conversation because it is rarely
written down. There is often no single original performance or written piece to which other
musicians can refer, often because of the unknown origins of a song. Barker is correct in saying
certain mediums have a non-original equality and it becomes especially true when there is no
single point of origin as we see in blues music.
Barker, however, shares something in common with Latour and Lowe in his critique of
Benjamin. Barker challenges Benjamin’s aura thesis by saying that the aura is not caused by
uniqueness. Latour and Lowe exemplified how an aura can be created by a reproduction, if that
reproduction is costly in terms of money and time. Barker even takes it a step further by saying
highly reproduced photographs can also be art and develop auras. Things such as framing,
composition and subject matter all play a role in determining its impact.355 Thus, according to
Barker, Latour and Lowe, the aura that Benjamin sought to eliminate with the reproduction exists
in various forms of reproduction.
In a similar critique, Robert Hullot-Kentor in “What is Mechanical Reproduction” states
that Benjamin was wrong in dismissing the auratic possibility of reproductions, because
reproductions can have authority as well. Hullot-Kentor states:
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Each artwork rejects its factuality, as the thing it is, by its form, which is the
process by which it consumes its appearance and reveals what is more than this
appearance. The reality revealed in this process – however difficult it may be to
specify, that reality – is the original of the artwork, regardless of its material.
Because the reality of an artwork is external to it, our eyes find it hard to locate
this work precisely, even when looking at it directly. The most important
artworks, by the power and sometimes violence with which they shed their
appearance, may make themselves irrelevant, as if they stand superfluously in the
way of their content, and no longer need to be seen, heard, or read.356
Thus, if the factuality of the work is not its determining factor, then its aura cannot be solely
based on its mere existence as an “original” work. Hullot-Kentor employs this critique from one
of Benjamin’s own pieces, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, in which Benjamin claims that
the origin of a work is not its beginning, but the work’s goal. Specifically, the work aims to free
itself from its formal constraints and become a truthful comment on the world in which it was
created.357 For Hullot-Kentor this is a major flaw in Benjamin’s own logic that hurts the notion
of an aura being exclusive to an original. This is very reminiscent of what we discussed in the
previous chapter with Heidegger and the truth of the work of art. The fact that the painting may
be a pair of shoes is secondary to what it is meant to reveal about that world. If we are to believe
Hullot-Kentor’s point, then Benjamin and Heidegger are actually closer to each other than
normally assumed.
We gather from these critiques that each form of art needs to be taken in consideration
under its own merit. Placing all works of art or all reproductions under one category reduces
their unique particularities and does not capture their essence in any way. In the same way that
Heidegger’s essay only considers static forms of art, Benjamin’s dismissal of the aura in
reproductions cannot be considered in only one form of art. Whether it is film, theatre, painting,
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or music, each artistic form has unique properties that need to be considered when we look at
reproductions. We previously discussed how the beginning of mechanical reproduction produced
the end of the aura for Benjamin, signalling the advent of political forms of art. However, this
section showed us that this is not necessarily the case, as various forms of art are reproduced
differently, which can cause the aura to re-appear in the original, or even appear in a
reproduction. Therefore, the artistic event that Benjamin claimed happens in reproductive arts is
not as clear as he may have thought. Different kinds of reproductions mean that the aura may not
necessarily disappear as Benjamin had hoped. But how do these changes in aura affect the event
of blues music? We have discussed briefly that each blues performance has a non-original
equality, seemingly avoiding the original/reproduction distinction. However, there is more to
consider than merely the live performance. We have yet to discuss recorded material and the
aura. Despite Benjamin’s apparent lack of discussion on music, there are actually several
important texts on Benjamin and music that I will unpack in the following section. For the
purposes of this dissertation, I would like to now consider how mechanical reproduction has
affected music and what it means to blues music.

Benjamin and Music
Although not many authors have written on Benjamin and blues music, one essay that explores
the relation is Karl Coulthard’s “Looking for the Band: Walter Benjamin and the Mechanical
Reproduction of Jazz.” The parallels between that essay and my dissertation are significant and
need to be expanded upon. Coulthard explains that jazz in its earliest form existed only in the
“instant of performance” because of its constant variation and lack of written score.358 Jazz
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(much like the blues) had virtually no written form and thus could never be repeated exactly
prior to the phonograph; jazz was always dictated by its “spontaneity and improvisation.”359
Hence jazz could not be easily manually reproduced because of its transient nature. Coulthard
states that “since jazz could not be manually reproduced, once it was technically reproduced, the
music was even more profoundly alienated from its aura of originality than were most other art
forms, to the extent that one might question whether an ‘original’ jazz performance exists outside
the medium of mechanical reproduction.”360
Coulthard continues his argument by explaining that there are two kinds of reproduction
for Benjamin: manual reproduction, synonymous with forgery and technical reproduction, which
challenges notions of authenticity. Coulthard explains that jazz does not fit within Benjamin’s
reproduction categories. Coulthard divides art into two categories for Benjamin. The first is prereproduction art which includes paintings, architecture and sculptures. In these cases,
reproductions remove the aura as they take the originals out of their physical and temporal
setting. The second category includes art that is designed to be reproduced such as film or
photos.361 For Coulthard, jazz falls in between both of these categories because its history
includes a time prior to reproduction which would preclude it from falling solely within the
second category. Similar to jazz music, blues could also be included within Coulthard’s second
category.
To some extent I must disagree with Coulthard’s depiction of jazz and the position in
which he places it. Although blues and jazz were both played prior to being recorded, what we
know of both genres is limited almost exclusively to the recordings. There is no longer anyone
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alive who heard jazz or blues music prior to their recordings, thus our knowledge is very limited
in that sense. Although there are some written records of people playing this kind of music, we
cannot know with certainty many of the subtleties because of these limited records. Therefore,
our knowledge is shaped very much by the recorded history, which places it squarely within the
second category that Coulthard described. He even admits this is a significant issue in our
narrative of jazz.362 This marks a significant point in my dissertation, as it questions what we can
know about jazz or blues music outside of mechanical reproduction.
In Chapter 1, I had mentioned recordings of field hollers done in the 1930s. The
“authenticity” of these field hollers is unknown because of how far removed they are from their
origin during slavery. What we hear from the recordings are an approximation (albeit a close
one) to what they might have sounded like during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the
problem that arises is that we cannot know with any certainty how accurate they may be. Thus,
the “original” recordings are what we know of field hollers today. The same can be said about
jazz, blues music, and Coulthard’s statement that originality in these forms of music really does
not exist outside of mechanical reproduction. This leads to a gap between live and recorded
music. Part of what makes art ritualistic is a distance that creates the aura. Unrecorded jazz has
this quality because we do not have certainty in re-telling its story which leads to the possibility
of myth. Therefore, we have a split between the recorded and un-recorded history in jazz and in
blues music.
Coulthard references Michael Chanan’s theory of musica practica, which translates to
music by ear rather than by the book.363 Chanan’s claim is that music transmitted aurally can
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only span two to three generations before it changes significantly. Music by ear has a spatial
limitation based on the people who participate in the music directly. With the advent of the
phonograph, this spatial limitation disappeared as music could be distributed to a greater number
of people. Eventually, listeners of recorded music developed a conception of jazz music through
recordings which would influence live jazz performers. For example, in what were called “tone
tests,” female singers would imitate recorded songs, which led to changing their own sound,
making way for live performances to imitate recordings.364 The expectations of what a live
performance entailed were therefore shaped by the recordings. Recordings forced some
musicians to play more conservatively because all their mistakes could be heard. Thus, when
audiences heard such perfect recordings they began to expect the same during live performances,
leading some musicians to become frustrated.365 Rather than being allowed free reign with their
own music, musicians began to be typecast into certain styles which dissuaded them from
pursuing other unexplored avenues. New standards were set as recorded music would be the
performance by which all others would be compared.
In his piece “Benjamin on Art and Reproducibility: The Case of Music,” Rajeev Patke
makes the case that Benjamin’s theories on the difference between the film actor and stage actor
is analogous to recorded and live music. Recall that Benjamin explains the difference between
the film and the stage actor lies in the nature of performance. While the stage actor has the
privilege of performing for an audience to which he or she can react, the film actor performs only
for the camera.366 Once again, this also means the disappearance of the aura for the actor because
of the presence of the camera. While the stage actor can identify with the role they take on, the
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film actor arguably cannot do so to the same degree because of the fractured methods of filming
movies. The characters are pieced together with editing in films and the aura of the movie star is
thus created by the film industry. The main difference thus lies in the breaking up of a
performance and the fact that the producer and the audience do not share time and space. The
result is that artists try to re-create the natural live performance through fragmented scenes.
Patke explains that in music, “Natural performance-conditions are violated in order to produce
their semblance. Ironically, when ‘live’ performances are recorded, either with or without the
knowledge of the producer, the end-product often fails to match the finish of the sound in a
recording perfected under studio conditions. Artifice thus provides a better illusion of
actualization than natural performance, especially in the case of rock music.”367 This point can be
once again applied to cases of blues or jazz music, in which the recording may be broken up and
edited. Much like the actor, the musician has changed in the wake of recording technology.
Songs do not necessarily need to be recorded at one time and can be broken up to fit a ‘mold’
that is generally accepted as a type of song. Of course, this technology was not present during the
early days of music recordings, so Patke’s point relies on more modern recording techniques.
Nevertheless, recording technology certainly changed the relationship between the artist and
audience in both film and music.
Ken Ueno critiques the way we have given precedent to the recorded performance. Many
people now compare live performances to the recorded ones. This has happened in part because
how the general audience experience songs for the first time through recorded forms which
causes them to form an identity of the song through repetitious listening. The song becomes
known through its recorded version because audiences listen to songs repetitively and memorize
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them (almost) exactly. Any deviation from this recorded performance leads the audience to
question the authenticity of the new performance. Ueno believes that live performances still
provide what he considers to be more “authentic” versions of songs.368 He notes the limitation of
technological mediation on our ability to hear and listen to music. Blues cannot be considered in
a fixed manner as it was always meant to be created and re-created, which can only be done
properly in live events. Although Ueno’s effort to preserve the live aspects of music is
admirable, I believe that mechanically reproductive aspects of music have transformed music too
much for there to be any authenticity left in the live event. Even blues music has been altered in
many ways by the artists who have tried to re-produce sounds that they have learned from
recordings.
In one final critique of Benjamin, in his work “Reclaiming the Aura: B. B. King in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Ueno (a classically trained composer) discusses his
experience of B.B. King coming to lecture at Harvard, during which King explained how
different blues styles develop.369 For King, being a great blues musician has little to do with
technique, and more to do with style. Of course any musician must learn the basics of their craft,
but learning to play in a unique style is what distinguishes each artist. Ueno echoes this
sentiment when he explains that during King’s performance, there were two distinct solos that he
played. Both were done over a standard twelve bar blues backing track, but the second one was
when B.B. King decided to “turn it on” and to perform in his distinct style.370 The music
suddenly came alive and King expressed something by telling a story through his playing. Ueno
states “It was almost like in the first solo B.B. had been merely reciting text whereas in the
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second he was preaching a sermon.”371 This anecdote is reminiscent of the story that Clapton told
in his solo during the performance of “Have You Ever Loved a Woman” that was discussed in
Chapter 1.
Through this performance, King was able to do something that was not always possible
in classical music, display his personality through his playing. This performance leads Ueno to
proclaim that the aura has shifted from the composer in classical music to performer in modern
blues music. Whereas in classical music players were expected to “channel the composer’s
original intentions”, through a written score, in modern recorded music we are not bound by the
written score.372 As a further example Ueno cites the song “Wild Thing,” which has come to be
associated more with Jimi Hendrix from his famous performance at the 1967 Monterey Pop
Festival than with the original band that composed the song, The Troggs. In blues music we can
tell who the speaker or performer is by how they sing or play their instruments and not
necessarily by the notes that they play. The notes themselves do not tell the story, but rather how
they are played, whether through different bends, tones or distortions. It is the performer and his
or her performance that creates the aura in music. Thus, the aura is tied directly to the artist,
rather than the score. With the advent of recordings, different performances have been preserved
and changed the way we listen and experience music. Ueno states “Audio recordings preserve
and transmit bent notes on a guitar, B.B. King’s voice, the tone of the guitar, and all the special
sounds that classical notation fails to transmit.”373 Unlike Benjamin, who said that mechanical
reproduction destroyed the aura, Ueno believes recordings help preserve the aura and blues
music is a perfect example because of how it relies on particular bends and tones to differentiate

371

Ueno, 18.
Ueno, 19.
373
Ueno, 22.
372

153

each performer and performance. Therefore, according to Ueno, blues music has an aura that is
attached to its performer, even in its reproduced or recorded form. Classical music has always
stood by the hierarchy of the score over the performer, giving the aura to the score itself, rather
than its performance. This is not possible in blues music since blues has never been a matter of
notation. Each song is tied to certain performers, providing it with a unique set of qualities that
cannot be easily replicated.
Similar to Ueno, Bruce Baugh also takes the stance that we must consider music from a
player’s perspective, saying that if we only consider notation then we cannot tell the difference
between the playing of a song from one artist to another.374 As an example, he cites the song
“Spoonful” as he compares Hubert Sumlin’s version to the one by the band Cream. He states that
“Although the notes are the same, the results are entirely different, Sumlin’s being a competent
and fairly standard blues interpretation, Clapton’s a demolition of conventional expectations of
how the blues should be played.”375 Ueno’s ultimate point is that he wants to create a different
paradigm of listening to music. Unlike classical music, which traditionally has had one paradigm
of listening to each score and any drastic deviation would be unacceptable, blues music and other
forms of popular music offer many variations because of the attachment of each song to a
particular artist. This allows for a more democratic form of listening where we do not prioritize
the score over its method of being played.376 Listeners are not forced to listen to music in a single
manner, listening for an exact replication. Rather, blues music allows for much greater variation
that is driven by the individual performer and recognized as such by the audience.
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Turning briefly back to Patke, he would disagree with how Ueno frames the question. An
interesting point that Patke makes is that he considers music not to be an object, which makes it
essentially virtual. For Patke, copies or reproductions do not inherently diminish music in any
way, unlike visual mediums like paintings:
In the visual or plastic arts, the copy cannot bespeak or embody the unique
material history of the original, nor its rootedness in tradition, which contributes
to its authority and aura. In the case of music, the notion of a unique history
cannot really apply to the score or script as material object. Since music comes
into being in the time of performance, to give authority or authenticity to its
physical objectification would mean little more than fetishizing the score. Even
the event of recording (especially if it is in the studio), would not have the
authority of an original painting or piece of sculpture, since the production takes
place for the sake of reproduction.377
Therefore, in terms of recorded music saying a score can have an authority has no bearing.
Perhaps they did prior to recorded music, but now they have significantly less relevance since
music is recorded for the sake of reproduction, taking any authority away from written score.
Only when music is played does it come to fruition and only when is it recorded does it complete
its process. That is not to say all music is played purely for the sake of recording, but that in
order for it to be heard on a large scale, it needs to be recorded. If it is not recorded or written
down, then it becomes difficult to discuss it at all, other than through approximation.
We can conclude from these various essays that the aura has fundamentally changed with
the advent of recording technology. Although Benjamin claims mechanical reproduction
destroys the aura, it is not as clear in cases of music, specifically in jazz and blues music. Latour
and Lowe, as well and Barker were right in their analyses that the aura can in fact remain in
different forms of reproduction and that we must consider each form distinctly. Without the
reliance on a written score, the aura shifts to the played piece of music and becomes associated
377
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with the player. In the example provided by Ueno, B.B. King’s style of playing distinguishes him
from all other players, even if they happen to play the same song. That is because songs become
associated with the subtle differences that the players can produce, namely, the player’s ability to
bend and shift notes in their own unique styles. The recordings help preserve the auratic factor
by revealing to us the subtleties of each player and song. Without recording technology, we are
limited to what we hear in live performance, which as we learned becomes increasingly difficult
to recreate further from the time of the original performance.
However, in these cases we are also presented with the problem of originality and
authenticity. Our knowledge of blues music is almost strictly based on the recordings produced
in the twentieth century. Although we have some information about its origins, blues music’s
aural history can only be approximated prior to recording. Perhaps one of the most important
points Coulthard makes is that we should not patronize musicians for learning their respective
genres through recordings. Although the practice of learning music by listening to recordings is
now very common, many purists may have frowned upon learning from reproductions rather
than through live performances. This “new age” of recording artists is not composed of
musicians that merely reproduce or imitate the past; many have developed their own sound and
style by listening to recordings. Some musicians even claimed that the recording studio was a
liberating force in which musicians could experiment and make mistakes.378 We must ask
whether or not we should call modern blues musicians imitators or innovators. If what we know
of blues rests upon its recorded history, then we certainly cannot fault musicians for relying on
that history.
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The transition from originality and authenticity to our reliance on reproductions is one
that Benjamin seeks. Although he was wrong in saying the aura disappears with mechanical
reproduction, having it shift to the artist opens the way to a more accessible view of music, one
which is not defined by a single manner of listening or playing. Individual artists adopt and adapt
older forms of music and sometimes improve upon what they learned. Regardless of race or
class, blues music has always relied on the adoption of the past to create something new. In the
same way that we need to overcome the ideals that are associated with the statues of Robert E
Lee, we need to stop valorizing notions of purity in blues music. As we have seen in Chapter 1,
the mystification of certain kinds of music can be dangerous and creates a false sense of racial
purity. Rather than trying to attribute certain qualities to the music, we should let the music speak
through the recordings we have. Those songs still have a story to tell, even if it may not be the
exact same stories that were told during the nineteenth century.
If blues music (as we know it) is tied directly to mechanical reproduction and to the
played form (becoming associated with particular artists), how does this impact our views on it
as an artistic event? With respect to the micro and the macro scale, blues music in its reproduced
form has an impact on both of these levels. On a micro scale, by tying the aura to the musician,
we can hear individual nuances that become part of the song’s nature. Rather than considering
the song as a static entity, its nature shifts with the styles of individual artists. On a macro level,
these shifts become permanent and engrained in the cultural ethos with recording technology.
Although the song may go through particular changes, those changes become associated
permanently with the artist because of the possibility of constant repetition. The audience can
listen to same song infinitely, which forever associates certain patterns or styles with a particular
artist. Therefore, Benjamin was correct in saying that technological reproduction is the
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production of the new, but wrong in completely dismissing the aura. Although the aura can be
dangerous when it becomes associated with ideas of purity and authority over its viewers, it is
not necessarily negative in cases such as blues music. We learn from the particularities of each
performer, but that does not give the performer full authority over the song. Rather, each
performance becomes an important happening that establishes a new paradigm for that particular
song.
Recording technology has created the possibility of mass distribution, which can have
positive and negative effects. Although technological reproduction allows for the possibility of a
more accessible form of art, it also opens up the possibility of mass industry. Which begs the
question, at what point do we have to consider mechanical reproduction as part of the culture
industry and what are the consequences? Despite its seeming resilience to popular demands, any
form of music that is distributed to the masses has to be considered from the perspective of
industry, economics and marketing. On the surface, any mass distribution can be considered a
negative effect of industry, but we have seen that mechanical reproduction can change how we
listen to music. We will see that Adorno is skeptical of these changes to the music industry.

Adorno’s Culture Industry & Art’s Place in Society
I will begin this section of the chapter by examining Adorno’s view of what he and Horkheimer
call the culture industry. Adorno’s critique of jazz must be read within the purview of his views
on the culture industry as a whole. Adorno does more than simply judge the musical merits of
jazz music; he analyses jazz’s place within industry and why popular music such as jazz is
problematic. I will argue that Adorno’s critique extends more broadly than jazz music. For
Adorno, all forms of music that succumb to the culture industry should be considered in the same
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light as jazz. Blues music in particular shares several qualities with jazz which we could deduce
would be problematic in Adorno’s view. Therefore, his critique of the culture industry impacts
how he sees artistic events and how music such as jazz or the blues should be considered within
that industry.
The basic premise behind Adorno’s view of the culture industry is that popular culture is
a means to produce cheap products (whether tangible or intangible) and sell them to consumers,
with the goal of assimilating the population into one large consumerist mass. What makes the
culture industry ubiquitous is that it does not need to disguise itself as culture or art, because
companies or industries have so much power. Adorno explains “The truth that they are nothing
but business is used as an ideology to legitimize the trash they intentionally produce.”379
Companies use their status to promote products under the guise of necessity or luxury, but have
no need to hide their intentions of making astronomical profits. The culture industry is an
industry that is based solely on the creation of profit with no intention of creating culturally
important products. It is an ideological campaign designed to suppress the population into full
scale control. Everyone gets placed into categories that are designed by marketing campaigns
that manipulate the population into buying goods and services they do not need. This is the
ultimate goal of the liberal capitalist society, as it produces the myth that the products it makes
must be consumed and are vital to life. People believe that these goods are necessary in their
daily lives and lose focus of the larger social and political issues because they are distracted by
the constant goal of consumption.
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One of the characteristics of the culture industry is that it infects everything with
sameness. No matter what the product, the differences always remain at the surface-level only.380
For example, once the culture industry sees that a particular plot in a movie is popular, it is
repeated in other movies with slight variations. The same can be said for popular music in which
chord patterns are repeated in different songs, or when songs follow common musical patterns
meant to appeal to the general population. All of these forms of media rely on clichés that appeal
to a large audience in order to maximize their profits. The end goal is not to produce anything of
artistic merit, but simply to exploit the popularity of a particular formula until it is no longer
desirable for consumption. By adhering to a formula, the culture industry takes out the necessary
spontaneity for art to be great. The use of imagination is taken away, because artists already have
a formula with which they can work.381 All they need to do is plug in their minor changes to the
formula and the result is another product for the culture industry. All forms of risk are
eliminated, which devalues art. Art has never meant to be safe and generic, but rather an act by
the artist which ideally calls us forth towards social and political reality. Instead, we have
become accustomed to the representation of art and the idea that it is merely supposed to mirror
reality. This is all done under the guise of difference which further perpetuates the notion that
these films or songs are all unique. Everything in culture becomes a commodity that can be
easily substituted, revealing its fungibility. Despite the repetitious nature of the culture industry,
things remain in constant motion so that they never seem the same. We see this with new car
models, or products that update their software with very minimal modifications. Although there
are certainly some differences, the essential qualities of the products remain virtually the same.
Any superficial differences are there to promote the idea of “individuality” as a consumer. Each
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person seemingly has a choice between products to create their personal sense of individuality.
Even at different economic levels, there are superficial differences in products, meaning that all
individuals are forced to adhere to the rules of the culture industry. Thus, individual consumers
are identified within the culture industry and must conform to it.
This culture of sameness impacts every aspect of daily life. We see it in politics when
two seemingly opposing parties have similar goals of mobilizing the masses. The means to that
mobilization may be slightly different, but the goal of controlling the population remains the
same. Thus, in conjunction with the media, political leaders change the discourse in order to
make sure each individual becomes a good citizen. The population is forced to take sides in a
fight that they cannot win. This is why the culture industry is dangerous on so many levels.
When the aesthetic becomes politicized, we are at risk of becoming a fascist state in which we
are controlled by the image. In this state, art has no power because it becomes subsumed under
the umbrella of industry. This is reminiscent of the points made by Benjamin, who believes art
needs to be politicized. Otherwise, it stays in the hands of the few who perpetuate notions of
authenticity and force the population into a submissive role. When art becomes more accessible,
the population is less susceptible to these notions of authenticity because the narrative is no
longer dictated by those in power. For Benjamin, that is when the event of art occurs and
becomes political, rather than hierarchical. However, where there is mechanical reproduction,
there is also industry. How do we differentiate from the power to create accessibility from the
power of the culture industry?
Everything created is marketed as though it is unique and made solely for the individual.
The reality is that each individual is merely one of millions of consumers buying the same
product. There is a greater system at work that turns the whole population into consumers and
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workers. We are left with no space in which we are unaffected by the culture industry. If our
space for creativity is taken away and we are immersed in the culture industry, how can great art
even exist? Adorno states that great art is produced if the artist “adopted style as a rigor to set
against the chaotic expression of suffering, as a negative truth.”382 The suffering of the human
condition is meant to be brought out by the artist. His or her job is not merely to present their
own feelings, but to present the suffering inherent in society through the image. This is part of
the enigmatic quality of art for Adorno. Although art must present suffering through the image, it
must also be an autonomous entity, meaning that it cannot be influenced by forces such as the
church or the state. Great art cannot be done for the sake of artistic technique itself, but must be
done for socio-political reasons that present the possibility of another society. Art must be
autonomous and still be able to critique systematic structures in the process.
What is the content of the work of art if it is meant to be a social critique? For Adorno,
the content has never been the most important factor in art. He is interested in its formal aspects,
namely that art is a semblance, because it gives appearance to what does not exist in society.
Rather than mere representation, art acts as society’s double by showing the viewer what is
possible. The culture industry tries to present reality as a technological paradise, to which
Adorno responds “The more seriously art takes its opposition to existence the more it resembles
the seriousness of existence, its antithesis.”383 Art is an implicit negation of society because it
shows the viewer what society is not. Society is not creative or free, but rather in a state of
cultural depression, in which its citizens are being exploited through ideas of systematic work in
the name of social progress. Society represses individual subjects through totalitarian style
systemization of the mind and the body. We are forced to live a life that is dictated by outside
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forces, leaving us little space for creativity in the workplace or at home. Thus, to say the work of
art is an expression of the artist’s feeling is a misunderstanding of what great art should be. The
individual experience is secondary to the experience of the collective within a society. If there is
no expression of suffering, then the work of art is merely made for entertainment. Art is meant to
provide a starting point for critical theory and we must engage with art if we want it to make an
impact. Adorno does not offer a guide on how the human condition can change or if it is even
possible. Rather, he offers a radical alternative through art that is meant to provide a new basis
for critique. Whether this is effectively going to change things is never made completely evident.
Considering that individual agency is not at the forefront of the culture industry, it becomes
difficult to identify a clear direction that humans can take in order to escape corporate and
institutional control.
What we see is that Adorno places a great deal of emphasis on the potential of art as a
catalyst for change in society. Adorno believes there are only certain kinds of art that have the
potential to change society. If art is meant to be counter-cultural, then it must have substance,
which means it must be subversive to the culture industry. In order for art to be an event, it must
be a counter force to the culture industry and stand as its antithesis. Therefore, anything
constructed solely for the purposes of making money or for pure entertainment would not be
considered great art. This would seemingly place blues and jazz music in a perfect situation, as
they often deal with suffering and the exploitation of industry. We have seen in Chapter 1 that
blues music has often dealt with themes of repression and exploitation. At its core, blues music
was a non-notational form of music that challenged how music could be played. Similarly, jazz
music challenged these same traditional practices through improvisation. However this is not
how Adorno interprets these forms of music. As I will demonstrate below, in Adorno’s opinion,
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jazz music never accomplished the goal of overcoming the culture industry; rather, it was part of
the problem.

Adorno and the Case Against Jazz
Adorno’s dislike of jazz music has been well documented and in this section I would like
discuss some of his writings and the criticism he has faced. I believe that Adorno’s critique is not
against jazz as such, but musical forms that fail to break from the culture industry. This includes
jazz, but also many other similar forms such as the blues. Adorno critiques jazz specifically
because of its popularity during his time, but as we will see many of his broad critiques could be
said about blues music as well. Although most of this discussion will focus on jazz, we can infer
that some of these critiques extend well beyond jazz music. His non-inclusion of other forms of
music, should not imply that he does not see problems with them, but rather that they were
perhaps not as popular and thus were not of equal concern.
Adorno is well known for his love of different forms of classical or so-called “serious”
music. Theodore Gracyk states that many academics tend to favour classical music and jazz
often gets put under the rubric of “pop” music that is juxtaposed against “serious” classical
music.384 Gracyk explains that Adorno often paints jazz with a broad brush, saying that jazz and
classical music should not even be sold in the same place, because by doing so jazz reduces
classical music to its level.385 This unfair categorization of jazz is problematic as it misses many
of jazz’s intricacies. Robert Witkin notes that in comparison to Adorno’s writings on classical
music, there are virtually no thorough investigations and analyses of particular jazz pieces,
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rendering Adorno’s analysis on jazz superficial and anecdotal. As Witkin explains, Adorno
denies that jazz was a) improvised, b) good music, and c) had African origins.386 As we know,
blues music also had similar origins and was a non-notational form of music. Therefore,
Adorno’s critique of jazz is more of a critique against modern forms of popular music that did
not conform to classical formulas of composition. Adorno essentially sees jazz as a non-event,
because it fails to produce anything new or of significance, beyond what classical music already
accomplished.
Adorno’s most prominent piece on the topic (and one which many of his critics cite) is
his essay, “On Jazz.” Although there are many other instances in which Adorno critiques jazz
music, this was his best known work devoted exclusively to this topic. Witkin gives Adorno
credit for acknowledging that jazz was indeed a modern form of music, and that the only way to
understand Adorno’s critique is through his critique of the culture industry.387 Adorno even
admits that there are “good” jazz musicians, but calls their playing “good bad music.”388 What
makes jazz so harmful is that it is part of a false consciousness created by the culture industry.
Gracyk explains Adorno’s views, saying that despite jazz’s efforts to respond to social needs it
has done so only in conjunction with technological progress. He continues by saying “Progress
creates leisure time for the masses, but the emptiness of this free time must be masked by those
who are in control.”389 The industry creates products to fill this void as a means to further control
the population. I find this line of argumentation problematic as it implies that any music that
relies on technological advancements must be a product of the culture industry. This antitechnological stance is problematic to all forms of music, not just jazz. As I argued in the
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previous section, blues music in particular cannot be separated from the technological
advancements that have been made during the past century. Blues music’s non-notational form
was captured in a way that was previously impossible and consequently changed the entire idea
of the blues event. By negating all forms of technology, we often cannot experience the
individual nuances of the performer, unless we happen to experience the performance live.
Gracyk continues by explaining that Adorno sees jazz as an analogy to the culture
industry through its formal musical properties. Adorno believes that jazz’s simple and constant
beat is its defining property. By simplifying its beat, jazz appeals to the masses and covers up the
“boredom and angst of people’s purposeless existence.”390 Pop music in general, manipulates us
by keeping the population distracted from social issues. So rather than signalling to the people
the social inequalities that are pervasive in the capitalist system (something which supposedly
great music can do), jazz perpetuates the false consciousness that “delights in the process of
killing time, which is a substitute for confronting social reality.”391 Furthermore, jazz is not
capable of producing a dialectical process necessary for it to be considered a great art form. Just
like in society, in music there is a dialectical process where all the elements are connected and
can change one another. Witkin explains:
The dialectical process was of the essence of Adorno’s utopian vision of the
social and was, in his philosophy, the mark of everything liberational and
grounded in individual expression. The image of an unchanging, rigid, or
nondialectical structure made up of elements that are juxtaposed without
developing out of each other or elements that are simply repeated or are
homogenous was, for him, a vision of massification, of collective force, and of
everything authoritarian.392
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For Adorno, this was why jazz was so harmful, not just on a superficial level, but also on a
deeply social level. The absence of social commentary within jazz music is the driving force
behind Adorno’s criticism, but is far from his only critique. Knowing that jazz perpetuates the
culture industry and fails to be a critical force in art does not tell us much about the reason why
Adorno has these beliefs.
In terms of its formal aspects, jazz is known for its improvisational character wherein all
the musicians in a band play over a steady beat and each player has the freedom to pursue their
own unique style. This is an important quality it shares with blues music. The essence of
improvisation lies in the fact that there is no standard notation and the musicians have the
freedom to explore different ideas. An important aspect of blues music is the shift of the aura to
the individual performer because of their ability to improvise. However, Adorno is very critical
of jazz’s improvisational efforts and calls improvisation in jazz “standardized.”393 According to
Adorno, despite their efforts to improvise, jazz musicians actually use formulaic or pre-planned
pieces of music. Adorno sees parallels between jazz and the culture industry. Lewandowski
explains that for Adorno jazz expresses “a kind of false happiness or positive Utopia – a claim
about the possibilities for individual autonomy and happiness in the form of the ‘good life’ of the
democratic collective.”394 Individuals are deprived of negativity and suffering in the world when
listening to jazz. Jazz can be seen as an analogy to society in which we reward the people
(individual players in a band) by adapting to a collective (jazz band) and staying within the
prescribed limits. Jazz does not negate conventions and thus even in sequences that seem
improvised, the rules remain the same with little to no deviation.
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Adorno’s skepticism of improvisation lies in the fact that he does not think that jazz is a
non-notational form of music. In other words, even without a written score, it borrows heavily
from traditional pieces to the point where it reifies the old, while acting like it presents
something new. To put it into the context of this dissertation, jazz lacks the evental qualities of
the new, because it does not present anything new through improvisation, a point with which I
disagree entirely. Once again, this point extends to blues music as we have seen borrowing has
been an essential aspect of the blues. Adorno finds any notion of non-notational forms to be
problematic. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno is skeptical of non-notational forms of music that are
deemed to be non-reifications, saying that they still reify but do so of past performances.395 This
implies that despite jazz’s efforts to seem new through every performance, it actually falls short
because it reproduces past performances. Jazz pieces fall into a mode of constant repetition of the
same. This is contrary to serious music which remains socially important to Adorno and adapts
to social circumstances. According to Adorno, jazz music is merely a change of “ornamentation”
in which the beat and tone stay the same while the variations of other instruments only provide
superficial changes. Jazz is part of the larger problem of sameness in a culture that only pretends
to make changes, while actually remaining unchanged. Adorno explains that jazz is only
modifying that which already exists and has added nothing new since the tango and fox trot,396 a
statement which undoubtedly comes from a lack of knowledge on the matter. This is an
important instance in which Adorno emphasizes the new in the formation of an artistic event,
something which he believes does not occur in jazz.
This continued sameness in jazz is part of what makes it sellable as a commodity. Not
only has jazz become a commercialized form of music, but that is part of its inherent nature.
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Adorno explains, “The modern archaic stance of jazz is nothing other than its commodity
character.”397 In this instance, Adorno questions if we can truly point to any “primitive” past for
jazz, or whether this is simply part of the culture industry’s clever marketing of jazz as an “antibourgeois” form of music. Robert Switzer calls Adorno’s view on this matter elitist and racist,
claiming the Adorno has a Eurocentric distrust of primitive music.398 No doubt, Switzer believes
Adorno’s critique extends beyond jazz music, as the blues was also known to be a “primitive”
style. Adorno’s critique in this case focuses on simplicity as a negative aspect of jazz music.
However, having a simple beat that appeals to a broad audience does not negate the quality of a
particular form of music. Again, Adorno is unwilling to admit that there can be a variety of ways
in which music can be played.
Gracyk says there are several other critiques we can make against Adorno’s claims. The
first is that there is no music in existence that does not draw from history in some way or
another. Adorno’s claim that jazz remains the same and borrows from sources such as pop music
or previous jazz standards should not necessarily dismiss it as a serious form of music.399 This is
particularly important when we consider that technological reproduction has made music so
ubiquitous. Musicians now rely on reproduced musical forms to learn new techniques and
develop unique ones. However, claiming that jazz or any other form of music cannot develop the
new because it borrows from pop elements is problematic. As I argue, the shift in aura to the
individual has caused a new musical paradigm in blues music. Gracyk critiques Adorno’s claim
that all jazz music draws from traditional pop standards, such as the 32-measure songs that were
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popular at the time.400 In this instance Gracyk addresses Adorno’s claim against Louis
Armstrong, in which he said Armstrong played traditional pop music. To put jazz within such a
narrow parameter shows Adorno’s lack of understanding of the topic as he insisted on jazz’s pop
formula.
The second critique by Gracyk addresses listeners who may not be familiar with musical
theory or the intricacies of music. Gracyk believes it is unfair to expect listeners to know the
importance of “socially relevant” music if they do not know musical theory in the same detail as
Adorno. Presumably, to have social relevance, music must appeal on a conscious level to a
significant portion of the population, otherwise it will not make the impact Adorno seeks.
However, in order to be influenced by music in such a way we would need a musically educated
population, the likes of which we have never seen in the Western world. This point also seems to
counter Benjamin’s idea that technological reproduction can be a liberating force for the masses.
The artistic event of political praxis occurs only when the masses are included in the event.
Adorno wants an unprecedented level of musical knowledge to produce the artistic event. This
idea is not feasible and is divorced from any realistic expectations we can have of the general
public. Since the majority of the population does not have the same formal musical education as
Adorno, how can Adorno’s preferred music make such an impact upon the masses? Witkin
references Gracyk saying that Adorno believes jazz should be listened to in the same way as
classical music, an idea that Gracyk finds problematic.401 Jazz and classical are two distinct
forms of music with such varying qualities that it would be unfair to expect their listeners to have
the same kinds of responses. Moreover, audiences do not necessarily listen to music for the same
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reasons. By expecting the same types of responses while listening to jazz, or other contemporary
forms of music, as opposed to classical, we diminish both of their unique qualities.
The third critique addresses the historical changes in musical capabilities and taste.
Listening to music during one period in history will have a different impact upon listeners than
listening to it during another period. People do not necessarily identify with certain kinds of
music in the same way as they may have during other points in history. This is reminiscent of
what Heidegger says on the revelatory nature of art. Works can be relevant to certain cultures
and then irrelevant to others. History plays a crucial role in the development of artistic events, as
Heidegger illustrates his example of the temple that has a significant impact upon one population
but then perishes. Music shares this temporal quality and its relevance may decline or completely
perish from one culture, or one time to another. Similarly, Badiou’s theory of weak events
applies, as different forms of art produce events during different eras. For Badiou, events need
loyal subjects, and artistic events are no different. Abstract art may gain fidelity during the
modern age, but would not have gained the same loyalty during the high Renaissance period.
The fact that jazz has survived for such a significant amount of time implies that jazz must have
meaning to the modern period, otherwise jazz would have never been an event. Therefore, unlike
Adorno, who believes that jazz perpetuates sameness, Badiou believes jazz offers something
completely new. It has never been made clear whether Badiou thinks blues music has had the
same impact on music as jazz, however, a similar logic can be applied as blues music was and
continues to be a unique form of music with loyal followers. As we have seen, blues music has
similar roots to jazz and blues’ improvisational style has been a clear break from the written
forms of the past. Thus, it can be argued that blues music is responsible for the production of the
new, as much as jazz has been.
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Lastly, one of Adorno’s greatest concerns with jazz is his emphasis upon the written
score.402 Adorno believes audiences who merely listen to music miss important relationships
between notes that can only be seen by looking at the written score. Again, this refers back to the
second point in which we noted that a limited amount of people have such a specialized
knowledge. Therefore, even fewer people will be capable of appreciating music if they are
required to read the music. Although by this last point one may suspect that the “work” of music
is restricted to the written score that is not the case for Adorno. The work is a process of
performance that comes only through proper training and development. No single performance
constitutes the work of classical music, because of the development of better methods of
performance. Thus, the first performance or its written score does not necessarily constitute what
the work may be, leaving us wondering where the work lies.403 In contrast to Adorno, Gracyk
believes that jazz challenges the division between work and performance, saying the two
elements work together as one.404 Therefore, to propose that the work must take precedence over
the performance ignores just how jazz functions in practice. Importantly, blues functions in the
same way as jazz in this particular case. The work is created and re-created with each
performance, creating a new paradigm of musical creation that is not available to works with a
written score. This process of re-creation allows the performer to perform the new on a micro
scale with each performance.
Gracyk argues that because of the individuality of each work of jazz, each performance is
unique. Gracyk states that jazz is inherently a “performer’s art” meaning that it is grounded in
individual styles and capabilities. This is reminiscent of Ueno’s point in the previous section
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when he discusses the shift of the aura from the score to the performer. Jazz and blues are
dependent on the individual player and their unique interpretations. The individual particularities
of a performance are what distinguish each event. Adorno misses the importance of the
individual performer because of his stubbornness and refusal to take jazz seriously. Clearly jazz
and blues music are different than traditional classical music in terms of how they are performed.
Although Adorno does not use the language of aura, he puts an emphasis on the written score
and its place in music. It seems as though he refuses to consider how other forms of music can be
important instances of artistic creation of the new.
Gracyk is far from the only author to critique Adorno on these matters. In terms of the
idea of jazz being solely created for the culture industry, much like Gracyk, Witkin believes
Adorno underestimates the autonomy of jazz. He quotes Heinz Steinart who describes jazz as
“an event and a happening.”405 Steinart goes on to say that jazz “relies on incident and
contingency,” and is thus much more important than what Adorno is willing to admit.406 For
Steinart, jazz is not the repetitive and commercialized style that Adorno thinks it is, but an event
where things are created and explored. Furthermore, the culture industry does not create
innovative material; it uses existing material to control the population. Witkin explains that the
pop industry is “parasitic” by adopting raw material it does not create.407 The culture industry
takes whatever it needs to make money, including the talents and songs from various forms of
music. However, that does not mean that music such as jazz or the blues are themselves pop
music. This is where Witkin makes his most crucial point. Although jazz or blues may be part of
the culture industry, the music itself is not necessarily made for the sake of selling as a
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commodity. The culture industry adopts any material it needs in order to sustain itself, even if it
means appropriating forms of music that are not necessarily conducive to mass markets. The
culture industry uses formulas found in jazz to create more popular forms of music and once
those options are exhausted and the demand dwindles, they move on to find more material. The
culture industry’s intention is to transmit music to a mass audience that would otherwise only be
available to a small community, which increases its chances of selling its products to a larger
audience.
Witkin makes an interesting point when he says that mass marketing can have a positive
effect. By reaching millions of people, mass marketed art such as music can open the path for
new exploration by new artists. Thus, the event of mechanical reproduction is not the creation of
the culture industry. Even though the culture industry arose out of this new artistic paradigm, as
there was an opportunity to make money, this alone should not reduce all mass produced music
to the culture industry. Another author who agrees with Witkin and claims that Adorno
misunderstands pop culture (particularly music) is Bruce Baugh, who contends that the goal of
emancipatory art is to awaken dormant feelings of dissatisfaction which are masked by the
culture industry.408 Pop music can appeal directly to the masses rather than to the elite. This is
counter to Adorno who does not believe such a process is possible. Despite the often watered
down music that the culture industry sells, it can lead to greater exposure, which in turn produces
more musicians, which can lead to quality music being produced outside the industry.409 This
would otherwise not be possible if the music was only available to a small group. Therefore, to
say that mass sales are inherently bad ignores the subversive potential of future artists that are
exposed to the music with mass marketing. In this case it is very much a double-edged sword
408
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where on the one hand the culture industry appropriates a style that is not meant to be popular,
but on the other hand exposes many different groups to music they would otherwise have never
heard. In particular, white artists during the 1950s and 60s learning blues music and sharing their
own form of it could be seen as a positive change that led to greater exposure of blues music.
This transition does not represent a new appropriation of the culture industry, but a change in
audience not previously possible. There is no doubt there were some misguided attempts such as
the ones at the Newport Folk Festival when they tried to “revive” an old sound. However, for
the most part, the transition to new audiences was positive and kept blues music at the forefront
of culture.

Musical Shifts in the Culture Industry
The purpose of this section was to illustrate that Adorno’s view of jazz music is an important
part of his misunderstanding of popular culture. For Adorno, jazz or pop music failed to produce
individualized styles on a micro level and did not break from non-notational works on a macro
level. He never saw jazz as an important event, but rather a form of music that is complicit in
perpetuating the culture industry. We saw how many of his arguments extended beyond jazz
music to include other forms such as the blues. However, it is difficult to completely deny
Adorno’s stance on popular music, particularly in terms of standardization and its formulaic
qualities. Often times we see popular music repeat trends that other successful musicians have
had and the industry exploits these sounds until they are no longer popular. However, this idea
lies at the centre of our analysis of the event. At some point, there must have been some force of
change that altered the formula and shifted the trend; otherwise we would be talking about one
standard form of pop music, something which has never been the case. Unless we are willing to
say that The Beatles are no different than swing music, or that electronic musicians sound the
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same as any crooner from the 1950s, we must admit that there have been significant changes to
pop music during the twentieth century. Now perhaps there is room to say that pop music
differences often remain at a superficial level (e.g. its attempts to sell itself have never changed,
even if the sound has), but even that claim would diminish the efforts made by millions of artists.
Since the technological reproductive stage, music has been able to evolve more closely to the
needs and wants of individual demands and yes, even market demands. But should we take a
reductionist standpoint and say it has all been for the sake of money? Surely, within that history
there have been events that have changed the history of music for the better, even if the market
forces have re-used that sound to the nth degree.
Although Adorno does not see it as such, jazz music had had a tremendous impact on
musical history and should be considered along with any serious form of music. Even though he
never discussed it, we can infer that for Adorno blues music would have more than likely fallen
under the same category. But I believe that even more than jazz music, blues music resisted
popular demands. Unlike jazz, blues music was never really associated with popular music in the
early to mid twentieth century with the possible exception of vaudeville blues. The only time
blues was popular was after the shift to white musicians in the 1960s, but that could be
considered blues rock as much as pure blues. Yet, we can never completely deny the ties blues
music has to the culture industry. What we need to consider is the prominent role of economics
in popular forms of music, particularly for recorded music. The blues and almost all other forms
of popular recorded music are tied directly to market conditions. In nearly every case, there
needs to be an outside source to fund the recording, marketing and distribution of music. As
mentioned in the first chapter, one of the reasons blues music shifted towards a more basic form
during the 1930s was because of the cost. There simply was not enough money to fund large
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orchestras and song writers for the women of the blues. Instead, studios chose to pay one person
to write, sing, play, and record all the music. This change was vital to how audiences would
come to experience the blues. For anyone outside the rural African American communities in the
American South, the blues became synonymous with these musicians for practically an entire
generation. That length of time is long enough to change the perception of any form of artistic
creation, which can lead to the implementation of their techniques in new musical forms. For
whatever reason, the blues became standardized based on these early recordings. Perhaps people
felt more attached to this type of music because its personal elements could be conveyed better
than the vaudeville blues. Nevertheless, to ignore the economic and cultural aspects of the blues
would be a mistake and would do a great disservice to its complicated history. Although blues
and jazz have a history of resisting market demands, we must ask: At what point do these forms
of music associate or dissociate with the culture industry? As I have argued, since its
standardization blues music has been a musical form associated with technological reproduction,
but that is not to say it has been reduced to merely a commodity.
Without thinking of its place within industry as a form of mechanical reproduction, we
lose an integral part of blues history. What we have seen from Benjamin and Adorno is that to
consider art as an event requires us to think of how technology and industry change the artistic
event. In the case of blues music, we need to consider its history as well as its playing. The
unique aspects of the player need to be noted, and the means of doing so often comes from
reproduced works of art. We have moved away from the origins of blues as a type of music that
was passed down from one artist to another in person and are now at a point in time when this is
not the primary form of learning, listening, or playing music. Blues music for generations has
been changed because of mechanical reproduction and industry. We can hear the subtle
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variations over and over with the click of a button and then repeat it ourselves. We are not
limited to a particular time and place when we have all the recordings at our fingertips. This is
not a normative judgement about technology, but a statement on how we must consider an
artistic event. The event of listening to a song is not isolated to a single time and place, but
occurs over the course of decades, or centuries and around the globe. The temporal shaping of
blues music is shared by the audience, which can cross over boundaries of space, especially
when the blues is recorded. My views are shared by Julia Simon in that we participate in a
temporal event through recordings.410 Its listeners experience blues as present in the moment and
enduring. Blues music traverses both time and space in its reproduction, as it is repeated over and
over in the same manner.
A fundamental shift occurs when technology is introduced into the event. Technology
can split the event into an infinite set of possibilities. A song that was once played for an
audience as a singular event now occurs as an infinite playing. Its original playing has no effect
as such, because each playing is a unique playing. The event becomes bifurcated into an infinite
amount of playings. With each repetition we arrive at a unique event that was not possible prior
to mechanical reproduction. Thus, the same playing or event is infinitely divided through its replaying. In other words, the unique playing of a song that once occurred is now re-played
infinitely the same but with difference. The song can derive new meanings with each playing and
can be heard or interpreted in new ways based on the location, even if it is essentially the same
recording. Events are no longer bound by space and time; they are free because of their replayability.
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Conclusion
I began this dissertation with the question “Is blues music an event?” In an effort to answer this
question, I explored the history of blues music and the circumstances in which it developed. The
blues developed in the Deep South of the United States, influenced by slave music. However,
when the first blues song was performed is uncertain, due in large part to its unrecorded
aural/oral tradition. We do know, however, that early in the twentieth century an effort was made
to capitalize on its growing popularity. Blues songs began to be published and soon became
codified and standardized in a manner never previously seen. Once those standards were in
place, blues music could be identified much more easily. The blues is a humble form of music
that relies on simple rhythms and melodies, while often telling stories of poverty and hardship.
However, the ways in which those stories are told can be humorous and playful. Although these
themes are serious in nature, by playing them in a humorous manner, the blues attracted a
broader audience. With the advent of mechanically reproduced music, those themes could reach
the general population, and soon the demographics shifted from a primarily African American
audience to one that was more racially diverse. The combination of changing demographics and
mechanical reproduction changed blues music significantly.
From this historical analysis, I develop a thesis that divides blues music into two
categories: the micro and the macro. The way in which the blues is played is reflective of the
historical situation from whence it came; therefore, our understanding of blues music is
dependent upon both of these categories. By exploring the theories of Deleuze and Badiou, I
found two distinct approaches to the question of the event. On the one hand, Deleuze’s
perspective is essential to understanding how blues music can be understood on a micro level.
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The small variations in blues music, particularly in its played form, are what set individual
performers apart. Furthermore, blues music has the “blue” note that alters the path of a scale and,
consequently, of many blues songs. For Deleuze, these notes present sudden shifts that affect the
sound of a song and can change the mood abruptly. These are the types of micro events unique to
blues music that can still have profound effects. The tension that certain notes create affects the
listener and they are an important part of the dynamic shifts we find in blues music.
On the other hand, Badiou’s theory is much more focused on large scale events that
create a rupture in being. For Badiou, events are unpredictable and fundamentally alter our view
of the world. However, events happen retrospectively because of fidelity from subjects.
Although events for Badiou are rare, he considered jazz music to be an event because of its
unique style. Blues music is similar in this regard because of its complete break from the status
quo. Perhaps blues music is not as widely recognized as jazz, but its impact upon music is
equally noteworthy. The common theme found in the works of these thinkers is that the event is
the production of the new. Although Deleuze and Badiou disagreed on the ways in which the
new manifests itself, I believe that the blues event cannot be discussed without both of these
thinkers. The unique style of blues music is reflective of the circumstances from which it arose
and thus the event happens on both the micro and macro forms.
Once we established that the blues is an event, I thought it would be beneficial to explore
Heidegger’s theory of the artistic event. Heidegger’s theory of the event accounts for the cultural
happening of work of art. The way being reveals itself depends upon the works of art that are
relevant in a historical circumstance. Many blues songs are examples of such cultural
happenings. We have seen the ways in which blues songs can reveal the situation of the
performer, for example, the poverty of African Americans in the South or the depression of
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artists such as Eric Clapton. In many cases, blues is a method of revealing the being of a
situation. However, Heidegger’s theory lacks any substantial discussion of technologically
reproduced works. Art is meant to reveal being and if it does not do so, then its relevance has
perished. That said, I have yet to discuss the demise or end of blues music in any way. Has the
blues event perished or do we continue to live within its cultural sphere? What are the impacts of
mechanical reproduction in considering this question? While we can understand how works of
art perish when they are singular entities, it is more difficult to make that argument when the
work is split infinitely by mechanical reproduction. In any event, whether artistic or not, we must
consider points of origin and demise. There was no clear beginning to blues music and it would
be difficult to argue that blues music has no relevance. Francis Davis notes that blues music was
never more popular than in the 1990s.411 Davis claims that we cannot say that the blues is dead
because we continue to stretch the definition of the blues.412 Blues musicians today continue to
push the boundaries of blues music, including fusing it with different styles. Artists such as The
White Stripes proved that the blues can even be fused with punk rock.
The infinite split of the mechanically reproduced piece of music must have an impact on
the event. Blues music was once so reliant on the presence of an audience because as an
improvised and non-notational style of music, it needed to be heard. However, when we
introduce technology, we cannot discuss the event in the same manner, as there are infinite
possible events, produced across different regions and timelines. I think that is the very essence
of mechanical reproduction, insofar as it can reproduce the event and continually reproduce the
new. That is why Adorno was unfair in his critique of the culture industry and the potential it has
for creating the new. Although we may see commercialization and production of the same type
411
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of genre, we cannot underestimate the powerful nature of the mechanically reproduced work to
reproduce a new event. Music can be heard and re-heard with no spatial or temporal limitations.
Furthermore, blues music has the unique feature of having an aura that is tied to the performer,
rendering the work unique, but also reproducible. Although I may hear a song that has been
recorded several times, it is the ability of the artist to create something unique which makes blues
an important case. The performer channels the history of the song into their own performance.
This history is passed down to audiences with the potential of creating new musicians, a process
made possible with the advent of mechanical reproduction.
I believe that an event needs to be a point of change. The amount of time that an event
needs to develop or occur is indeterminate. There is no definitive answer to what constitutes an
event or on what scale it needs to occur. I certainly do not think that they are as rare as Badiou
would have us believe, but I also do not think that simply any occurrence can be called an event.
Therefore, to say that blues music is an event does not necessarily classify it as a large or a small
event, but rather it is part of both scales in different ways. It is an interruption in many ways to
the musical status quo and how we think of music in its non-notational form, as well as a cultural
happening that is meant to reveal something about the artists who perform it. Furthermore, the
notes it delivers are revealing of the particularities of the performer, as they illustrate the subtle
ways in which notes can bend or shift. Even at the smallest level, blues music continues to affect
us by producing and re-producing the event.
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